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7Introduction
Vincenzo Zezza
Italian Ministry of Economic Development
dg for Industrial Policy and Competitiveness
This work comes from the worthwhile initiative from Andrea Stoc-
chetti and Francesco Zirpoli, that, willing to commemorate the mas-
tership of Bepi Volpato, in the autumn of 2012 collected, in the won-
derful background of the Ca’ Foscari University in Venice, a pool 
of scholars and researchers, all devoted since several years to the 
automotive industry analysis, under different perspectives. This panel, 
that probably considered it also a moral obligation due to the same 
Volpato lesson, kindly invited myself, as a practitioner in the area of 
industrial policy for the automotive sector, in order to try to stimulate 
their discussion.
I kept very proudly since the first moment the chance to collect a lot 
of insights and new ideas for my work, and moreover a lot of reflections, 
questions and answers came to me from the reading of all the chapters 
of this book.
The main questions that arose since the first meeting were all around 
the sometimes clear, sometimes less clear, consciousness that we are 
affording a phase that is surely of crisis for the automotive sector, but, 
as always in the case of a «transitional» phase, a phase of great oppor-
tunities.
All the doubts were posing indeed questions like:
 - Are we experiencing the automotive sunset, both like a reference 
product and a reference industry, for an advanced economy? And, if 
the answer would be positive, how to explain the rapid growth of the 
product and the industry in the fast growing economies like China, 
India, Russia, Turkey, etc.?
 - How is the «mobility model» evolving, with reference for example to 
«individual, or personal, vehicles», and new public transport modes 
(i.e. car sharing, company cars, etc.), and which is the role of tradi-
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tional drivers for the sector like the «driving pleasure», the «freedom 
feeling» or the «social status» represented by luxury cars?
 - Are those technologies like for instance electrification (on the prod-
uct side), or process flexibility by automation (on the manufacturing 
side), or ict and «virtualization» (on the design side), representing 
an «evolution» or a «revolution» path? And if the answer goes for 
the latter, why are they exploiting right now, ten or twenty years later 
their first appearing?
 - How are the manufacturing technologies, or those applied to the new 
product development process (npd), impacting on work organization 
inside the car maker (oem), between it and its suppliers, or even in 
the framework of the global capital markets?
Only to summarize the most of them…
After having read the different papers it comes to me the reflection 
that the automotive crisis in the years 2008-2009, that took place at the 
global level but specially for the countries were a stronger and long-
standing tradition in the car making was in place (Europe, usa, Japan) 
went overlapping afterwards, in those three economies, on three very 
different phenomena, roughly:
 - a general rethinking of the development path in the usa, where the 
Obama administration gave a clear steer toward manufacturing, from 
the previous «mantra» of dematerialization and development of the 
service sector (a refocusing that in Europe has decisively been adopt-
ed also from the uk);
 - a «systemic» crisis in Japan, strongly related to the China growth, and 
seriously impacted by the terrific tsunami of 2011;
 - the up to now useless effort of Europe to harmonise its very different 
economies in terms of models and performances.
As one can deduce from the fact that those considerations are at the 
same time suitable for the automotive sector as well as for the economy 
as a whole, two main conclusions can at least be sketched out:
 - the first one is that the automotive production and market still repre-
sent, on the global scenario, one of the most important, if not «the» 
most important, indicator of the «real economy» trend;
 - the second is that the combined effect of globalization and technology 
innovation has since a four to five years reached the top of the «in-
dustrial production pyramid», i.e. the car, that is indeed the industrial 
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production iconic product, so bringing us in a phase of radical changes 
as well as in terms of consumption attitudes (the sustainable mobility), 
technologies (electrification, fuel cells, natural gas, etc.), industry 
global structure (new Asian or South America entrants, merger and 
acquisitions, etc.).
Therefore it seems as the present situation shows a series of analogies 
with that of a century ago, when the car was barely appearing on the 
world scene. This make very complex and tricky the task for the policy 
maker, that, as a good theory and practice, should avoid to intervene 
in those situations characterized by high «uncertainty» (lack of data, 
or conflicting information) and «ambiguity» (signals with multiple and 
different interpretations).
On the other side it is true as well that in those situation it is especially 
needed from the business sector any kind of address or orientation from 
the policy side, in order to settle out a more clear development path and 
to ignite with a stronger emphasis a growth dynamic.
Therefore it is worthwhile to mention that in those situation the typi-
cal policy measure that is largely spreading, and universally accepted, 
is that of establishing some form of public-private «fora» from time 
to time called «industrial (or technology) platforms», «public-private-
partnership», «joint technology initiatives», «high-level-groups» and so 
on (like those for instance launched by the European Commission), or 
«Councils», or even «Circles» (e.g. the Automotive Council in the uk), 
where to let «germinate» from the discussion between all the stakehold-
ers, adequately guided and coordinated, those needed indications.
Looking at the Italian case, the above mentioned considerations take 
an even more net shape (as well outlined by Enrietti and Calabrese): a 
car market that steadily grew at a good pace for almost forty years, even 
if with some episodic falls, from time to time sustained by mean of public 
subsidies,1 that induced a mobility model dominated by individual pri-
vate cars (Italy has one of the highest motorization rate in the world, as 
well as one of the oldest fleet in Europe and one of the smallest company 
cars fleet in Europe), but also a car market that felt by 48% in the last 
five years period (but without a sensible effect on the motorization rate!), 
igniting a production fall of 56% in the same period, also because the 
1. A brief reference can be found in the chapter elaborated by Bubbico, with the sole 
omission of the last one, the scrapping incentives scheme launched in the years 2009-2010, 
coordinated with those launched almost all over Europe, and that summed up to almost one 
billion euro of Italian taxpayer money.
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same production substantially rely on one single car maker (sole case 
in Europe), but by apparent paradox maintaining almost unaffected the 
parts and components industry, that diverted up to 50% of its produc-
tion to export. Even if, as the work of Enrietti and Calabrese shows, a 
concentrating trend between the suppliers arose.
The valuable papers of this book can then help in understanding how 
and why Italy seems to represent, once more, an effective living labora-
tory, for testing, verifying and validate some trend that are actually in 
place on the global scale.
For those reasons, the considerations and problems elicited from the 
present work can became a valid reference for someone with the aim to 
support the policy making process, specially in the view of the forthcom-
ing «Italian Automotive Council», that has already been announced and 
should be putted in place in the next months.
One should indeed reflect on the impact over the Italian automo-
tive industry (oems and suppliers), its business processes, and its new 
product development processes, as described by Trombini and Zirpoli, 
coming from the trend in product platform standardization (e.g. between 
the ones of Fiat and Chrysler), or on the effect of the stretching of one 
car model life-cycle, after a longstanding period of further and further 
reduction, on the market behaviour.
Those trends of course realign the relationship between the sole Ital-
ian oem (that is experiencing a steep drop in production at its Italian 
plants) and the supply chain operating on the same territory (that, on 
the contrary, is relying more and more on export markets). Where this 
realignment seems to act especially on the usual «know-how» flows. 
Indeed this relationship once acted, at least in some areas of the country 
(Piedmont, following Pirone), like those of an actual industrial district, 
where two critical knots were represented by the Fiat Research Center 
and by Elasys, and it is no coincidence that those were at the same time 
the largest and best performing private research centres, respectively 
in the North and in the South of Italy. But again Pirone as well as Bub-
bico remember us another Italian paradox, represented by the fact that 
the car making process is by the time based almost exclusively in the 
centre-south of Italy plants, while instead the supply chain production 
is mainly based in the centre-north, from which it serve the foreign 
markets. A kind of geographical distribution that if in the past was also 
supported by the strong relationship between the southern plants with 
local research institutions (the Iveco’s and Getrag’s ones in Puglia, with 
Politecnico di Bari and Fiat Research Center in the same city; the Fiat 
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plant in Pomigliano with Elasys or the National Research Council - cnr 
Institute for combustion engines in Napoli), seems today to have weaker 
roots. But it has to be said, as a proof of the fluid phase in which we live, 
that some evidence of opposite trends is rising up: like the synergies 
between a former newcomer supplier like Adler, and the local cnr led 
technological district for new materials (Imast), that allowed the former 
to reach a degree of technological excellence on carbon fibre working; 
or in Abruzzo region, the involvement of Fiat and Honda (motorcycle) 
plant in the establishment of an «automotive campus» for research and 
training.
In this scenario some hints for possible change path can be briefly 
outlined, as, for instance:
 - the Fiat decision of investing in some assembling plants in the north 
of Italy, like that of Grugliasco (Torino) and the one lastly announced 
in Mirafiori (Torino);
 - the above mentioned case of Adler, were a supplier evolve toward 
a higher technological level (as described by Pirone), and decide to 
invest in an advanced production plant in Campania (south) to manu-
facture a hi-tech component (the carbon fibre body) for a car that is 
assembled in a plant located in the north (Modena).
Finally it come back to me the experience of the Industria 2015 
Programme (an industrial innovation public funding policy program, 
launched in 2008 on five areas, one of which was that of innovative 
solutions for sustainable mobility, with an endowment of around 200 
M€) that succeeded in letting come out the connections, in terms of 
know-how, between the most important oem (not only car makers, but 
also bus, commercial vehicles, offroad vehicles producers) and their 
most innovative suppliers. Even if those innovation projects afforded 
some administrative troubles that in some cases vanished the effort of 
reaching tangible results.
That concept of explicating the know-how relations between oem and 
its suppliers as a task for the industrial policy, is the one that Pirone 
recalls, when he describes the process of mutual learning between the 
twos and specially when he emphasizes the critical aspect of responsibil-
ity over innovation. Only as a hint it seems important to me to underline 
that indeed the cited Industria 2015 Programme was based on two criti-
cal points: the realization of an iconic product (the totem) that should 
have embody all the innovations distributed along its «Bill of Materials» 
under the responsibility of any supplier hierarchically organised.
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All the problems that the «modularity» approach seems to bring with, 
furthermore, suggest to us that the oem dealing with this approach 
needs a higher control degree over its suppliers, and specially over the 
knowledge flows inside and outside its supply chain, but this need barely 
fits with the corresponding need of managing procurements for common 
platforms on the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean.
The same global trend toward the standardization of product plat-
forms, indeed, finds very different behaviours in the industry, as a proof 
of concept of the «fluidic» phase which we are dealing with, if one con-
sider for instance the brand proliferation in Volkswagen, as opposite 
with their shortening in Fiat, or the same Fiat strategic decision to as-
sign to the Italian plants the mission of representing the «luxury pole» 
in the company framework.
Here the work of Cabigiosu, even if centred on the electric motoriza-
tion, offers us a proof of how the product architecture reflects on the 
supply chain architecture, and its organisation processes, leading us 
again to that «uncertainty and ambiguity» with reference to the product 
itself, that we can bring back to the organisation model, emphasizing 
the need, in the actual phase, for institutional bodies where trying to 
elicit the best models and practices to deal with that uncertainty, like 
the cited «platforms» or «councils».
It is worthwhile to mention under this respect that the «new entrants», 
like those from the Asian countries, seem to better deal with their prod-
ucts and supply chain management models, under the paradigm of mod-
ularization.
The said core problem of the oem control over the supply chain is 
then extended by Buzzavo, from the know how flows across the design 
and manufacturing suppliers, to that of the involvement of the dealers 
network. And another one should be added that is that of the car mak-
ers financial branches, as the usa industry restructuring process teach.
And at this point I’d like to cite a personal experience, when I was 
involved at the reengineering of the Fiat npd process. Indeed working 
on the early npd process phases, we thought of involving the main deal-
ers by asking them for which contribute they could offer to the process. 
I was a little bit astonished from the fact that they were really happy 
for this involvement, that surprisingly had never been tried before, but 
when we asked for their projection over the next 4 to 5 years, they said 
that they barely could have predicted the next six months market, and 
with a really pour confidence over a one year timeline. No chances of 
assuming by them any responsibility over a longer period, as the car 
design process claims to the car maker.
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But if the uncertainty and ambiguity over the future is the typical 
situation at the present time, it is as well as true that new technologies 
applied to the design process, virtual prototyping, and the high flexibility 
degree reached by the manufacturing process, thanks to automation, 
could actually give today to the dealers a more proactive role.
It is also by looking at those aspects that a «Council» could represent 
in Italy a fundamental tool to settle up some kind of «code of conduct» 
and fundamental governance models, also in the marketing and financial 
areas.
The present turbulence on the manufacturing side finds its counter-
part on the consumption behaviours in the work of Stocchetti, from 
which it seems to come out, on the one hand, the trend toward «personal 
vehicles», and on the other hand the growing reliance on mass public 
transport, with a «niche» for satisfying the usual «driving pleasure» or 
«freedom feeling» that come from cars.
Here the case of the city of London seems to me emblematic. Indeed 
the uk and London severe policy against traffic congestion (with the 
declared aim of making of London a better place where to live, and 
«to attract» there more citizens! as I could personally ear from recent 
meeting with local authorities) did not result in a car market depres-
sion, but on the contrary were followed by a growing market (the only 
case in Europe) and a substantial development of car assembling, with 
a strong export share.
And another important consideration relies in the growing interest 
of car makers and traditional mobility operators over the car-sharing 
business model, as the recent acquisition of Zipcar from Avis (as report-
ed by Garibaldo), or the «Car2go» initiative by Daimler, or the same 
Italian network of such services, largely based on Fiat cars, seems to 
confirm.
And if it is true that at the last Car Shows in Europe, the «personal 
vehicles» seemed to represent the only real news, one should also reflect 
on the not so performing experiences of the Smart by Mercedes, or the 
c1 by bmw, or even Segway. Not to mention the fact that the year by year 
growing markets of the emerging countries shows dynamics very close 
to those of the western economies in the past decades.
Again the role for a place like a Council, where to share and coordinate 
trends and paths, becomes crucial, as Finotto explains, even when the 
solution is found on the ground of new entrepreneurship. For instance 
in the case of new ventures based on new electrification technologies, 
Finotto reflects on the real case of Pagani, where it is clear the impor-
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tance of a «traditional» «connective tissue» for the emerging of the new 
business. And that real case brings to me some critical question about a 
similar recent case, but failed, that regarded another historical Italian 
brand, De Tomaso, whom revamping was projected over a new manufac-
turing technology, quite similar to that of Pagani, and on the interven-
tion of some public policies. The similarities are indeed several, if one 
reflects over the circumstance that the technology at the ground of the 
Pagani project had been developed in Lamborghini in the framework of 
a publicly funded project, and perhaps for that reason considered from 
the company not so strategic to be developed, as Pagani did by himself. 
So that one could even consider Pagani as a spin-off favoured by public 
industrial/research policy.
At the end the role of a Council should be indeed that of creating op-
portunities for pursuing technological and organisational trials, in order 
to shed some light over the uncertainty fogs of the present.
And Garibaldo again reminds over the circumstance that any revolv-
ing in the sector should be the output of a «collective» process. With 
which in mind I’d like to recall the objectives of some recent industrial 
policy initiatives, like the establishment of a «Network Contract» (es-
pecially between smes), the realization of prototypes (demonstrators) 
under the cited Industria 2015 Programme, or the establishment of the 
Istituti Tecnici Superiori (its – technical schools of tertiary degree) aimed 
at the valorisation of the longstanding tradition of technical know-how 
developed in the Italian industrial districts.
And most of those policy measures come back also in the work of 
Pirone, where he refers to the «enterprise network» or point at the 
critical issue over the responsibility for innovations in the supply chain.
The importance for a Council finally comes also from the work of Cala-
brese, from which for instance a reflection arise when it is mentioned 
the «shock» produced in the French industry, and public opinion, by 
the somewhat failing of the public policies focused on car electrifica-
tion. And as a direct actor I can also debate on the very poor appeal of 
a recent policy measure in Italy, aimed at promoting the substitution of 
old vehicles used for work purposes by smes, craftsmen, taxis etc. with 
low emission vehicles (bec veicoli a Basse Emissioni Complessive).
The British policies at the end seem instead to be the ones that have 
reached the best results. And from some recent personal contacts with 
the uk authorities, the activities pursued under the Council umbrella 
are going in the direction of attracting new suppliers to produce inside 
the uk throw:
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 - the establishment of a sectorial research centre for the whole supply 
chain (a role that up to few years ago was played in Italy by the Fiat 
Research Center / Elasys);
 - the launching of an agency for attracting investments in the country 
by foreign suppliers.
The key seems to be that of a stronger and deeper cooperation be-
tween the private sector (oems), public administrations (Department of 
Business Innovation and Skills), and public-private partnership like the 
Technology Strategy Board.
If Italy will apply and customise this strategy it could better play a role 
also in the European bodies framework, were, as Calabrese reminds us, 
a stronger work has to be done in order to better harmonise different 
policies aiming at industry, research, work, welfare, health, environment, 
climate, only to cite those more close to the automotive industry interest.
Those final considerations moreover would suggest to be more cau-
tious asking, as Bubbico or Garibaldo does, urgent national industrial 
policies for the sector, and complaining the lacking of coordination for 
the policies at the local level.
It is worthwhile to mention indeed that most of the local policies 
cited in those works actually descend from national policies like those 
elaborated inside the Accordi di programma (Programme Agreement), 
national guidelines or Governmental Agencies, as well as some direct 
industrial policies were in place in the last years, as from some of the 
examples cited above.
The actual problem seems to me the one of agreeing on those poli-
cies at the different national and local level, and moreover between all 
the involved stakeholders, before than between the political parties, in 
order to really put them in place, to pursue the same policies over the 
years, and to really measure and assess their effects. Not to mention the 
importance to have a place that can act as a link between the public and 
the private sector, as well as between the oems and the suppliers, and 
between the European, the national and the local policy level.
For those reasons I believe that an Italian Autmotive Council could 
be the answer. 

Part 1
Perspectives on firms’ strategy and organization 
in the global automotive industry
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Innovation processes in the car industry:  
New challenges for management and research
Giulia Trombini and Francesco Zirpoli
abstract Over the past decades the development of a car has become a com-
plex activity involving skills and resources from a variety of industries and actors, 
and requiring the accomplishment of tight regulatory norms and market needs. 
Technological and market forces have led incumbent firms to radically change 
the organization of their innovative activities, shifting from a closed vertically 
innovation model to a distributed one. The aim of this study is to review the main 
challenges carmakers are currently facing and the organizational and strategic 
solutions adopted to perform innovative and development activities within verti-
cally fragmented networks. The chapter casts light on the organizational and 
strategic challenges of downstream development activities, then it also tries to 
overview the strategic role of up-front research activities, namely the research 
activities leading to patenting. The main changes brought by the distributed in-
novation model on new product development activities are discussed, focusing 
on the principles guiding outsourcing decisions and the governance mechanisms 
carmakers use to manage networks of external suppliers. The study, then, re-
views the role of patenting in the industry as a means for carmakers to appropri-
ate value from innovation in vertically fragmented networks. Finally, it discusses 
the changes on the organization of innovation activities that the emergence of 
the electric car-standard may imply for carmakers’ innovation strategy.
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the development of a car has become a com-
plex activity requiring skills and resources from a wide variety of actors 
and industries. Due to the enlargement of the car’s technological com-
ponents (e.g. electronics components) and the rise of new technologi-
cal trajectories (e.g. the «electrification» trend), carmakers have been 
increasingly needing to master a wide variety of technological fields in 
order to stay at the forefront of technological developments (Maxton, 
Wormald 2004). Moreover, market pressures and tight competition have 
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pushed carmakers to speed up their product development process while 
constantly reducing costs and improve quality (Clark, Fujimoto 1991). 
In order to respond to such twofold (technological and market) chal-
lenge, carmakers have revolutionized their product development pro-
cess. In the first place, they have changed the new product development 
organization. Starting from the beginning of the 1990s, they implement-
ed solutions such as (1) the heavyweight project manager (Wheelwright, 
Clark 1992), emphasizing the role of the project leader in integrating 
knowledge and development efforts within teams, (2) multi-project man-
agement tools, for reaping the benefit of sharing components across 
projects (Cusumano, Nobeoka, 1992), and (3) the integrated develop-
ment of product families, in order to reap economies of scope and scale 
by leveraging common product platforms (Meyer, Utterback 1993). As a 
consequence, from an organizational point of view, new managerial roles 
diffused such as the product manager, platform and program managers 
(Clark, Fujimoto 1991).
In the second place, carmakers started establishing a large number of 
external ties with suppliers. Such move not only allowed carmakers to 
quickly access specialized knowledge, thus facing technological novelty 
and uncertainty, but also contributed to reduce the development time 
and costs of new product development activities (Clark 1989; Cusumano, 
Takeishi 1991; Nishiguchi 1994). The central role of external sources 
of innovation contributed to complicate integration and coordination 
problems in new product development process. The most common so-
lution to address such problems was the use of guest engineering and 
new product development teams that involved also suppliers’ engineers 
(Nishiguchi 1994). 
On the whole, technological and market pressures have made the 
process of developing a new car an extremely complex organizational 
task. Thousands of different parts, often developed and manufactured by 
suppliers, have to be integrated into a product that must be both highly 
reliable, e.g. complying with strict regulations, and performing, e.g. 
matching sophisticated customers’ expectations. In this respect, market 
segmentation and customers’ preference volatility have made invest-
ments in new product development very risky: time to market reduction, 
quality improvements and cost cutting have become key variables for 
reducing the sunk costs related to launching a product that once on the 
market may not be well accepted by customers.
In light of the rising product development complexity, the aim of this 
chapter is to provide an overview of the current challenges that carmak-
ers face, taking both the carmakers as well as the broader industry level 
(i.e. suppliers’ networks) as units of analysis. The aim is to describe the 
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organizational solutions adopted by carmakers to carry out both upfront 
research as well as new product development activity and to understand 
their link. The chapter, unlike the usual take on innovation processes 
in the automotive industry, not only casts light on the organizational 
and strategic challenges of downstream development activities (i.e. the 
development process of new car models), but also tries to overview the 
strategic role of up-front research activities (i.e. the research activities 
leading to patenting). These ones, with few exceptions (Antonelli, Calde-
rini 2008) have not been investigated in the literature. This leaves a gap 
in our understanding of the contribution of up-front research activity in 
explaining carmakers’ innovative performance.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we highlight the major chal-
lenges carmakers face in adopting a distributed innovation model. Spe-
cifically, as far as new product development activities are concerned, we 
focus on integration and coordination problems with external sources of 
innovation and the related organizational solutions oems adopt in order 
to benefit from division of labour while minimizing the risks of decay in 
technological competences and architectural knowledge. Then we shift 
our focus to the role of upfront research leading to patenting and review 
the role of patenting in the industry as a means to appropriate returns 
from innovation in fragmented vertical networks. Finally, the study re-
views the potential impact on the organization of innovative activities 
that the «electrification» of the car may cause. The chapter concludes 
by drawing the managerial implications emerged from the analysis and 
highlighting avenues for future research. 
2 Organizational challenges
2.1 Division of labour within the industry value chain 
As mentioned in the introduction, the car is a multi-technology prod-
uct, namely an artefact made up of components that embody a number 
of technologies. Components are distinct portions of the product that 
perform specific functions and are linked to each other through a set of 
interfaces defined by the product architecture (Brusoni, Prencipe, Pavitt 
2001). In the past decades, the range of disciplines relevant to the design, 
development and manufacturing of a car has largely expanded in both 
breadth – the number of relevant fields – and depth – their specialization 
and sophistication (Wang, von Tunzelmann 2000). Given the increasing 
expansion of the set of knowledge and resources, carmakers rely on 
specialized suppliers in order to complement their research and develop-
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ment efforts and to cope with the increasing product and technological 
complexity. The outsourced activities comprise different phases of the 
innovative process, from design to engineering and production tasks. 
Managerial literature outlines that relying on a network of external 
suppliers provides oems with several benefits that, ultimately, positively 
impact the firms’ innovative performance (Clark 1989). Indeed, suppli-
ers’ involvement in the innovation process provides access to special-
ized and tacit knowledge that for oems would be difficult to replicate 
in-house. Further, supplier’s expertise and comparative advantage in 
the performance of specific tasks decreases the costs and time of design 
and engineering phases of the development process. Finally, by relying 
on a network of several suppliers, firms have access to heterogeneous 
and diversified technological competences. 
Despite the outlined benefits, the division of labour along the indus-
try value chain poses important challenges to carmakers. Firstly, firms 
have to govern multiple and concurrent ties in order to access external 
knowledge and skills; oems have to manage complex portfolios of rela-
tions with external suppliers, selecting appropriate governance mecha-
nisms to boost inter-firm collaboration while minimizing partner’s op-
portunistic behaviour. Secondly, they face a key organizational decision: 
which components/capabilities should be outsourced and which should 
be retained internally? In the next sections, we will analyse both issues 
and describe the organizational solutions helping firms to benefit from 
a distributed innovation model while coping with its complexity.
2.2 Coordination and governance mechanisms
Managing a network of external suppliers requires carmakers to iden-
tify the efficient governance mechanism in order to access external 
knowledge and skills while avoiding issues of opportunism, knowledge 
leakage and appropriability. The choice of the governance mechanism 
is key in determining partners’ incentive to cooperate. Under specific 
circumstances, different governance forms might lead to heterogeneous 
performance outcomes in terms of partners’ coordination, knowledge 
sharing and innovation output. As outlined by the broad literature on 
alliances (Colombo 2003; Oxley 1989), contingent on the motives and 
content of the exchange, some organizational forms are more suitable 
than others in easing and coordinating partners’ interaction. 
Transaction costs literature pinpoints that the choice of the govern-
ance structure is dependent on the contractual and appropriability haz-
ards firms face in the technology exchange (Oxley 1997). The higher the 
complexity and specificity of the exchanged product, the more likely that 
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the relationship is governed by a hierarchical mechanism in order for 
partners to align incentives to cooperate and cope with product com-
plexity (Kogut 1988). Hierarchical forms, such as joint ventures, provide 
firms with the opportunity to restrain opportunistic behaviour and hold-
up issues. Similarly, when appropriability concerns threat the exchange, 
transaction costs literature predicts that firms will recur to hierarchical 
governance structures in order to monitor knowledge flows and avoid 
unintended knowledge spillovers and innovation circumvention issues. 
Another stream of research – the competence perspective literature – 
argues that the choice of the governance mechanism is dependent on the 
degree of overlap between the technological competences of the part-
ners involved in the transaction (Colombo 2003; Mowery Oxley, Silver-
man 1996). A high dissimilarity in partners’ technological bases hinders 
the exchange and learning opportunities, leading partners to choose a 
hierarchical governance form based on tight coordination mechanism 
in order to optimize the technology absorption process and hence the 
knowledge transfer.
Traditionally, in the automotive industry, oems manage networks of 
external suppliers through a diversified portfolio of contractual arrange-
ments, ranging from traditional arm’s length market transactions to 
more hierarchical governance mechanisms such as formal alliances 
and joint ventures. Bensaou (1999), in reviewing the type of carmaker-
supplier relationships, proposes four modes of exchange: market ex-
changes, captive buyer tie, strategic partnership and captive supplier 
tie. The former – market exchange – is used for highly standardized 
products based on mature technologies that require little engineering 
efforts and expertise from the supplier. Given the standardization and 
maturity of the underlying technology, these ties require neither idiosyn-
cratic investments on both parties to the transaction nor coordination 
and knowledge sharing mechanisms. 
Unlike market-based exchanges, captive buyer relationships are char-
acterized by an asymmetric commitment of the partners: the carmaker 
is held hostage by the supplier. Suppliers typically control a proprietary 
technology and benefit from a strong bargaining power over the oem 
(Bensaou 1999). These are contingencies where the exchange involves 
complex components that require customization, but do involve stable 
technologies (e.g. bearings, glass products). The carmaker heavily de-
pends on the supplier specialized skills and assets. 
Strategic partnerships are usually associated to the exchange of high-
ly customized and complex components/subsystems, for instance the 
breaking system or the air-conditioning system. Due to the technology 
and capabilities requirements, both the oem and the supplier put highly 
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specific assets into the relationship. On its side, the carmaker has to 
undertake tangible and intangible investments relative to the supplier’s 
component, given the high interdependence between these components 
and the rest of the vehicle. Suppliers, on their side, develop design and 
production skills tailored to the buyer’s requirements. Hence, due to the 
undertaking of co-specialized investments on both sides of the transac-
tion and the need of extensive coordination mechanisms to cope with 
technological complexity, partners recur to strategic partnerships to 
manage the tie.
Finally, captive supplier ties refer to those asymmetric relations where 
the supplier is held «hostage» by the carmaker and commits large spe-
cific investments to hold the customer and stay in the market. The ex-
change involves complex subsystems based on a new technology typi-
cally developed and owned by the supplier but whose commercialization 
depends on the carmaker.
In light of these different outsourcing modes, the choice of govern-
ance structure to manage the supplier relationship greatly influences 
the capability of the carmaker to involve external knowledge sources 
in its innovation activities. A mismatch between the type of relation-
ship and the content of the exchange might produce negative effects 
from outsourcing, hindering the ability of carmakers to benefit from 
an open innovation model. Such «matching» is indeed very complex as 
carmakers often cooperate with the same supplier on a set of multiple 
and concurrent projects, each featuring different level of involvement 
of the supplier in the new product development process of the carmaker 
(Zirpoli, Caputo 2002). In this respect, the matching of the governance 
structure and the type of relationship must be managed at the level of 
the single project rather than at the firms’ one.
2.3 Outsourcing decisions and the scope of the knowledge base
The second key challenge posed by an open innovation model is relat-
ed to carmakers’ decision on which disciplines and components should 
be developed and produced in-house and which ones are to be contract-
ed out to suppliers. In performing innovative activities, oems face two 
divergent objectives. On the one hand, they aim at exploiting flexibility 
and economies of specialization by outsourcing design and engineer-
ing of components/subsystems to suppliers. On the other hand, they 
need to base their competitive advantage on the capability to introduce 
breakthroughs and new product architectures. Indeed, firms need to 
reconcile economies of specialization while remaining integrated in the 
knowledge domain (Brusoni et al. 2001). 
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In the past, management scholars proposed modularity as the guiding 
principle in outsourcing decisions (Sanchez, Mahoney 1996). Through 
the specification of standardized components interfaces, carmakers 
could outsource the design and development of entire subsystems and 
reduce the coordination mechanisms with the suppliers for the devel-
opment activity. Further, through modularity, firms could increase the 
specialization of their knowledge base and focus on the product-archi-
tectural knowledge, since the component-specific knowledge was left 
to the specialized supplier. 
Recent studies, however, pinpoint the limits of modularity and the 
threats it poses to carmakers in effectively relying on external sources 
of knowledge (Macduffie 2012). Many carmakers incurred negative 
effects when implementing design and engineering outsourcing. In 
this respect, Fiat is a leading example. During the 1990s, the heavy 
reliance on external suppliers in the engineering and design phases 
of new product development activities led the firm to a gradual decay 
in technological and component specific skills, which ultimately hurt 
its capability of managing component interdependencies and above 
all product performance. Zirpoli and Becker (2011) pinpoint two main 
reasons for the negative effect of outsourcing activities based on the 
modularity principle. The first one is related to the intrinsic features 
of the car, whose product architecture is characterised by persistent 
integrality. This restrains the degree of «modularization» of the prod-
uct. The overall performance of a car, in fact, is not dependent only 
on the performance of the specific components but also on how these 
different components/subsystems interact with one another. Hence, 
it is risky to outsource activities on the basis of the product architec-
ture, since vehicle-level performance cannot be attributed to particular 
components.
The second reason is related to competence accumulation issues. 
Due to the distributed learning process characterizing the automotive 
industry, the carmaker acts as system integrator: it coordinates the 
work of suppliers and manages the relevant technological and organi-
zational interfaces (Brusoni et al. 2001). However, by heavily outsourc-
ing the design and engineering of specific components and subsystems, 
oems loose knowledge and familiarity with component-specific tech-
nologies. This loss hinders their understanding of potential product 
interdependencies, ultimately weakening their capability to act as sys-
tem integrator. Hence, the key challenge carmakers face in their inno-
vative activity is the following: how to benefit from outsourcing while 
concurrently feeding internal knowledge domains both in component 
and architectural knowledge?
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The achievement of a balance between economies of specialization 
and competence accumulation is non-trivial. However, according to re-
cent studies in innovation management (Brusoni, Prencipe 2006; Zir-
poli 2010), this challenge can be accomplished through the adoption 
of specific solutions in the organization of innovation activities. oems 
need to maintain in-house technological and engineering capabilities in 
order to effectively coordinate the work of suppliers, and this calls for 
organizational solutions that favour the accumulation of competences. 
In this respect, the division of innovative labour between the oem and its 
suppliers should be based on this principle rather than on pure product 
architecture and cost-efficiency principles, traditionally proposed by the 
modularity literature (Sanchez, Mahoney 1996). The division of labour 
should be such that guarantees the system integrator opportunities of 
learning-by-doing in component-specific knowledge as well as capabili-
ties to introduce new product architectures. Organizational solutions 
that favour in-house learning opportunities on key components and sub-
systems allow the oem to experiment on component interdependencies 
and the vehicle overall performance while concurrently benefiting from 
the involvement of suppliers in the innovation process.
3 Strategic challenges
3.1 Beyond economies of scale:  
  the strategic implications of raising complexity
Exploiting scale efficiencies, a traditional driver of competitive advan-
tage in the automotive industry, plays a less relevant role in a world that 
has turned towards a distributed innovation model. In the new business 
ecosystem, there are many evidences showing that the key challenge 
for carmakers will be to handle complexity in new forms. 
First, as manufacturing, design and engineering of cars are not per-
formed any more in vertical integrated companies but in highly frag-
mented vertical networks, flexibility of cost structure at carmakers’ 
has increased, but so has organizational and strategic complexity. As 
a consequence, while the need for standardization within each single 
model design engineering and production is much less pressing nowa-
days, oems must face new threats. In fact, outsourcing has produced 
the consequence of (1) increasing competitive tensions within the value 
chain (with suppliers’ bargaining power growing) and (2) complicating 
integration and coordination among a higher number of actors (car 
makers, first- and second-tier suppliers, research centres, etc.). In such 
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a scenario, strategic success is a consequence of the ability of firms to 
device organizational solutions consistent with their strategy and less 
dependent on traditional strategic levers, such as economies of scale. 
At the moment, only few producers – notably Toyota – have been able 
to take full advantage of a more distributed mode of production in the 
industry with some, like Fiat, forced to back source design and engineer-
ing activities after having experienced the complexity of managing a 
distributed product development process (Becker, Zirpoli 2003; Zirpoli 
2010) or gm and Chrysler forced to bankruptcy.
Secondly, the minimum optimal dimension of plants due to the adop-
tion of flexible manufacturing systems and lower product development 
costs due to the introduction of virtual simulation tools in product de-
velopment has, once again, reduced the strategic role of pure «scale» 
considerations but augmented the level of complexity to be managed. As 
far as manufacturing is concerned, new production technologies have 
eased the joint production in the same plant and with the same tools 
and equipments of different models lowering break-even points. For ex-
ample, thanks to the flexibility of production technology, Fiat and Ford 
produce in the same plant the Fiat Panda, the Fiat 500 and the Ford Ka. 
On the other hand, the complexity in managing operations has grown 
accordingly. As far as product development is concerned, the growing 
use and accuracy of virtual development and simulation tools has been 
a major source of novelty in the overall product development strategy 
of firms. Traditionally, literature has associated with the use of virtual 
development tools (1) the reduction of experimentation costs due to the 
speeding up of the testing phase, (2) the reduction of the number of 
costly physical prototypes and redesign linked to their fast obsolescence, 
and (3) the improvement of design quality via the availability of informa-
tion very early on in the development process (front loading problem 
solving, Thomke 1998). More recently, however, literature has observed 
how virtual tools help engineers to observe phenomena that are much 
less readily observable otherwise enabling almost infinite iterations of 
the same experiment and, importantly, isolating one parameter in each 
run. As compared with physical experimentation, they therefore ap-
proach a «laboratory-type controlled environment». In this way, virtual 
experimentation allows testing hypotheses that are not constrained by 
the logical bounds of the premises one starts from. It thereby enables 
a non-conservative design, which is important in order to achieve dis-
tinctive new designs (Becker, Salvatore, Zirpoli 2005). These features 
provide carmakers with the opportunity for enlarging and differentiating 
their product portfolios without scarifying efficiency. However, also in 
this respect, it is important to note that the sustainability of an aggres-
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sive marketing strategy based on the proliferation of niche models and 
model variants is premised on the sharing of components and platforms 
across these models. Only this measure would contain the industrial 
costs to a sustainable level. To do so, the challenge is leveraging econo-
mies of scope on both competences and components. This is, once again, 
a hard and complex task from an organizational point of view. In order 
to develop models that share components and systems of components 
without sacrificing their differentiation for customers, company must 
introduce several constraints to design, engineering and manufacturing 
activities and manage a tight organizational integration between inter-
nal functions, product development platforms and external suppliers. 
So far, few carmakers have fully succeeded on this pattern (e.g. Toyota 
and Volkswagen), especially due to its ensuing organizational complexity.
Overall, considering the new modes of designing, producing and mar-
keting cars, there is consensus that the key challenge has switched 
from managing product development activities (and manufacturing ef-
ficiency) by leveraging economies of scale, to governing complex value 
chain relationships and integrating new product development efforts. 
3.2 Leveraging patents across firm’s boundaries 
In the previous paragraphs, we examined the organizational solutions 
oems implement in order to access and integrate external knowledge 
into internal innovative activities and the strategic challenges brought 
by the raising organizational complexity of product development. How-
ever, along with the organizational challenge of how to reconcile division 
of labour and competence accumulation, it is to emphasize that firms 
also face a key strategic issue: how to profit from innovation? Due to 
the distributed innovation process and the high competitive pressure 
in the current industry scenario, it is key to identify and analyse the 
mechanisms carmakers have at their disposal in order to appropriate 
the returns from innovation.
Past innovation literature pinpoints several modes through which 
firms may appropriate value from research investments: secrecy, lead 
time, patents, and complementary assets (Cohen, Nelson, Walsh 2000; 
Teece 1986). The effectiveness of these modes is clearly dependent on 
the appropriability regime of the industry – namely a set of environmen-
tal factors that influence an innovator’s ability to capture the profits 
generated by its invention (Teece 1986, p. 287). Relative to this issue, 
past studies highlight that the tighter the appropriability regime, the 
higher the strength of patents, allowing firms to effectively appropriate 
returns from their inventions and to earn monopoly profits. 
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In the automotive industry, major carmakers traditionally implement 
aggressive patent strategies through up-front research, applying for 
patents worldwide and investing large amounts of resources in maintain-
ing and renovating their patent portfolios. This is particularly true for 
the large incumbents of the industry. For instance, Toyota applies 1,000 
patents per year on average. Other large competitors implement similar 
patent strategies – Volkswagen is an example. 
At first, such a recurrence to patenting might indicate that firms use 
them for profiting from innovation: patents protect the profits directly 
accruing from the commercialization of the patented innovation. Despite 
the intense patenting activity of carmakers, a survey investigating the 
mechanisms firms use to profit from innovation shows that, in the indus-
try, patents are rarely employed as appropriation mechanisms (Cohen 
et al. 2000). Firms strongly prefer secrecy, lead time, and the control 
over strategic complementary assets such as manufacturing and com-
mercialization infrastructures. Many patents, in fact, can be invented 
around at modest costs and they are ineffective at protecting process 
innovations, which represent a large share of oems’ innovation outputs. 
Hence, the questions to be posed are the following ones: what is the role 
of patents in the industry? Why do carmakers adopt aggressive patent 
strategies, despite reporting that patents are ineffective in appropriat-
ing returns from innovation? We believe that the strategic reason has to 
be found in the organization of the innovation activity itself. 
Given the distributed innovation process and the fact that the car is 
a complex multi-technology product, it often incorporates several inno-
vations not directly controlled by the carmaker, but rather by external 
suppliers and competitors. In this context of distributed and highly par-
titioned knowledge, building up large patent portfolios might serve oems 
the achievement of three main objectives. First, they serve as isolating 
mechanisms in order to protect the firm’s competitive advantage. Pat-
ents provide firms with an exclusionary right: they can exclude others 
from the development, use and sale of the patented invention. Given the 
costs of applying and maintaining patents, a proprietary patent strategy 
is likely to be pursued for technologies with high «strategic stakes» for 
the carmakers. In order to build effective barriers to imitation, firms 
frequently build overlapping and complementary patents to minimize 
the chances that the technologies are invented around (Somaya 2012). 
In this respect, an example is provided by the patent strategies imple-
mented by Fiat during the past decade. In order to protect key core 
technologies, such as the multi-jet and subsequent multi-air technology, 
Fiat applied for families of patents worldwide and hired legal experts to 
ensure that the patents were legally robust in order to effectively protect 
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core technologies for the firm’s competitive positioning. These patents 
were then carefully maintained over the patent life-period.
Another frequent mechanism through which firms pursue a propri-
etary patent strategy is co-patenting with suppliers – the patented in-
novation is assigned both to the carmaker and the supplier. Since it 
is frequent the case that competing oems share suppliers for specific 
components/technologies, it is key to overcome issues of unintended 
knowledge leakage and threats of invention re-engineering by competi-
tors. By sharing the proprietary rights with the supplier and integrating 
the joint patenting contract with specific clauses (Hagedoorn 2003), the 
carmaker can overcome these risks. It can effectively control the use the 
supplier makes of the technology, for instance monitoring and limiting 
the diffusion of the technology to competitors through licensing.1 
The second function of patents from a carmaker’s standpoint is that 
of a defensive strategy tool. Through patenting, oems aim to acquire 
freedom to operate and to avoid expensive litigation costs and delays in 
product development and launch, by directly controlling several propri-
etary technologies included in the final product. Firms build large pat-
ent portfolios in order to avoid the risk of being held up for instance by 
competitors and to prevent potential patent disputes with competitors. 
Patent infringement – the use or sale of a patented invention without 
the applicant’s permission – in fact is a recurrent event in the industry. 
Finally, large patent portfolios might serve to reinforce the bargaining 
power of the carmaker in the distributed innovation process. By guar-
anteeing patent coverage, for instance on a core technology that other 
firms are using or developing and on which there are sufficient costs and 
risks in working around the firm’s patents, the patent gives the firm the 
bargaining power vis-à-vis users of the technology through the threat of 
patent litigation (Somaya 2012).
In light of the current organization of innovation activities within 
the industry, it emerges the importance for carmakers to strategically 
manage their patent portfolios both for defensive as well as leveraging 
purposes. The ip management issue becomes central in order for firms 
to protect their competitive position (Reitzig 2004). As management 
scholars have outlined, in this context, supporting organizational condi-
tions such as patent knowledge in the top-level management and optimal 
1. Literature on co-assigned patents reports that, in the past, firms considered co-patent-
ing as a second-best solution, since under specific regimes (like in the us), the co-assigned 
patent can be used or licensed by both assignees without approval from the other. However, 
firms over the years have gained experiences with forging additional contracts in order to 
better monitor the use of the invention by the co-assignee (Hagedoorn 2003).
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cross-functional coordination between legal and technical experts (Re-
itzig, Puranam 2009) become key organizational capabilities to enhance 
performance and appropriate returns from innovation.
4 The challenges to innovation processes  
 brought by the «electrification» of the industry 
Recently the potential technological discontinuities brought by the 
new hybrid and electric power-train technologies have been indicated as 
a potential trigger of a relevant change in carmaker strategic approach, 
industry dynamics and new product development. At the moment, as 
a high number of supply and demand factors can potentially influence 
the evolution of the technological trajectory of hybrid and electric vehi-
cles, it is extremely difficult to evaluate the relative importance of each 
factor in isolation as well as its interaction effects (see also Errichiello, 
Zirpoli 2013). 
Similarly, it is not easy to predict the potential changes that the «elec-
trification» of the industry might bring to the organization of innovation 
activities in the automotive industry. So far, the picture that emerges on 
the power train technology of the future, its evolution, firms’ strategies 
and appropriability regimes is characterized by high «structural uncer-
tainty» (Knight 1921). The technology is still in the phase of «variation» 
and technological ferment – with electric power train competing with 
many hybrid technologies and they altogether competing with other 
«green» and perhaps more efficient solutions (eucar 2009). In this situ-
ation, the mechanisms leading to a «selection» of a dominant design 
and the consequent «retention» of a specific value network and commu-
nity organization configuration (Rosenkopf, Tushman 1998) are far from 
being clearly defined. Under the current scenario where a dominant de-
sign has not yet emerged, we would expect firms’ innovation activities 
to be mainly devoted to upfront research activities in order to explore 
and seize (through patents) the benefits of a new standard. In this phase, 
firms are likely to experience a period of exploration in order to experi-
ment with the different technological solutions and gain capabilities 
on a wider set of technological domains in order to effectively react to 
an eventual technological shift towards the «industry electrification». 
However, so far we do not have systematic empirical evidence showing 
that carmakers and suppliers are carrying out such a type of research 
activity and, hence, no accounts of its effects. Moreover, in case of 
emergence of the electric car as a dominant technological paradigm, 
we expect to observe a re-organization of the automotive value chain 
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and a re-assessment of the value distribution along the supply chain. 
The electrification of the industry might indeed favour the entry of new 
players in the industry (e.g. electricity providers, battery suppliers, etc.) 
with important consequences for what concerns the value creation and 
value appropriation strategies of leading carmakers in the organization 
of innovative activities. On the contrary, if the electric car will remain 
confined to a niche-market, no relevant changes in the organization 
of new product development are expected and industry incumbents 
will be in a position to rapidly switch to alternative and less disruptive 
solutions without loosing the knowledge-base they have accumulated 
over the years. 
5 Final remarks
In the past decades, technology and market factors led to a radical 
re-organization of innovative activities within the automotive industry, 
with a shift from a closed-innovation model to a distributed one. The aim 
of this chapter was to identify and discuss the main organizational and 
strategic challenges in innovation activities that industry incumbents 
are currently facing in light of this radical change. 
From an organizational point of view, the analysis pinpoints the cen-
trality for carmakers to effectively manage networks of external sup-
pliers both for what concerns the mechanisms through which govern 
external ties as well as the type of activities to allocate to external part-
ners. On the one side, the choice of the governance mechanisms – from 
arm’s length market transaction to strategic partnerships – appears to 
be key in order for carmakers to access external specialized knowledge 
while avoiding issues of partner’s opportunism, knowledge leakage, and 
appropriability. The analysis casts a light on the importance of selecting 
the governance relationship by taking as primary unit of analysis the 
project-level rather than the partner’s one. Carmakers, in fact, often 
cooperate with the same supplier in a set of different and concurrent 
projects. It is therefore key to choose the partnering mode that at a 
project level guarantees the effective and efficient involvement of the 
supplier in the internal development activity.
Another major challenge brought by a distributed innovation model 
is the scope of the knowledge base carmakers should master. In order 
to effectively act as system integrators, carmakers need to properly bal-
ance economies of specialization with competence accumulation. In this 
business context, division of innovative labour should hinge on where 
system integrators experience learning opportunities both in compo-
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nent-specific knowledge as well as architectural knowledge. The chapter 
highlights that outsourcing decisions should be based on a competence 
accumulation principle rather than on pure product architecture and 
cost-efficiency principles as past modularity literature has proposed.
From a strategic point of view, the chapter reviews the role of econo-
mies of scale within a business environment characterised by a distrib-
uted and highly partitioned knowledge. The study sheds light on the fact 
that, due to a set of different factors – increasing flexibility of carmakers’ 
cost structure, decrease in the minimum optimal dimension of plants, 
etc. – the key strategic challenge has shifted from managing product 
development activities by leveraging economies of scale to governing 
complexity in value chain relationships and integrating new product 
development efforts. 
Secondly, the chapter clarifies the role of up-front research leading 
to patenting and the use of patents in the industry, highlighting the 
strategic function large patent portfolios may play in favouring carmak-
ers to appropriate value in fragmented vertical networks. By providing 
firms with exclusionary rights, patents represent defensive and isolating 
mechanisms to protect core innovations of the technology portfolio as 
well as to protect firms from the risks of being held-up by competitors 
and incurring into long and expensive patent disputes.
The analysis put forward highlights clear avenues for future research. 
First, in light of the likely technological shift the industry may face in 
the next years, future studies should focus on the technological compe-
tences carmakers are currently accumulating through their patenting 
upfront research activity. The analysis would clarify the type and scope 
of technologies carmakers are currently experimenting and may provide 
empirical insights on the technological standard that is likely to emerge 
and the likely incumbents that, under this standard, may dominate the 
market. Moreover, future studies should also attempt to model the dif-
ferent industry scenarios and hence patterns of division of innovative 
labour that may emerge under the different technological standards. 
This would clarify the future organizational and strategic challenges 
carmakers will face in the coming years. 
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Are carmakers ready for the «peak car»?
Andrea Stocchetti
abstract This chapter investigates the problem of the so called «peak car», 
that is: the possible structural decline of cars’ demand. Specifically, we try to 
investigate to what extent the «peak car» in Europe finds it premises in the 
evolution of the principles and policies for sustainable urban mobility (SUM), 
here including innovative principles of design and use of urban space. Our hy-
pothesis is that significant progresses are taking places in the overall perception 
of utility derived from owning a private car and in the concept of quality of life 
related to urban living. The ongoing change is also reflected in the principles 
stated by documents that outline EU policies in the field of sustainable mobility, 
were an evolution of the approach to the traffic and congestion issues can be 
read over time.
1 Introduction 
The hypothesis that car demand could begin to shrink and that the car 
as a product itself can enter into a life-cycle stage of decline has never 
been taken into serious consideration for a very long time. The wide-
spread belief, more or less implicit, was that once the market saturation 
is reached, car demand would settle relatively flat. However, since 2007 
the European demand for cars has fallen steadily, and after seven years 
of persistent decline that belief falters.
Starting from the empirical evidence of a significant and diffused 
reduction in car use in Europe and the usa, some authors have started 
to foreshadow different scenarios that postulate the decline of the car. 
Such hypothesis is often referred to as «peak car» (or «peak car use», 
or «peak car travel», or similar words) and it has become an object of 
systematic analysis only in recent times.
This chapter proposes a brief overview of the main contributions on 
this subject. It will also investigate to what extent the increasing rel-
evance and spread of policies for urban sustainable mobility have an im-
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pact on such phenomenon. We will try to investigate to what extent the 
«peak car» in Europe finds its premises in the evolution of the principles 
and policies for sustainable urban mobility (sum), here including innova-
tive principles of design and use of urban space. Our hypothesis is that 
significant progresses are taking places in the overall perception of the 
utility deriving from owning a private car and in the concept of quality 
of life related to urban living. Such ongoing change is also reflected in 
the principles stated by documents that outline eu policies in the field 
of sustainable mobility, were an evolution of the approach to the traffic 
and congestion issues can be read over time.
In our opinion the topic is important in order to evaluate carmak-
ers strategies and to understand some of the most recent competitive 
dynamics in car industry. Peak car determinants are at the basis of the 
profound social renewal oriented towards different and more sustain-
able living principles. These principles strongly refuse the negative 
aspects related to car use (among which pollution is only one out of 
many and perhaps less important today than in the past). A car-free 
society is unlikely, but a legitimate question is: to what extent the pre-
sent industry can downsize? To what extent present city-car concepts 
fit the actual orientation of mobility demand? Twenty years ago very 
few people would have bet on the disappearance or on the reduction of 
house goods like televisions and telephones. But this is exactly what is 
happening today with the emergence of different lifestyles triggered by 
social development and progresses in the field of mobile devices, web, 
multimedia and so on. Nowadays carmakers are still having a traditional 
approach to car design and production facilities, while the European 
urban society is probably more inclined to Personal Mobility Vehicles 
(pmv)1 than to city cars, even electric ones. Perhaps the contributions 
that have studied the phenomenon of peak cars can help give an answer 
to such questions.
Since 2006 the growth of new car registrations in Enlarged Europe2 
has decreased, except for a limited revival around 2009, driven by the 
incentives for scrapping introduced in several European countries. In 
1. pmvs are commonly intended as small-size electric vehicles designed for individual 
use (one or two people) in short urban journeys and/or in large indoor places like airports, 
railway stations, plants, malls, etc. pmvs were originally intended for assisting people with 
limited movement capability, but then they evolved towards a wide variety of concepts. Al-
though almost all carmakers often present very innovative and efficient pmv prototypes, no 
concrete efforts to develop marketable models in this field have been made by carmakers. 
Segway Inc. is presently the only pmv producer operating on a global scale.
2. In this chapter we refer to eu27+efta3 as «Enlarged Europe», and to eu15+efta3 as 
«Western Europe».
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2012 carmakers have sold almost 3.3 million cars less than six years 
before (-20,6%) and the forecast for 2013 signals a further decrease. 
The negative trend is even more evident considering the Western 
Europe, where the effect of incentives in major countries (Germany, uk, 
France, Italy and Spain) has been barely sufficient to slow the decline 
(fig. 1). 
Common sense suggests that the present trend has been determined 
mainly by the financial crisis and by its effects on the overall macroeco-
nomic context since there is a remarkable similarity between the evolu-
tion of gdp and that of the demand (fig. 1). On the other hand, a series 
of profound changes are taking place in the social and technological 
context of the car market. Such changes trigger a series of questions 
about the possibility that, beyond the traditional income-based explana-
tion, other variables are having a role in reshaping the structure of car 
demand and patterns of use. In particular, a central question is if this 
is just an adjustment within a period of permanently mature demand or 
it is the signal of a major discontinuity. Indeed, a turnaround has been 
hypothesized for what concerns the intensity of use of the car, suppos-
edly declining after decades of steady growth (Puentes, Tomer 2009; 
Newman, Kenworthy 2011; Goodwin, 2012b). 
Fig. 1. New cars registrations and gdp variation in Europe 2006-2012.
Sources: acea, Eurostat.
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To our knowledge the issue and the expression «peak car» was raised 
for the first time – with statistical support – in 2006, in an article pub-
lished by the magazine Local Transport Today (ltt 2006). The article 
reported the results of a survey developed in 21 British urban areas 
showing that in the previous ten years a significant reduction of private 
car use occurred. In London, for instance, the car incidence in total 
traffic has decreased from a 60% peak in the beginning of the 1990s to 
less than 30% in 2011 (fig. 2). London and the uk are a somehow paradig-
matic case of urban transport development. The post-war reconstruction 
and transport planning revolved around the prediction of increasing 
car traffic and around a policy of providing adequate road network as 
an answer to an increasing population and to a forecast of increasing 
demand for private transport (Banister 2002; Metz 2012). 
This approach to transport planning, called «predict and provide», 
has been the dominant one at least until the 1970s and it is still highly 
influential in European countries that are particularly backward in the 
field of sustainable mobility as, for instance, Italy. On the contrary, in 
the uk and the usa the traditional transport planning analysis has been 
harshly criticized since the end of the 1970s and overturned from mid 
1980s (Banister 2002; Vigar 2002; Imrie, Lees, Raco 2009). London city 
transports has therefore been originally planned in a context where car 
Fig. 2. People entering in central London in the weekday morning peak-road traffic by 
mode of traffic.
Source: Londontransportdata.wordpress.com.
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was dictating the rules of planning. But in the early 1990s the town’s 
transport plan has been subject to a general re-orientation from private 
to public transportation and to walking and cycling (Middleton 2009).
Nowadays a very similar situation is detected in the United States and 
in Great Britain. In both countries the estimated total miles driven has 
started to decrease from 2007, after decades of steady growth (figures 
3 and 4). It is noteworthy that, even in previous recessionary phases, 
in the usa there has never been a so evident decline in mileage (fig. 3).
Although several sources and contributions are available about trends 
in car market, very few contributions present a systematic analysis of 
trends in the use of car and of the possible determinants of its variation.
Newman and Kenworthy (1989, 2006, 2011) demonstrated the inverse 
correlation between the urban density and the reduction of «automotive 
dependence» of urban systems. According to these authors, the intense 
use of car is mainly triggered by urban sprawl and the lack of efficient ur-
ban mobility systems. On the other hand, a high level of urban density is 
a crucial factor to the development of efficient urban transport systems 
Fig. 3. Estimated vehicle miles driven on all roads in the usa, 1970-2012 (twelve month 
moving average).
Source: Advisor Perspectives Inc., courtesy of dshort.com.
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and this encourages commuters to use public transport instead of pri-
vate cars, particularly in a context of increasing gasoline costs. Puentes 
and Tomer (2009) dispute a prevailing effect of gasoline costs and point 
the fingers at a different model of urban development and to the related 
emerging lifestyle, metropolitan growth and development trends: 
Overall, cities are growing and downtowns have been improving in the past 
twenty years […] especially noteworthy is the revival of young adults seeking 
urban living. In turn, urban residents are more likely to use alternative modes 
of transportation than automobiles [Puentes, Tomer 2009, p. 4].
Maybe because of its recent origin, to our knowledge the phenomenon 
peak car (intended as a major discontinuity in car demand and pattern 
of use) is explicitly denied in very few contributions. However, there are 
also relatively few contributions that investigate it, as well as those that 
analyse the possible causes in a systematic way.
Metz (2012) deeply analyses the case of the uk and London; he shows 
that not only the car use, but the whole demand for personal daily trans-
fers has ceased to grow especially in those areas that experienced an 
urban revival according to new planning criteria. The author presents 
specific examples, e.g.: «The relegation of the car is most marked in the 
Fig. 4. Estimated vehicle miles driven on all roads in Great Britain, 1970-2012 (twelve 
month moving average).
Source: gb National Road Traffic Survey, Department for Transport.
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urban regeneration that has taken place in the former Docklands area, 
particularly on the north side of the River Thames to the east of central 
London» (p. 23). Transport systems are, therefore, designed to wrap 
mobility around the more valuable areas of the towns, thus excluding 
cars from the inner urban zones.
Newman and Kenworthy (2011) analyse several available sources and 
claim that the peak of the distance travelled per car has been already 
attained and that from now on car use will decrease as a result of the dif-
ferent orientation toward mobility. According to these authors, the rais-
ing in oil prices and the overall costs of operating a car are only minor 
factors. The reorientation of urban planning and design from car-based 
criteria towards sustainable mobility-based priorities – that consider 
transit, walking and cycling on top of the list – can spark a virtuous cir-
cle of increasing efficiency in time and money use that could bring to an 
«exponential decline» in car use (Newman, Kenworthy 2011). 
Goodwin (2012a) examines the three most commonly acknowledged 
hypothesis about the trend in car use (interrupted growth, saturation 
and peak car, this one intended as the overall result of people’s choice 
about car) at the light of the various data and phenomenon observed 
in transports statistics and the related possible inferences. His conclu-
sions are that presently available statistics do not allow to discriminate 
between those three different hypothesis. The same author (2012b) also 
concludes that, although not indisputable, the hypothesis of peak car is 
anyway more plausible than that of a temporary decline.
On the other hand, Le Vine and Jones (2012) deny the existence of 
peak car; they claim that the peak car is evident only for specific groups 
and areas, while the overall decrease in car use and travelled distance is 
an effect of economic recession and regards almost exclusively company 
cars, while the use of private cars remains stable. They also dispute the 
methodology used to measure the intensity in car use, claiming that 
population-adjusted data give different feedbacks in different areas.
2 The causes of peak car
Authors who endorse the hypotheses of a discontinuity in the trend of 
car use and the related peak car hypothesis identify several causes for 
this phenomenon, both traditional and relatively «original» ones. E.g.: 
traffic management policies, the increasing incidence of home working, 
economic crisis, a shift from privately owned cars towards car rental 
and car sharing, demographic changes in license owners composition, 
and so on.
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Of course, traffic restrictions are the first suspects in such a context, 
but a systematic review on available evidence comes to the conclusions 
that the evidence base for the effectiveness of such interventions is weak 
(Graham-Rowe et al. 2011).
An early work by Daniel Jones (1981) identified the mix of market satu-
ration, transport policies, car operating costs and urbanization as pos-
sible factors bringing the European demand for cars to an early maturity: 
«In Europe the greater population density and urbanization, the more 
extensive provision of public transport facilities and the much higher 
cost of buying and running a car all result in maturity being reached at 
lower levels of car density than in North America» (Jones 1981, p. 8). Al-
though this prediction about the evolution of car density have not come 
true at that time, it might have come true now. According to Eurostat, 
in 2008 the number of passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants in Europe 
was 470, higher than the Japanese (454) and the usa (444).3 Interestingly, 
the key variables for the saturation mentioned by Jones (urbanization, 
population density and public transportation) are nowadays considered 
priority goals in the urban mobility system planning. 
Goodwin (2012a) doesn’t admit explicitly the existence of a peak car 
intended as the beginning of a downward spiral in car use, but he ac-
knowledges a decreased use of cars and classifies the possible factors 
responsible for that in a series of categories. Together with the eco-
nomic motivation related to costs, prices and income, other important 
categories are a) quality and reliability of public transport systems, b) 
new policy trend in land use that reduces urban sprawl and increases 
the quest for the benefits related to central area locations, c) social and 
technological changes that affect people preferences and behaviours 
as for patterns of work, use of leisure time, way of shopping and so on. 
Finally, d) also the opportunities offered by mobile Internet technologies 
have a role insofar they increase the accessibility of public transport 
and offer an alternative way (productive or entertaining) of using time 
while commuting. 
Newman and Kenworthy (2011) identify six causes for the peak car 
use, three of which (the growth of public transport, the reversal of urban 
sprawl, the increase in fuel price) re-propose more or less the concepts 
expressed by Goodwin. The other three elements are: a) the increase in 
3. Here we specifically discuss passenger cars, therefore pick-ups, vans, and duty ve-
hicles are excluded. Other sources (i.e.: worldbank) wrongly use the term «passenger cars» 
to indicate: «road motor vehicles, other than two-wheelers, intended for the carriage of 
passengers and designed to seat no more than nine people (including the driver)». We do 
not adopt this definition since we consider it misleading for the analysis of the car industry.
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the average age of people living in the cities, b) the growth of a culture 
of urbanism, intended as the tendency to move from suburbs to the in-
ner city to take the opportunities that urban centres offer, and c) the 
hitting of the «Marchetti’s wall», that is the reaching of a development 
condition that puts severe limitations to the growth of urban areas and 
that can be overcome only through the construction of transport systems 
much faster than car in a context of urban traffic.
Marchetti’s wall is the limit to the growth of an urban centre that 
is determined by the means of transport available to move within the 
town. Such limit refers to a theory deriving from both empirical observa-
tions and conceptual analysis of people attitude towards travel, a theory 
known as «Marchetti’s constant». Such theory states that the amount 
of time or effort that people spend in daily transfer is constant and the 
actual travelled distance depends on the used mean of transport (Mar-
chetti 1994). According to this author, the historical analysis of human 
settlements and of human instincts shows that people tend to move and 
to establish their activities within an area defined by a limit of one hour 
travelling time (the Marchetti’s constant). Such behaviour has anthro-
pological determinants and it regulates towns and cities path of develop-
ment in relation with the distance that people can reach within an hour. 
For instance, if the average speed of a car in urban traffic is 30 Km/h, 
the Marchetti’s wall will be an area with a radius of 30 Km. This theory 
has several implications; specifically, it identifies the radius of attraction 
of urban amenities as a function of the mean of transport available. This 
limit would be able to influence, among the rest, the individual choices 
of localization and the choices of destinations for daily activities, thus 
the urban development. In fact, the Marchetti’s constant is often used 
in the analysis of possible peak car determinants.
Kenworthy and Laube (1999) have measured the average journey-
to-work trip time in 46 cities in the usa, Western Europe, Canada, Aus-
tralia and Asia; the average values are between 22 and 35 minutes for 
trip, while minimum and maximum are respectively around 20 and 40 
minutes. Schafer and Victor (2000) come to the same conclusions of 
Marchetti through a statistical analysis; they claim that, on average, not 
only the time devoted to travel is fixed (about 1,1 hours), but also the 
share of income allocated on travel is fixed and follows the income trend. 
Newman and Kenworthy (2006) assume Marchetti’s constant princi-
ples and evidences from the catchment area of main urban attractors to 
detail the accepted time and distance in a journey from the start to the 
destination (like, for instance, an urban service, transport nodes, ameni-
ties and so on) and to consequently identify principles of urban planning 
capable of reducing car dependence. 
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Metz (2010, 2012) identifies a mix of causes at the basis of the peak 
car, all referable to the saturation of the demand for daily travel, which 
on its turn derives from two joint factors: 1) the improved mobility sys-
tems, providing high levels of access and destinations’ choice at a higher 
speed; 2) the fixed «budget» (in terms of time and costs) that individual 
allocate to daily travel and that drives people to live in a range (generally, 
less than one hour of travel) not exceeding a predetermined distance 
away from the main daily activities, work being typically the first of 
these one.
Jones (1981), discussing the early-1980s car crisis, has been somewhat 
visionary in identifying the critical factors that could have brought to 
a saturation of car demand other than market-driven, and specifically: 
a) the relevance of population density and of urban transport policies 
on car demand, b) the overall cost efficiency (both «internal» and «ex-
ternal») of the car with respect to other means of transport. The issues 
related to these two elements (urban transport policies and car overall 
efficiency) have actually risen to reference point in both national and 
European transport policies and are commonly referred to as problems 
of sustainable mobility.
In one way or another all these authors assign a significant role to 
the urban mobility systems development, moderated or enhanced by a 
behavioural component which refers to demographic variable and/or to 
subjective attitudes. However, none of them makes an explicit reference 
to a possible relationship between the sum policies and the reduction 
in car use. Several scholars, as we have seen, take into account the 
change of attitude towards the use of the car by people, but none of them 
explicitly highlights or otherwise assumes an impact of sum policies on 
behaviours and, therefore, on the peak car phenomenon. 
This is quite surprising since there is a very evident overlapping be-
tween the peak car triggering factors and the set of priorities estab-
lished in the policies of European States for sum. In our view, this is one 
of the main variable affecting car demand in recent times, both from the 
qualitative and the quantitative point of view. In other words, we think 
that sum policies might have gone far beyond spreading the acceptance 
of traffic restrictions, but they might have familiarized a generation with 
a different concept of lifestyle that breaks the long-standing relationship 
between income, motorization and private mobility.
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3 The ouster of the car by the quest for sustainability
It is reasonable to assume that the various factors mentioned in the 
previous literature review are cooperatively responsible for reshaping 
the car demand determinants. In hindsight, however, the sum of those 
determinants is entirely consistent with the commonly acknowledged 
roots of the quest for a more sustainable transport. External and indirect 
costs, impact on quality of life, the growing importance of alternative 
urban models and related lifestyles are found at the same time within 
sustainability policies and among the factors determining the peak car. 
In other words, the quest for efficiency and sustainability put the car at 
the border of the range of mobility solutions. Car is a very low energy 
efficient vehicle; private car use, specifically, is far from being economi-
cally efficient from the point of view of individual owners, due to man-
aging costs and related external costs which are going to be more and 
more addressed to drivers through charges (for instance, the «London 
fee» for entering in central city). Moreover, the saturation of a private 
car by an individual driver is far from being convenient with respect to 
car sharing and car rental. In the medium term it would be reasonable 
to expect an increasing use of car from fleets rather than exclusively 
owned cars.
Car use is, therefore, under attack from a variety of significant battle-
fronts; this contrasts with the major emphasis given to the pollution issue, 
often perceived as the most important, sustainability-related problem in 
car use. Previously reviewed contributions show indeed that the trans-
port mode choice is affected by several «contingencies» that might have 
as an outcome a significant increase in the number of people who waive 
owning a private car, at least among those living in high-density urban 
centres. In some cases (Marchetti 1994; Schafer, Victor 2000) it emerges 
that it’s not a matter of contingencies at all. On the contrary, some au-
thors claim that the daily mobility behaviour follows criteria rooted in 
the human anthropological nature and there is no guarantee that the 
car is always the best way to satisfy them. Even traffic control meas-
ures have not proven to be as effective in reducing car use as one could 
think (Graham-Rowe et al., 2011). Finally, the acknowledged principles 
of sustainable city development explicitly oust cars (Kenworthy 2006). 
The actual discontinuity, if there is one, is that the possession of a 
car may seem much less attractive than ever. In the past, the ultimate 
answer to personal travel needs was the ownership of a car and the dis-
criminating factor for its access was the available income or wealth. The 
oil crisis in the 1970s has placed a greater emphasis on car running costs, 
but the overall association between car ownership and wealth has not 
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been questioned until recent times. Nowadays it has been demonstrated 
that wealthier societies have the higher transit use per capita while in 
major cities there is no correlation between car use and wealth (Ken-
worthy, Laube 1999; Le Néchet 2012). The emergence of a broader vision 
that tries to assess also the sustainability aspects of human activities has 
made popular models of costs-benefit analysis including aspects of the 
overall car impact (i.e.: Mayeres, Ochelen, Proost 1996; Sælensminde 
2004; Lemp, Kockelman 2008). All contributors in this field identify 
more or less the same set of disadvantages in relation with car depend-
ence. In short: a) quality of life decreases in relation with emissions and 
related health damages, b) traffic congestion creates discomfort and 
disadvantages related to loss of time, c) high social and private costs 
are related to car crashes and minor accidents, d) other societal, envi-
ronmental and economic disadvantages are related to global warming 
and environment detriment, d) land use and the disadvantages related 
to the infringement of other possible use of the space occupied by the 
vehicles and the required infrastructures, e) negative effects of various 
kinds associated to a sedentary lifestyle. 
Kenworthy and Laube (1999) demonstrate that there is no economic 
advantage for the collectivity in developing car dependence. In fact, the 
evaluation of external/social costs of transport modes bring to evidence 
higher costs of car than other transport modes. Several authors tried 
to estimate the external costs of vehicle ownership (Lemp, Kockelman 
2008; vtpi 2011), that is, social costs not directly borne by the owners. 
According to a review by Lemp and Kockelman (2008) the overall sum 
of external car use costs vary from 0.16 to 0.27 euro per mile driven, ac-
cording to car type and size. This would mean an external total cost in 
Europe for each car on the street between 2,400 and 4,000 euro per year. 
In a city like London, for instance, where 350,000 cars are estimated 
entering the central area every day, external costs would be from 2.3 to 
3.8 million euro per day.
At this stage a legitimate question is: what if the car ceases to be con-
sidered a benefit independently from regulatory restrictions and even 
from the point of view of the individual? The greater emphasis given over 
time to the collective disadvantages associated with the use of the car 
may have drastically changed the individual assessment of the trade-off 
between the «costs» and the benefits of owning a car. Furthermore, this 
trade-off further worsens due to the contribution of other factors. New 
alternatives, other than car ownership, are available to have a means of 
mobility when needed (such as short- or long-term rental and car shar-
ing), and such alternatives are getting more and more efficient with 
respect to the costs of operating a car at the usual rate of saturation, 
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which is usually very low.4 At the same time, several other forms of use 
of the time spent driving are offered, in particular using mobile devices 
during transit (which today is like or very similar to having social rela-
tionships) or doing physical activity walking and biking. 
In all this, policies to make cities attractive and sustainable environ-
ments – in terms of mobility but also in terms of a series of other activi-
ties related to sociality and leisure – are perhaps the main antagonist 
of the car. In other words, our impression is that the environmental and 
functional performance of the car are not challenged (or they are not the 
only ones), rather the car patterns of use and the overall benefits of car 
owning with respect to alternatives choice for individual mobility are. 
More specifically, our hypothesis is that the widespread orientation of 
local, national and European policy makers towards sustainable mobility 
practices will tend to marginalize the car far beyond the traffic restric-
tion actions and affecting the overall evaluation of the product «car» in 
its present configuration. In the following part of this chapter we will try 
to demonstrate the plausibility of this hypothesis through a summary of 
how the priorities set by the sum plans reinforce the elements that the 
literature places at the base of the peak car.
We think that such topic is of some interest for the automotive indus-
try. Seemingly, carmakers’ panacea to urban mobility issues is almost 
exclusively intended along the dimensions of the electric engine and of 
the small size. But in light of the above discussion this approach appears 
far too simplistic. 
4  The shift in the attitudes that will take carmakers off guard
The pillars of eu policies for sum are stated in a series of documents 
(com 2001; com 2007; com 2009) that show over time a shift from a 
mainly regulatory perspective focused on technical aspects of transport, 
towards a holistic view which integrates the development of societal 
desirable aspects. This change reflects and probably amplifies, through 
a dissemination of values, an emerging trend that has already been 
noticed in some of the contributions that have investigated the causes 
4. According to acea the average annual distance travelled by a car in the eu is about 
14,000 km/year. This implies that the average daily mileage is below 40 Km or, in urban 
environment, no more than 1,3 hours per day. aaa Association (2012) estimates that the 
actual yearly cost of running a medium sedan car at such mileage is about 8,000 euro (car 
depreciation included), that is 0,57 €/Km. These estimates refer to the costs for the owner. 
Additional external or social costs are not directly borne by the owners, but in a sustain-
ability perspective they should be included in the overall evaluation of car efficiency.
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of peak car. The importance of these documents in the debate is in fact 
twofold. Not only the European Commission is the eu executive arm and 
proposes new European legislation, but it is also in charge of carrying 
out consultation among stakeholders. It is legitimate to acknowledge in 
these documents widespread orientations, at least among the countries’ 
institutional representative bodies and local authorities.
Together with the specific policies aiming at reducing car dependence, 
the European Commission documents related to mobility state several 
priorities indirectly addressed to car use reduction. In short: 1) the 
overall transport demand reduction, 2) the cutback of urban sprawl and 
the implementation of innovative criteria in the design and use of urban 
space, 3) the development of integrated mobility systems. 
These priorities set the pathway for the implementation of the smart 
mobility in urban environment, triggering principles that are coherent 
with the sustainability philosophy and that tend to penalize car use as a 
means of private mobility, for several reasons that can be summarized 
as follows:
1.  The traditional «predict and provide» approach to transport plan-
ning is abandoned and a «sustainable transport» planning approach 
is adopted.5 In this vision the car ceases to be the input data for al-
locating investments in road construction; car traffic is considered 
an element to be managed and possibly to be minimized, while the 
car in itself has an inherently negative connotation.
2.  The development of an energy-efficient mode of transport is a corner-
stone in urban planning. Since car is at the bottom of the efficiency 
scale, transport systems push towards making its role as marginal 
as possible and to exploit the advantages of urban density.
3.  A key priority is the integration of urban and metropolitan mobility 
tools. Several projects have been implemented and are developing 
right now with the intent to increase the accessibility of the overall 
systems of urban mobility tools in an area through the integration 
of fares and tools of payment. In such scenario the use of the car 
could reasonably be considered a second-best option, probably a 
decreasing option as the integration process goes on together with 
the focused improvement of urban mobility systems.
5. «There is a permanent contradiction between society, which demands ever more 
mobility, and public opinion, which is becoming increasingly intolerant of chronic delays 
and the poor quality of some transport services. As demand for transport keeps increasing, 
the Community’s answer cannot be just to build new infrastructure and open up markets» 
(com 2001, p. 6, policy guidelines section).
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4.  The attention towards social sustainability involves safety, health and 
segregation issues. Planning principles tends therefore to enhance 
and make as pleasant as possible the role of walking and cycling 
as ways to reduce health problems (cardiovascular disease, obesity, 
etc.), to spread the presence of people in all areas, thus improving 
urban safety through social control, and finally to avoid the creation 
of differently-accessible areas, precursors of ghettos and of social 
segregation.
In our opinion these traits endorse the idea that eu sum policies are 
moving towards an approach which is far different from a mere restric-
tion-to-traffic one and put the basis for self-reinforcing mechanism of 
gradual, voluntary reduction in the use of the car. 
These premises are not obvious. In fact, the 2001 White Paper on 
European transport (com 2001) is based on rather different premises. 
The 2001 White Paper section dedicated to the policy guidelines points 
the finger at balancing the contradictions between different portions 
of the society that require different forms of development. Economic 
development and sustainability are in fact presented as a trade-off and 
the title itself («Time to decide») clearly recall a regulatory need. The 
section devoted to «The need for integration of transport in sustainable 
development» is in fact entirely focused on the technical – not values-
related – aspects of sustainability: ghg reduction, fuel dependency and 
energy efficiency. Car is widely acknowledged at the bottom end of the 
scale in all these aspects (Lefèvre 2009), so it is not surprising that 
the path identified is «to break the link between transport growth and 
economic growth and make for a modal shift» (com 2001, p. 10). While 
the imposition of traffic limitations at the local level is considered in-
feasible, the adoption of charges related to the type of road is seen 
as a possible incentive to multimodality. In the section devoted to the 
rationalization of urban transport, the suggested measures are mainly 
those encouraging alternative fuels, stimulating demand for hybrid and 
zero emissions vehicles. 
Following eu documents on urban mobility (com 2007; com 2009) set 
a significant discontinuity in what puts the mobility in urban areas in 
the leading positions on the political agenda, taking into account the 
economic and social relevance of the urban contribution to European 
population settlements and to the generated gdp. Moreover, these docu-
ments hint at a different development process in relation to mobility 
management, a kind of process that goes beyond the traditional idea of 
regulation for several aspects that increase the predictable acceptability 
of the transformations, and specifically:
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1. the proposal of a holistic project of urban lifestyle, leveraging on 
emerging social trends and thus bringing the debate to a level of over-
all project of life rather than triggering negotiation processes closely 
related to restrictions;
2. a long-term orientation towards goals whose implementation requires 
the application of new and/or advanced knowledge, in this creating 
opportunities for new research and new business rather than preclud-
ing the development of existing ones.
The holistic approach emerges from specific statements, like for in-
stance: «The choices that people make in the way they travel will affect 
not only future urban development but also the economic well-being of 
citizens and companies» (com 2009, p. 2). The underlying idea is that of 
a «new culture of urban mobility» which makes of a less car-dependent 
life-style an explicit objective, driving policies guidelines oriented to-
wards a car-free desirable urban lifestyle. This triggers a change in 
behaviours and perceptions where the reduction of car use comes from 
a deliberate choice rather than as the outcome of regulations. This is a 
remarkable step forward with respect to the early view of the problem, 
circumscribed to the pollution issue and congestion issue. In such con-
text, traffic restrictions are considered «individual laudable actions» 
but not an ultimate solution since they might reduce harmonization and 
interoperability across Europe (com 2007, pp. 10-11).
White paper 2011 clearly addresses a future urban mobility, which is 
expected to be largely composed by fleets (that can be read as collec-
tive cars) and Personal Mobility Vehicles (pmv),6 concepts that nowadays 
are rarely known and seen, but that should probably be in the priority 
agenda of carmakers: «The use of smaller, lighter and more specialised 
road passenger vehicles must be encouraged. Large fleets of urban 
buses, taxis and delivery vans are particularly suitable for the introduc-
tion of alternative propulsion systems and fuels» (com 2011, p. 8).
5 Conclusions and implications
Several authors agree about the decreasing of car dependence in 
Europe and the usa; such phenomenon is positive in its economic and 
societal consequences and is commonly acknowledged and pursued by 
European and local authorities as well. In this trend, a role has prob-
6. On pmv see footnote 1.
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ably to be assigned to new concepts of urban mobility that are develop-
ing in the European cities. Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (sum) are 
nowadays a priority both for the European Union Agenda and the local 
authorities agenda of all European countries. All key eu documents re-
lated to urban mobility identify traffic, and specifically car traffic, as the 
major problem related to urban living. Consequently, main concerns in 
sum plans are all, more or less, orienting policy towards the exclusion 
of cars from the urban environment.
Carmakers should take peak car into consideration as a real issue for 
the next future, since it appears as a change towards a different con-
ception of the use of car. Presently, the attention is almost exclusively 
devoted to pollution, car-size and, in general, land consumption issues. 
But we think that this perspective is simplistic and misleading. If it was 
only a matter of pollution reduction, then electric cars or zev in general 
would be the way to solve it. If it was a matter of land consumption, than 
small size cars, underground parking and similar would solve it. But in 
fact the issue is probably on a different plane. 
In the actions promoted by eu one could read several battlefronts 
in which the car is a losing competitors against other form of urban 
mobility. Among the reasons to let the cars out of mobility plans, the 
«traditional» disadvantages (high operating costs, pollution, social costs, 
overall efficiency, and so on) create urban contexts in which the car 
does not represent a worthwhile investment. But a different conception 
of urban lifestyle could make the car not even desirable with respect to 
other means or mobility solutions, existing or not. The question has its 
importance for the automotive industry, considering that over 70% of 
the European population lives in urban areas.
If this was true, at least crucial elements should be brought to atten-
tion in the automotive industry studies:
1.  The impressive knowledge and skills that carmakers put on the 
ground in the analysis of customers’ preferences and behaviour 
when developing a new car model might emerge as useless in an 
expanding context of no-car choice. 
2.  Urban planners, policy makers and mobility managers should be 
considered crucial carmakers interlocutors in pursuing an effective 
product development process.
3.  The role of innovation, as usual, becomes crucial since the means 
of individual mobility coherent with the urban sustainable mobility 
concept should be radically different from the present characteriza-
tion of car and capable of fitting the new system of emerging values.
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The impact of electric motorizations  
on cars’ architecture and supply chain relationships  
within the automotive industry
Anna Cabigiosu
abstract This contribute reviews the existing literature on electric vehicles’ 
architectural changes and discusses their supply chain management implications. 
The study identifies the main architectural and technological changes induced 
by cars’ electrification and it suggests that electric vehicles are likely to become 
more modular than the traditional internal combustion engines vehicles. Then, 
the study evaluates the potential impact that such changes will have on supply 
chain management practices focusing on the contingent and moderating role of 
variables such as the rate of technological change and the car makers’ strategies. 
The study concludes identifying some conditions that may foster the development 
of electric vehicles modular supply chains.
1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the issue of electric vehicles (evs) architec-
tural changes and then, building on the modularity literature, debates 
the implications of their supply chain management. In fact, there is still 
no study that a) reviews the existing contributes about evs’ architectural 
changes and helps appreciating whether evs are moving, and to what 
extent, toward higher levels of modularity, and that b) relying on the 
modularity literature discusses their managerial implications. 
J.P. Morgan estimated that by 2020 about 11 millions of evs will be 
sold worldwide («Automotive News» 2009). According to J.P. Morgan, 
this will mean that evs will equal nearly the 13% of the global passenger 
market at that point in time. 
Interestingly, following both the managerial and engineering litera-
ture, electric motorizations will affect car design and architecture and, 
in turn, the way in which carmakers manage design activities and the 
corresponding supply relationships. Particularly, some scholars have 
argued that evs will migrate towards more modular architectures that 
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may lower the need of hand-in-glove relationships between carmakers 
and suppliers (MacDuffie 2012; Christensen 2011). 
The modularity literature suggests that, beside evs, many products are 
becoming more modular over time, and that this development is often 
associated with a change in industry structure driven by the quest for 
the benefits provided by higher degrees of specialization and disintegra-
tion, as the pc industry illustrates (van Bree et al. 2010; Baldwin, Clark 
2000; Fine 1998; Fixson, Park 2008; Langlois 2003). In the specific case 
of the car industry the growing interest in the modularization of design 
is also determined by the strategic focus on the product architecture 
(Batchelor 2006). It is reasonable to assume that such interest will be 
intensified in view of the expected renewal of the dominant car design.
Within this area of research, studies have investigated the relation-
ship between the degree of product modularity and the nature of vertical 
inter-firm relationships, namely the across firm «mirroring» hypothesis 
(i.e. if and to what extent products and organizations share similar ar-
chitectural properties and, more specifically, if and to what extent the 
degree of modularity of sourced components is inversely related to the 
«thickness» of buyer-supplier relationships) (Cabigiosu, Camuffo 2012). 
While the «mirroring» hypothesis finds support in the 70% of the studies 
(Colfer, Baldwin 2010), the automotive industry appears to be a special 
case in that a) cars today are still overall integral products (MacDuffie 
2012) and b) there is no conclusive answer to key questions concerning 
the role of modularity in shaping the vertical contracting structure and 
inter-firm coordination of the car industry (Cabigiosu, Camuffo, Zirpoli 
2013; Zirpoli, Becker 2011). 
While modularity in production and platforms design are already 
widespread practices in this industry, till now modularity in design has 
been confined to subsystems such as the a/c system and the automo-
tive console (Fixson 2003; Sturgeon, Lester 2003). Carmakers mainly 
leverage on product platforms that include components shared among 
a variety of car models, but only a few of them are modular. 
In this scenario, scholars suggest that also evs are designed and pro-
duced relying on platforms but even that new electric technologies are 
increasing the cars’ modularity level (Christensen 2011). 
As MacDuffie (2012) suggests, product architecture of new electric ve-
hicles needs to accommodate heavy battery packs, a high-capacity elec-
trical system, complex software, and small electric motors potentially 
located in the wheels. Indeed, mapping from function to component is 
likely to move closer to the one-to-one correspondence that is found in 
electronic and information technology products. Moreover, today a large 
number of components used in the various electric drivetrain solutions 
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are shared. Hybrid drivetrain, the fuel cell drivetrain and the battery 
electric drivetrain all share components and systems such as batteries, 
electric motors, inverters, generators and brake energy regeneration 
systems (Christensen 2011). All in all, components commonality across 
different electric and hybrid motorizations may facilitate modularity-in-
design and shift the industry’s definition of module away from modular-
ity-in-production. Particularly, modularity-in-design may support «the 
rise of new suppliers providing specialized expertise for module design 
and production, and change the prevailing division of labour between 
oems and suppliers» (MacDuffie 2012, p. 49). 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section clarifies the 
concept of modularity in products and in organizations, while the sec-
ond synthesizes the main findings about modularity and platforms in 
the automotive industry. The third paragraph describes the main car 
architectural changes identified/forecasted due to the introduction of 
new electric motorizations. The fourth section reviews the modularity 
literature and identifies those key car attributes (e.g. the car complex-
ity), industry specificities (e.g. the rate of technological change), and 
carmaker strategies (e.g. the level of vertical integration and knowledge 
endowment) that all may help in predicting whether and to what extent 
evs higher modularity level will reshape supply relationships. The con-
clusion section draws the research and managerial implications and 
points out some future research directions.
2 Modularity in product design and in organizations
The scheme by which the functions of a product are allocated to its 
components is called its «architecture» (Ulrich 1995). Modularity refers 
to the way in which the design of a product is decomposed into different 
parts or modules that are characterized by independence across and 
interdependence within their defined boundaries (Campagnolo, Camuffo 
2010; Ulrich 1995). This independence is achievable through the adop-
tion of standard interfaces that decouple the development and the inner 
working principles of a product’s components (Baldwin, Clark 2000). 
Despite the differences in approaches, scholars converge in identify-
ing three main features of modules: they are separable from the rest 
of the product; they are isolable as self-contained, semiautonomous 
chunks; and they are re-combinable with other components. Separabil-
ity, isolability, and re-combinability are properties deriving from the way 
functions are mapped onto the components and from how components 
interact, i.e. from their interfaces. 
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Ideally, a perfectly modular product is made of components that per-
form entirely one or few functions (1:1 component/function mapping), 
with well-known, defined and codified interfaces among them (Ulrich 
1995). If these interfaces – i.e. the communication protocols among com-
ponents – are widely diffused within a given industry, these components 
have open standard interfaces. However, if the protocols are designed 
specifically to suit a certain firm’s requirements, i.e. they are firm spe-
cific, these protocols are closed and non-standard, unless we consider 
closed interfaces as proprietary standards used by a single firm or a spe-
cific network of firms (Fine et al. 2005). Interestingly, modular products 
are characterized by standard interfaces among components, but the 
other product’s features and attributes – including technologies – may 
change. Thus, a modular component is not necessarily standard.
Research on the degrees of coupling between product and organiza-
tional architectures has flourished during the last two decades. Within 
this body of research, some studies recently investigated the relation-
ship between the degree of product modularity and the nature of vertical 
interorganizational relationships (Baldwin, Clark 1997, 2000; Fixson, 
Park 2008; Colfer, Baldwin 2010).
In the extreme case of full product modularity, all the components 
exclusively perform one or few functions and the interfaces among 
them are completely open standard. In this case, all the suppliers that 
design and produce a given component use the same interfaces or a 
closed set of interfaces. Thus, they do not need to discuss with the buyer 
how components should be designed in order to fit the product design. 
Since components’ design and development can be isolated and con-
ducted separately by suppliers within a «frozen» product architecture, 
co-development practices are unnecessary and the advantages of rela-
tional quasi-rents negligible. Buyers and suppliers need not to engage 
in «thick» relationships through which continuously improve products 
and processes, control opportunism, and share risk. 
In 1996, Sanchez and Mahoney formulated the «mirroring» hypoth-
esis suggesting that loosely coupled standardized interfaces in a modu-
lar product architecture provide a form of coordination that reduces the 
need for overt exercise of managerial authority to achieve coordination 
of development processes. In such cases, the concurrent and autono-
mous development of components by loosely coupled organization struc-
tures is possible. Modularity in product design reduces the need for 
«hand-in-glove» supply relationships, because knowledge encapsulation 
within modules lowers inter-firm interdependence and, hence, coordi-
nation and control needs (Sanchez, Mahoney 1996; Langlois 2003). The 
suppliers that design and produce modular components know ex ante 
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the interfaces of the component; this, in turn, reduces the information 
exchanges needed to design a component that fits the overall product 
design. Since component design and development can thus be isolated 
and carried out separately by suppliers within a «frozen» product ar-
chitecture, the need for intense coordination is lowered. Also, modular-
ity in design can improve the management and the outputs of the new 
product development activities by allowing firms to easily decouple both 
the design and the manufacturing of the components that constitute a 
product as well as ensuring an easy and well performing integration of 
the externally supplied components into the final product architecture. 
Overall, modularity in design should lead to modular supply chains 
in which members have few close organizational ties and, thus, may be 
more easily mixed and matched, highly dispersed and geographically 
and culturally distant (Fine 1998; Doran 2007). According to Sturgeon 
(2002), a modular industry is fragmented owing to various specialized 
capabilities associated with the manufacturing of various components. 
A modular industry is characterized by loose coupling of component 
designs, and a loosely coupled knowledge, a high rate of innovation, de-
signers flexibility in developing and testing products, and a high number 
of compatible suppliers. 
In the modular networks, the overall industry structure remains ver-
tically disintegrated. While some oems retain internal manufacturing 
capacity for specific reasons (fear of intellectual property loss, tight 
integration between processes and product innovation, retention of pro-
cess expertise to qualify outsourcing partners, etc.), globally operating 
contract manufacturers facilitate the build-up of external economies of 
scale and scope. Sturgeon (2002) calls this model modular production 
network «because distinct breaks in the value chain tend to form at 
points where information regarding product specifications can be highly 
formalized». Between these nodes, linkages are achieved by the trans-
fer of codified information. The author underlines how such a network 
is allowed by standards consolidation inside an industry that works as 
communication protocols. Components with standardized and industry-
wide accepted interface specifications decouple firms from one another, 
leading to increased specialization and technological improvement of 
components independently from innovations of other firms (Mikkola 
2003). Moreover, inside modular networks the trust, one of the features 
of the local networks, is substituted by international standards, which 
permit to compare different suppliers on a common base. Firms, by 
outsourcing a large share of their manufacturing, become more organi-
zationally and geographically flexible. Being the suppliers’ production 
relatively flexible in terms of volumes and products characteristics, their 
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transactions with brand-name companies remain general. Instead of 
«thickly relational» interactions between firms, as in the relational net-
works, modular supply chain are characterised by «thinly relational» 
interactions because the supplier specifies its own processes, purchases 
its own inputs, and retains an autonomous financial stance vis-à-vis its 
customer (Sturgeon 2002). Indeed, modular networks are characterised 
by the limited interdependence among actors. Thus autonomy is based 
on several preconditions as the use of it, «base processes», and widely 
accepted standards. All in all, modular supply chains are more flexible 
and eventually global. 
Interestingly, in reviewing the literature Colfer and Baldwin (2010) 
found that the mirroring is supported in the 70% of the cases and it is 
positively correlated with the firm’s performance. Nevertheless, while 
the modularity literature emphasizes the existence of the mirroring as 
well as its performance implications, most recent contributes identified 
the necessity to build a contingent view of this theory. 
Particularly, Cabigiosu and Camuffo (2012) identified some conditions 
under which the mirroring holds, such as (a) the stability of product ar-
chitecture; (b) the presence of industry standards; (c) firms’ strategies, 
organizations, and capabilities not aimed at increasing the integration 
with suppliers. Moreover, Furlan, Cabigiosu and Camuffo (2010) high-
lighted that, even for highly modular products with a stable product 
architecture, we are less likely to observe the «mirroring» in techno-
logically dynamic industries, characterised by incremental and modu-
lar innovations, where buyer-supplier integration is needed no matter 
the level of component modularity. Zirpoli and Becker (2011) show that 
component modularity does not substitute for high powered inter-organ-
izational mechanisms, in the sense that it does not solve the problem of 
integrating component’s technical performance within the vehicle. De-
fining standardized physical interfaces does not standardize the perfor-
mance contribution of a component and does not reduce the reciprocal 
interdependencies between component and vehicle performances. The 
authors show that this is particularly true for complex and technologi-
cally dynamic components (such as electronics or car occupant safety 
systems). Brusoni et al. (2001) show that, when the architecture of fast 
changing components stabilizes, manufacturers outsource both design 
and production but keep in house component-specific knowledge for 
rapidly changing components whose dynamism generates the possibility 
for technological unbalances. 
In this study, we will rely on the above literature to discuss if, how and 
to what extent evs’ architectural changes may affect supply relation-
ships management practices.
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3 Modularity in design in the automotive industry
The past decades have shown an increase in vehicle development and 
manufacturing outsourcing with a consequent shift in tasks and knowl-
edge from carmakers to first-tier suppliers. Nowadays the key processes 
own by the carmakers have a narrow focus: vehicle design and engineer-
ing, manufacturing of chassis, body, engine and powertrain, final assem-
bly. All other components (interiors, cockpit, braking system, electrical 
system, traction control system, fuelling system, exhaust system, coolant 
system) are usually designed, engineered and manufactured by suppli-
ers (Takeishi 2001; Fixson et al. 2005). 
In this context, modularity has attracted the interest of scholars in 
that early studies showed that product modularity reduces the need 
for a tight coordination between buyer and supplier during the product 
development stage (Doran 2004; Fixson et al. 2005; Ro et al. 2007): the 
specifications of standardized component interfaces and a clear one-to-
one component-function mapping were credited to create an informa-
tion structure that allows coordinating the activities as loosely coupled. 
Moreover, component modularity should increase and ease the rate of 
introduction of modular and incremental innovations while the concur-
rent and autonomous development of components speeds the through-
put time of npd activities thus reducing the npd costs (McDuffie 2012). 
Despite the expected benefits of modularity in design, recent empiri-
cal evidence shows that only few car components at the first level of the 
product hierarchy are truly modular and cars are overall integral prod-
ucts: the modularization efforts of some us and European carmakers 
have not been implemented successfully, with rare exceptions (Ro et al. 
2007; Sako 2003). In this respect, Fixson (2003) reviewed existing lit-
erature about product modularity in the car industry and offered a list of 
vehicle sub-systems that the literature has classified as modular. These 
systems are located at the first level of the vehicle product architecture 
hierarchy and are: the a/c system, the automotive console, the under-
body, the instrument panel, the brake system, and the climate control. 
Overall, only few car subsystems are highly modular. Recent studies 
suggest that while modularity may enhance carmakers’ performance, 
modular strategies are not the most performing in this industry and that 
further modularization processes in the a/c system would not necessarily 
lead to inter-organizational loosely coupled relationships between oems 
and suppliers (Cabigiosu, Camuffo, Zirpoli 2013; Zirpoli, Becker 2011). 
Cabigiosu et al. (2013) show that the complexity in the car architecture 
reduces the chances of modularity to be effective as a functional equiva-
lent of high-powered inter-firm coordination mechanisms (Cabigiosu, 
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Camuffo 2012; MacDuffie 2012; Zirpoli, Becker 2011). High-powered 
inter-organizational coordination mechanisms remain necessary to en-
sure effective and efficient product development. Moreover, they show 
that, in order to increase the modularization of vehicle components, 
carmakers need to heavily invest in component-specific knowledge (i.e. 
increase their level of vertical integration) and that the knowledge they 
held, more than component modularity, enhances the coordination with 
suppliers. One exception is identified by MacDuffie (2012) that describes 
the case of Chinese carmakers. These oems design modular cars because 
they almost completely rely on external suppliers to design the car sys-
tems. Once the suppliers have designed the car systems, the Chinese 
oems preserve these architectures that, otherwise, they would not be 
able to fully manage.
Overall, modularity has still a limited traction in the automotive in-
dustry and the evidence about its impact on supply chain management 
is not decisive. In the automotive industry we mainly observed that 
modularity in production is defined as the outsourcing of a product’s 
components: independent companies (e.g. suppliers) may develop, pro-
duce and deliver subsystems that are consistent with the scope and 
depth of their core competences (Campagnolo, Camuffo 2010). Modular 
designs are supposed to ease modular productions. While modularity 
in organization relates to how supply chain relationships are managed, 
modularity in production attains to the disaggregation of the production 
activities along the supply chain. Today, the automotive industry shows 
a high level of modularity in production and a low level of modularity in 
product design and organization, i.e. cars are overall integral products 
while subsystems are externally sourced maintaining a high level of 
integration with suppliers.
By reviewing the existent literature, this paper aims at evaluating the 
expected level of modularity of evs and, by building on the modularity 
theory, at discussing how evs’ architecture may affect the management 
of supply chain relationships. 
4 Electric vehicles main architectural changes
This study focuses on ev’s main architectural innovations and their 
organizational implications with a focus on supply chain management 
strategies. Particularly, in this section we will review the existing litera-
ture on evs to understand if and to what extent evs are, and are likely to 
become, more modular in their design.
evs powertrain system mainly consists of an electric engine that moves 
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the wheels, a battery for energy storage, and an electronic control sys-
tem. Initially, most car manufacturers, such as Renault and Peugeot, fa-
voured electrifying existing models pursuing a low-cost strategy. These 
evs were unsuccessful, mainly due to a limited range, and a higher price 
relative to comparable ic vehicles. A fter 1997 a few car makers, such as 
Toyota and Honda, launched hybrid vehicles that had similar range as 
ic vehicles. By 2008, the us market shares of these models grew till 4% 
(Dijk, Yarmine 2010),
The first generation of evs is derived from the adaptation of existing 
product platforms. Presently, with very few exceptions, electric vehicles 
are obtained through the adaptation of chassis (or floor pan), bodies and 
powertrain engineered for traditional internal combustion engines (ic). 
Also hybrids and fuel cell solutions can often be integrated into existing 
vehicles with minor changes to the car design. 
Consequently, evs, hybrids and fuel cell cars all suffer from under-
optimized energy efficiency and car architectures. The perspective of 
very low sales volumes and the dramatic uncertainty about the future 
of evs technological trajectories has so far refrained carmakers from 
heavily investing into dedicated evs’ architectures for the mass market. 
Moreover, battery and fuel cell technology are likely to be niche markets 
because batteries are still comparatively expensive components. Broad 
diffusion for evs is expected only around 2020 (Brown et al. 2010). Con-
sequently, today evs are often built on ic-based platforms and only the 
second generation of evs may go over this technological lock-in (Cowan, 
Hultén 1996; Midler, Beaume 2010). Marletto (2011) talks about a «car 
regime» environment in which the lock-in is so much rooted that shift 
towards ecological motorization could be achieved only through poli-
cies of institutional change. Van den Hoed (2007), studying patents in 
alternative drivetrain technologies, showed that manufacturers invested 
in both battery electric drivetrains and hybrids and fuel cell solutions 
but gave priority to the latter because they can more easily lead the 
drivetrain electrification in mass-produced cars. 
Table 1 shows that today the main components that are not in common 
between ic cars and evs are those belonging to the engine group and the 
transmissions (Cuenca et al. 1999). Indeed, we will now focus on how the 
architecture of these components is changed and to what extent they 
may affect the overall car architecture and its modularity level.
According to Christensen (2011), a large number of the components, 
such as batteries, electric motors, inverters, generators and brake en-
ergy regeneration systems, are shared across ev, hybrid and fuel cell 
drivetrain solutions. The similarities of alternative drivetrain technolo-
gies suggest that their development activities can be partially shared 
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and that the drivetrain can become more modular. Christensen (2011) 
provided some examples of how alternative drivetrain technologies are 
affecting car architecture. General Motors developed the gm Hy-wire 
model following a platform approach in which a skateboard-like lower 
body, containing a full fuel cell system with drive-by-wire technology, can 
be applied to various upper body vehicle applications. The Chevy Volt, 
produced by General Motors, has an electric drivetrain developed on a 
platform that facilitates the flexible choice between three different pro-
pulsion options: a pure battery electric option, a combined electric/com-
bustion engine option and a combined electric/fuel cell option. In such 
a case, the three propulsion options constitute three modules. Finally, 
Mitsubishi has developed a design strategy where «the modularization 
of related components for electric drivetrains enables the company to 
develop components for three interchangeable drive systems simultane-
ously. Mitsubishi has designed an in-wheel assembled electric engine 
that can be applied to a battery electric vehicle, a hybrid electric vehicle 
or a fuel cell electric vehicle» (p. 217). The lithium-ion battery and the 
in-wheel electric motor are both produced by external suppliers. 
These cases suggest that both the engine and transmission can be de-
signed as car modules and have an inner modular architecture in which 
components can be shared across platforms. Moreover, following Chris-
tens (2011), ev concepts will improve the feasibility and implementation 
of the drive-by-wire (dbw) technologies that eliminate the mechanical 
connection between the steering wheel and the steering gear box thus 
freeing up space in the engine compartment. A small motor aids the 
driver to turn the steering wheel in a smooth easy motion. Instead of 
operating the steering and brakes directly, the controls would send 
commands to a central computer, which would instruct the car on what 
to do. The great advantage being put forward this way is that it would 
possible to improve the roadholding and the overall energy efficiency 
through the electronic control of the joint work of steering, suspensions 
and brakes in response to driver’s actions and road conditions (Varghe-
see et al. 2008).
dbw would provide a triple source of benefits: 
1. gear lever, steering columns and pedals could be abandoned with 
benefits in terms of lower complexity, weight and space thus increas-
ing the degree of freedom in the interiors design;
2. making the chassis and the body independent with a dbw solution 
would give the possibility to design and engineer these two macro-
components separately, theoretically as two separated modules. In-
deed, the elimination of mechanical elements for driving control is a 
automotive in transition
the impact of electric motorizations 67
Table 1: components in common between ic vehicles and ev.
Vehicle group and subgroup Fullycommon
Somewhat
common
Not
common
Body group
Body-in-white ×
Paint and coatings ×
Glass ×
Interior body trim ×
Exterior body trim ×
Seats ×
Instruments panel ×
Restraint system ×
Body electrical components ×
Heating, ventilating,  
and air-conditioning (HVAC)
×
Engine group
Base engine ×
Emission control ×
Engine accessories ×
Engine electrical components ×
Cooling system ×
Transmission group
Transaxle ×
Clutch and actuator ×
Transmission control ×
Chassis group
Frame ×
Suspension ×
Steering ×
Brakes ×
Exhaust system ×
Fuel storage ×
Final drive ×
Wheels and tires ×
Bumpers, fenders, and shields ×
Chassis electrical components ×
Accessories and tools ×
Fluids ×
Source: Cuenca et al. 1999, p. 10.
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premise for a radical detach of the chassis (which would include all 
elements needed to assure the motion: engines, transmission, bat-
teries, brakes and so on in a sort of «surfboard») from the body and 
the passengers’ cabin (presently the chassis and the body are welded 
together). The potential advantage is to have a lower number of inter-
faces, a much higher freedom of design of the body and the interiors 
coupled with a higher degree of standardization of the surfboard. As 
Cabigiosu et al. (2013) suggested, highly modular cars are character-
ized by a wide reliance on open-standard interfaces that can constrain 
the car’s style viable options. The overall reduction of ev complexity 
is key to avoid that too many frozen interfaces limit oem’s design 
choices;
3. finally, the substitution of mechanical interfaces with electrical ones 
and the opportunities offered by the integrated electronic control of 
the whole powertrain should ease the development of open standard 
interfaces.
evs have no emission (therefore no exhaust system is needed) and can 
exploit the advantages of direct transmission. Theoretically, no clutch or 
conventional gearbox are needed, since the electric engine provides a 
very high torque since the minimum regimes. Differential can be elimi-
nated connecting electric motors to the wheel axle. Since all transmis-
sions elements are a major source of lost in efficiency, designer will 
likely tend to focus on solutions that eliminate them (Larminie, Lowry 
2003; Kulkarni et al. 2011). The «extreme» solution is to have the motors 
coupled to the wheel-shaft; such a solution provide a significant improve-
ment in performances (speed and acceleration) and a very significant 
saving in space and weight. 
Also, evs allow partially substituting mechanical interfaces with elec-
tronic interfaces. In traditional cars a huge share of electronic systems 
is devoted to the control of ic functioning (injection, fault diagnostic, 
cooling, etc.). Such systems will disappear while driving and traction 
controls electronics will probably became even more relevant and, as 
suggested by the history of the pc industry, they are likely to become 
open standard interfaces (Baldwin, Clark 2000). As far as this last point 
is concerned, there already exist industry standards for computers, bat-
teries and battery components. Nevertheless, there is still a need to 
develop international standards for larger-scale battery packs that can 
be used by the ev as well as advanced and future battery technologies. 
«Basic standards and frameworks exist, but much work to bring the 
needed regulations and standards to light is still required. A number of 
the most pressing areas have been identified, particularly new battery 
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technologies, the emergence of v2g (vehicle to greed) technologies and 
possible impacts on the quality of electricity on power networks, and 
in terms of the full lifecycle environmental impacts associated with the 
evs» (Brown et al. 2010, p. 3806).
Overall, evs allow reducing the number of the components in a car, the 
interfaces among them and partially substituting mechanical interfaces 
with electrical interfaces that are easier to standardize. Today, these 
architectural changes mainly regard the engine group and the trans-
missions that are still «plugged in» a traditional ic based vehicle thus 
reducing the potential ev efficiency. 
To achieve ev «product integrity», as defined by Clark and Fujimoto 
(1990), oems may need to deeply revise the next generations of evs’ 
product architectures in order to adapt to new constraints (especially 
the battery location). They need to rethink the performance criteria, 
which drive the technical design choices on nearly every component of 
a car. For example, energy efficiency is a key performance for evs as it 
has an immediate impact on vehicle autonomy. Thus, redesigning more 
energy efficient lighting or heating is a key aspect of future ev projects. 
The whole design system has thus to be reoriented on the new electric 
mobility paradigm. The occurrence of a «performance gap» may be sat-
isfied only by more technically integrated solutions (Brown et al. 2010; 
Sierzchula et al. 2012).
5  evs, modularity in design and supply chain relationships
In this section we debate, by building on the modularity and the in-
novation management literature, what the expected effects of a evs ar-
chitecture on supply chain management relationships will be. Firstly, we 
will discuss the role that the interplay between modularity and techno-
logical dynamism has in shaping supply relationships. Secondly, we will 
include into the analysis oems organization, strategies and capabilities.
The literature suggests that industries often become disintegrated 
over time (Baldwin, Clark 2000). As Fine and Parker outline (2008), this 
disintegration has been explained by the increasing efficiency through 
the division of labour and, at the firm-level explanation, by the potential 
gains from specialization and gains from trade. In their work on the evo-
lution of the computer industry, Baldwin and Clark (2000) describe the 
initial creation of the modular architecture as preceding the emergence 
of a modular industry structure. Also Glavin and Morkel (2001) and Fix-
son and Park (2008) emphasized the relationship between product archi-
tecture and supply chain management practices in the bicycle industry.
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The above analysis suggests that oems’ attempts to move toward high-
er levels of modularity may be eased by electrification (Christensen 
2011). The observed higher modularity levels may support the idea that 
these architectural changes may enhance more loosely coupled sup-
ply relationships, increasing the suppliers substitutability, easing the 
integration of external sources of innovation till eventually leading to 
modular supply chains (MacDuffie 2012; Sturgeon 2002). 
The analysed evs architectural characteristics, such as the evs lower 
number of interfaces and components, suggest that evs are, other things 
equal, more modular than ic vehicles and that evs may potentially reduce 
the complexity of the design activities and of the corresponding supply 
relationships. 
Moreover, the need to simultaneously plug-in ev, hybrid and fuel cell 
drivetrain solutions into ic car platforms may foster the development of 
shared standard interfaces, ease the integration of externally sourced 
components and reduce the need of hand-in-glove relationships with 
suppliers.
Besides, the above paragraphs also describe how today evs do not only 
display architectural changes but also embody innovative technologies, 
such as the dbw technology. Moreover, both evs architecture and tech-
nologies are likely to face further modifications in the next years. Indeed, 
the potential managerial implications of evs higher modularity level 
should be discussed contingently on the level of technological change of 
the first generation of evs as well as on the future technological trajec-
tories that may regard evs technologies and dedicated platforms. 
Cabigiosu and Camuffo (2012) suggest that modularity in products 
and organizations may be related only if product architecture is stable. 
Component modularity works as a functional equivalent of high-powered 
inter-organizational coordination mechanisms only if the product archi-
tecture is ex-ante defined and frozen thus embodying those open and 
widely diffused standard interfaces that ease the coordination between 
a buyer and a supplier. 
Nevertheless, even if the product architecture is stable, we may not 
observe a relationship between modularity in products and in organi-
zations. When the product architecture is stable we may still observe 
intense and frequent modular and incremental innovations. In industries 
characterized by high levels of incremental and modular innovations, 
buyers may remain interested in getting access to supplier’s knowl-
edge base, in monitoring suppliers’ cost structures and performance 
via collaborative and «thick» supply relationships (Furlan et al. 2010). 
As Wolter and Veloso (2008) suggest, when component technological 
change is frequent, buyers will engage suppliers in an intense informa-
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tion and knowledge sharing and will rely on complex integration and 
control mechanisms, no matter what the degree of modularity of the 
sourced components is. In general, technological variation in compo-
nents continuously generates inter-organizational interdependencies 
throughout the product development process, despite efforts to limit 
them through modularity. 
Thus, till evs will be characterized by architectural changes and/or by 
frequent and intense modular and incremental innovations, even if the 
car architecture is modular, we cannot expect that their supply chain 
will become modular à la Sturgeon (2002).
When oems act as system integrators of complex and technologically 
dynamic components, such as car subsystems, they have to keep sub-
stantial component specific knowledge even about outsourced compo-
nents. Two ways to nurture this component specific knowledge are to 
maintain a high level of vertical integration or to remain engaged in 
«thick» relationships with suppliers. Brusoni et al. (2001) show that 
manufacturers keep in house component specific knowledge for rapidly 
changing components. oems acquire component specific knowledge to 
maintain the ability to act as system integrators and develop collabora-
tive relationships with suppliers. Cabigiosu et al. (2013) show that the 
ability to design a highly modular car subsystem is contingent upon 
an in-depth knowledge of both the subsystem architecture and its in-
ner components. Given cars’ architectural complexity, only oems with 
components specific knowledge can design more modular systems and 
experience the benefits of this architecture, as coordination and control 
mechanism. While component modularity and design outsourcing are 
considered as complements in modularity literature, they may be dif-
ficult to combine. Carmakers can effectively modularize a system if they 
maintain in-house some subsystems specific knowledge by increasing 
their level of vertical integration or, alternatively, if they extensively rely 
on supplier’s competences and high-powered integration mechanisms. 
On the transactions point of view, tapping into the capabilities of the 
supplier by continuously exchanging information about the product or 
the process allows the buyer to better evaluate the supplier’s offers. 
Moreover, technological change increases the performance uncertainty 
of the sourced components and makes it more difficult for the buyer to 
develop measures of suppliers’ performance. Therefore, the partners 
need to share information and maintain collaborative hand-in-glove sup-
ply relationships to reduce information asymmetries and to write clear 
and credible contracts, no matter what the level of component modular-
ity is (Furlan et al. 2010; Wolter, Veloso 2008). 
Therefore, despite the evs’ potential higher level of modularity, we do 
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not expect that modularity may substitute high-powered integration tolls 
till evs will face architectural changes and/or frequent and intense incre-
mental/modular innovations: supply chain relationships are likely to re-
main collaborative, characterized by an intense information sharing and 
physical co-location. On the contrary, if evs’ architecture will stabilize and 
innovations will be characterized by a low frequency and intensity, mod-
ularity in design may ease the management of supply chain relationships. 
Besides, even under these circumstances, organizational interdepend-
encies may remain and the need for collaborative supply relationships 
will persist. Some levels of buyer-supplier integration may complement 
modularization ex post allowing problem solving for unforeseen design 
and supply chain management issues. 
Furthermore, while today evs constitute a niche market, we do not 
know how oems strategies will evolve. 
If evs will be considered key in the competitive scenario, car-makers 
may be wiling to increase their control over these architectures, their 
sub-systems and components, thus maintaining a high level of vertical 
integration no matter the level of evs’ modularity. In this case, oems 
would not narrow the scope of their knowledge because relying on the 
component specific knowledge owned by suppliers may be too risky. 
oems’ knowledge necessarily have to span components boundaries (Bru-
soni et al. 2001; Cabigiosu, Camuffo 2012). 
On the contrary, if evs will be perceived as a marginal market, oems 
may not highly invest in components specific knowledge and be more 
willing to rely on the higher level of modularity that evs may enable and 
to match it with loosely coupled and less-intensive supply relationships. 
In such cases oems may rely on available industry standards and external 
suppliers competences to develop evs (MacDuffie 2012). For the sake 
of completeness, this scenario is likely to exist only if electrification per 
se will increase car’s modularity level. Otherwise, specific oems effort 
and investments in components specific knowledge will be required to 
increase evs modularity, thus increasing oems’ level of vertical integra-
tion (Cabigiosu et al. 2012). 
All in all, we expect that modular evs will be coupled with modular 
supply chains, characterized by a high level of outsourcing and loosely 
coupled supply relationships, only if a) evs technical characteristics per 
se increase the level of car’s modularity; b) architecture stabilizes and 
presents minor modular/incremental innovations and b) oems do not 
perceive components specific knowledge and evs as a source of competi-
tive advantage. 
Even in this scenario, modularity may complement and not fully sub-
stitute high-powered integration tools (Cabigiosu, Camuffo 2012).
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6 Conclusions
Part of the modularity literature argues that modular products are 
produced by modular supply chains (Sturgeon 2002). This study, by 
reviewing the existent literature, shows that evs architecture is likely 
to become more modular than ic architecture and that evs embody new 
technologies. Also, while evs developed so far are mainly built on ic 
platforms, the next evs models may be more performing and innovative 
if developed from dedicated platforms. 
With high uncertainty about changes in technology and markets, sta-
bilization of a modular product architecture is a two-edged sword. Some 
standardization may be necessary to allow first-tier suppliers to focus on 
the complex subsystems in which they have distinctive capabilities. But 
too much standardization can become a barrier to systematic innovation 
and lock car-makers into a potentially obsolete product architecture. 
This explains why firms, such as car-makers, are reluctant to commit 
to single product architecture and to a closed set of standard interfaces, 
hence constraining the development of product and organizational mod-
ularity. In these contexts, new hybrid forms of industrial organization 
that mix and match elements of modularity and integration are likely 
to emerge. These hybrid organizational responses reflect the fact that 
firms need to cope with highly complex technical and competitive chal-
lenges for which no ready-made organizational solutions exist. 
Only at the point in which evs will become overall mature products, 
characterized by a stable product architecture and a low level of techno-
logical change, oems will not perceive as key to maintain the control over 
externally supplied evs’ subsystems and modularity may play a role in 
fostering disintegration processes of evs’ supply chains. In this scenario, 
co-development practices might be less relevant and the advantages of 
relational and geographical quasi-rents negligible. Suppliers and buy-
ers identity may become less important thus increasing the competition 
within the industry. Besides, even this may be a temporarily equilibrium 
that will resist till new technologies that foster the re-integration of the 
product architecture will be introduced (Fixson, Parker 2008).
Today, oems’ strategic control over car subsystems, such as the pow-
ertrain, and the evs’ technological evolution are likely to limit modular-
ity in supply chains. The need to maintain a high level of control over 
the powertrain technology and its performance fosters the integration 
and knowledge sharing with suppliers of complementary components 
and oems’ reliance on collaborative supply relationships. The intensity 
of these relationships is also increased by the fluidity of the technology 
embodied into evs’ components. 
automotive in transition
74 anna cabigiosu
Future studies should focus on the potential of evs’ market. If evs will 
remain a niche market it is less likely that oems’ strategies will focus 
on them, that dedicated platforms will be developed and that oems will 
heavily invest in innovative technologies. Also, scholars may analyse 
whether suppliers with proprietary technologies will play a dominant 
role thus favouring the development of open standards, as happened in 
the pc industry with the Wintel platform. 
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Towards a new business model  
for automotive distribution
Leonardo Buzzavo
abstract The automotive industry has been undergoing a profound reor-
ganization in upstream activities for quite some time. Such reorganization, 
however, has only recently started to affect the distribution domain that has 
traditionally been based on a system of family-owned franchised dealerships 
according to a scheme of vertical quasi-integration. During recent years the 
market downturn in Western Europe has exacerbated an already critical situ-
ation of reduced dealer profits due to high levels of intra-brand competition, 
while service and intangible elements in the automotive product matter and 
digital technologies are creating new potential for change. This chapter focus-
es on the transformations in place (including margin structures and retailer 
concentration) and discusses how the traditional business model of franchised 
dealerships (intended as a set of choices on the target, the offering, the chain 
of activities and the profit model) is evolving.
1 Distribution in the automotive value chain
Distribution plays an important role in the automotive industry, for 
two major reasons. Firstly, it represents a considerable portion of the 
value chain: industry observers generally estimate its cost between 
25% and 30% of the vehicle list price, and the number of employees 
which are involved in sales and servicing activities in mature mar-
kets (such as Western Europe) is usually higher than those which are 
involved in manufacturing and assembly (Volpato, Zirpoli 2011). Sec-
ondly, the distribution chain is also a focal point for the effectiveness 
of the whole automotive system as it is a territory for value creation: 
the value of the whole automotive product as perceived by customers 
is not just determined by the vehicle itself and its intrinsic features 
but depends on many factors linked to the point of sale and service. 
Moreover, distribution is a means to match supply and demand, possi-
bly not just shifting metal downwards but rather activating intelligent 
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«market sensing» mechanisms that are beneficial for the whole system 
(Volpato 1986). As a matter of fact, franchised dealers are not just in-
volved in selling and in physical distribution activities but have become 
more and more involved in tasks of marketing and brand support since 
manufacturers are highly interested in enhancing the purchase and 
ownership experience towards greater customer loyalty, possibly «for 
life» (Sewell 1990).
Automotive distribution features a significant degree of complexity 
due to the specific nature of the product and its demand. Cars are dura-
ble goods with a high economic impact on the customer budget, which 
calls for the deployment of an appropriate system of servicing and parts 
distribution throughout the market. Demand is highly segmented and 
that requires a broad product range with significant depth in terms of 
variations and specifications. In every target market there is an importer 
(usually owned by the oem, i.e. a national sales company) that manages 
product distribution through a network of dealerships (owned by inde-
pendent entrepreneurs), ensures servicing activities through a network 
of authorized repairers, and coordinates parts distribution.
The flows of information and finished products that move throughout 
the automotive supply chain involve many players after the assembly 
line, including market-level importers, franchised dealerships and logis-
tics companies who often manage stocks on behalf of the manufacturers. 
As a consequence, the performance of the whole distribution system is 
not just related to the local optimization of sub-processes, but is heavily 
influenced by the coordinating mechanisms at the whole system level 
(Buzzavo 1997).
This chapter focuses on the role of automotive distribution within the 
whole value chain and addresses the following key questions:
1. How is distribution evolving when compared to performance improve-
ments achieved in other parts of the value chain (i.e. upstream activi-
ties)?
2. How are franchised dealers, being the key actors in the distribution 
chain, performing?
3. Are there trends of retailer concentration, and to what extent?
4. How is the business model of franchised dealerships evolving in re-
sponse to industry transformations?
These questions will be addressed with specific reference to the West-
ern European market and, in most cases, by making direct reference to 
the Italian market, where more detailed and analytical data are available 
over a significantly long time frame.
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Before addressing these questions, for the sake of a better under-
standing of our reasoning, it is worth sketching out how the current 
distribution system originated about one century ago.
2 The origins of the automotive distribution system
At the beginning (late 19th and early 20th century) manufacturers op-
erated a mixed distribution structure with multiple channels (Pashigian 
1961) including: a) branches (sites that were wholly owned by manufac-
turers and used for direct sales); b) distributors (wholesalers who man-
aged large stocks of cars in relevant geographic areas and channelled 
cars to consumers through retailers – dealers –, which could be either 
owned by a distributor or by an independent operator, and which of-
fered a wide range of services to the consumer, in particular repair and 
maintenance activities); c) agents (in charge of collecting orders from 
customers, but with a very simple and cost-effective organization).
With the market expansion that took place after World War One manu-
facturers aimed at exerting greater control over the increasing number 
of dealers, who were assigned an exclusive sales territory and a set of 
operating standards. When, after World War Two, the large growth in de-
mand created a mass market, dealers undertook rising investments for 
vehicles and parts stocks and for brand-specific items (e.g. tools, signs), 
often representing sunk costs. The distribution contract was full of so 
many obligations that it determined a sort of vertical quasi-integration 
(Volpato 1989). In other words, dealers were independent operators but 
their policies were highly influenced by manufacturers.
The development of such an asymmetric situation was made possible 
by favourable market conditions (a seller’s market), which created op-
portunities of high profits for car manufacturers. These profits have 
partly been handed over to dealer owners who in substance have given 
up much of their entrepreneurial independence, accepting the consider-
able restraints existing in the franchising contract, in exchange for high 
profitability levels.
As effectively pointed out by Marx (1985), the system of franchised 
distribution adopted by the automotive industry was not coming from a 
«grand plan» but rather it evolved due to changing economic conditions. 
In the early decades of the 20th century a relatively simple distribution 
systems existed that was only appropriate for a static and predictable 
environment: it could no longer deliver the level of coordination that 
was necessary to meet the increasingly diverse and sophisticated de-
mands for products and services which were coming from consumers, 
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with a set of sales fluctuations and the need to manage a growing need 
for trade-ins (that is, used cars that new car buyers had to dispose of 
while purchasing a new one) that made every transaction unique and 
requiring trading and not just retailing skills, with a new factor of risk 
and financial burden involved.
On the whole, the phases of market growth and rapid motorization that 
took place in the second half of the 20th century have heavily shaped the 
underlying properties of the distribution system and its operating logics. 
Thanks to the steady growth of sales volumes, competition among deal-
ers representing the same make (intra-brand competition) was not an 
issue. Moreover, within the relationship between oems and the market 
the orientation towards customer satisfaction did polarize on the prod-
uct (function, design, quality) leaving a rather marginal role to service 
elements (delivery times, relationship with the dealer, after-sales care, 
and so on). In other words, such emphasis on engineering and manufac-
turing dimensions left little room in oems and national sales companies 
for an approach based on a service culture and customer care.
Given their rigid cost structure, oems are generally inclined to satu-
rate plants and therefore to maximize production volumes, so that even 
during phases of lower demand the tendency is to push sales, channel-
ling a considerable level of product in the market. So in the traditional 
logics of operation the distribution network has represented a sort of 
pipeline in which stock pressure could be exerted rather than a tool 
through which a two-way communication channel could be activated 
so as to valorize the wealth of information that can be gathered from 
customers (Volpato 1986).
Starting from the 1970s, in the car market a series of changes oc-
curred, which gradually led to a buyer’s market, and started under-
mining the sustainability of the traditional structure. Among the most 
relevant factors of this transformation there are the oil crises, the entry 
of Japanese competition in the international car market, and the gradual 
disappearance of first-time buyers, switching to replacement demand 
in mature markets. Later on, at the turn of the century, pressures grew 
further with the increase of globalization and competition, the tech-
nological transformations, and the effects of the worldwide recession. 
Although the pressures for change in the 1970s and the evolution from a 
seller’s to a buyer’s market started increasing the degree of competitive-
ness and eroding margins without inducing significant changes from a 
structural standpoint, the set of changes unfolding in the new century 
have brought a more radical set of pressures for a deeper overhaul of 
the business model.
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3 Industry transformations and the «system mismatch»
As we have seen, the specific architecture of the automotive distribu-
tion system was developed in a way that was consistent with the state 
of demand. When things started to change, a considerable degree of 
«mismatch» between upward stages of the car system and downward 
activities has emerged.
The market shifted from a seller’s to a buyer’s market, replacement 
demand became dominant, while customers were becoming more ma-
ture thanks to the availability of more and better information, hence they 
were also more demanding in terms of quality, reliability, safety, residual 
values, elements of customization and so on. The extreme acceleration in 
the growth of information and communication technologies (ict) and the 
rise of social networks have altered the quantity and quality of informa-
tion available among customers, and the mechanisms governing adver-
tising and shopping. The greater level of transparency has dramatically 
reduced the information asymmetry between customers and dealers 
(e.g. with respect to the dealer margin and the presence of additional 
manufacturer campaigns), while electronic media stimulate aggressive 
comparison-shopping and can drive margins down. 
While production started to chase growingly differentiated customer 
needs through a set of multiplying segments and niches, the higher 
degree of homogeneity among quality and reliability standards of ve-
hicles triggered more attention towards intangible elements revolving 
around the purchase and ownership of a vehicle. This has determined 
the greater importance of soft elements such as: customer care, brand 
image, customized relationships, provision of complementary services 
and so on. As a result, distribution players (franchised dealers) have 
become more and more important as customer touch-points.
What happened upstream? Over recent decades manufacturers have 
embarked in massive reorganization efforts towards more efficient and 
flexible chains, adopting the lesson of lean manufacturing and lean com-
ponent supply. This trend was vividly promoted by a research undertak-
en by the imvp (International Motor Vehicle Program) that identified the 
set of principles lying at the basis of Toyota’s superior performance – in 
terms of efficiency, quality and flexibility –, which acted as a world-class 
benchmark (Womack et al. 1990). But the most striking thing is how from 
the standpoint of manufacturing and component supply, many indicators 
show evidence of a performance improvement, whereas looking at the 
distribution arena the situation appears quite baffling.
Figure 1 shows the trend in the levels of stock of finished vehi-
cles at the market level, in the four major European markets (France, 
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Germany, Italy and uk). Part of this stock is kept in manufacturer-
controlled compounds (vehicles that have been imported to the target 
market), the rest is located at dealerships. For volume brands, over 
the last 15 years the level of stock at compounds, measured in days of 
sales, has reduced only marginally (from 14 days to 11.1). The stock at 
dealer level has remained relatively flat at around 40 days, with the 
exception of two swings in 2009 and 2011 due to rather favourable 
and unfavourable levels of demand respectively. But the situation is 
even more striking when one looks at the levels of stock for premium 
brands, with both compound and dealer stocks increasing consider-
ably over the years.
It should be noted that a non-lean distribution can act as a serious 
bottleneck for the whole system and reduce its overall performance, for 
example by eroding advantages obtained in manufacturing in terms 
of product variety of lead time. For example, a lead time advantage in 
production, which is rather complex and costly to achieve, can be offset 
by inefficiencies downstream. Similarly, production leaps in terms of 
variety and ability to build to order and to customer specifications loose 
importance if high stock levels are in place, driving dealers to push sales 
from existing stock (Waller 2012).
Fig. 1. Market-level stocks for volume and premium brands.
Source: icdp – data for France, Germany, Italy and uk.
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We can therefore argue that the transformation of the value creation 
architecture of the automotive chain has just started to affect distri-
bution that still holds considerable potential (Buzzavo 1997; Maxton, 
Wormald 2004; Dietl et al. 2009), and this has become a more urgent 
task given the dramatic fall in sales volumes in major European markets 
that took place more recently due to the financial crisis and recession 
(see figure 2).
This situation of «system mismatch» between the upward and down-
ward portions of the automotive system is causing distribution to grow 
in importance within the strategic agendas of oems, with considerable 
delays to be addressed.
4 Changes at the economic level: dealer margins
The transformations in the automotive industry (saturated market and 
falling demand, intense competition, developments in ict) have contrib-
uted to make the distribution business more complex. The increase in 
sophistication pushed dealers (with their human resources, their pro-
cedures, their services) to become more professional and supportive of 
customer needs, usually incurring in higher costs. Intra-brand competi-
tion has eroded margins requiring dealers to gain efficiency (i.e. reduce 
costs) and to boost other profit generators (such as service, parts, used 
cars, finance, etc.).
Figure 2. Sales trend in major European markets.
Source: acea.
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The intensity of the competitive confrontation has started to induce 
manufacturers to reduce their cost structures on all sides. Besides in-
tensifying the focus on the reorganization of their manufacturing and 
component chains, they have started to reduce new car selling margins. 
Broadly speaking, the industry has shifted from a typical gross dealer 
margin of over 15% in the mid-1990s (plus some extra bonuses, mainly 
volume-related) to a gross dealer margin in the order of 10% in recent 
years, with a vast increase in variable margin elements (often represent-
ing one third or more of the total available margin). The variable margin 
elements are linked to the dealer’s ability to fulfil certain requirements, 
such as, for example, customer satisfaction levels, additional brand-
related investments and procedures, customer information reporting, 
and so on, with schemes that can become highly complex (Buzzavo, 
Montagner 2005). The increased competition has driven up rebates to 
customers, wiping out much of the gross margin, so that dealers end up 
covering their costs (and possibly trying to earn a profit) on the variable 
component, which results in a greater uncertainty. Figure 3 shows how 
margin structures have changed during the past decade (data refer to 
volume brands in the Italian market).
Over the recent decade the total gross margin available (including 
the base margin plus additional bonuses depending on quantitative and 
qualitative elements) has remained rather stable between 13% and 14%. 
What changed much over the last decade is the size of the rebate to cus-
Figure 3. The structure of dealer margins.
Source: Quintegia (2013).
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tomers (due to oversupply versus a depressed market, triggering strong 
intra- and inter-brand competition) and the size of extra sales campaigns 
that manufacturers must activate in order to keep dealers alive. In fact, 
additional incentives in the form of extra sales campaigns must grow 
to compensate for increased rebates to customers, so that the actual 
gross margin (the base margin plus bonuses plus campaigns minus the 
rebate to the customer) hovers around 7-8%. From a general standpoint, 
such gross margin is broadly sufficient to cover the structure of dealer 
costs, generally in the order of 7%, leaving approximately a 1% return 
on sales (ros). But this line of reasoning remains theoretical, because 
the dramatic fall in demand has considerably reduced the average sales 
throughput of franchised dealers. In other words, while the gross mar-
gin has remained relatively stable (thanks to the support of extra sales 
campaigns), the losses in volumes have made the business unsustainable, 
so that many dealerships have been drowning in red ink. As a matter of 
fact, by looking at the portion of total sales that are retail sales (hence 
excluding direct sales by manufacturers for example to rental and leas-
ing companies, large fleets, etc.) we see that the total volumes sold by 
dealers in Italy have reduced from circa 1.7 million vehicles in 2004 to 
0.9 million vehicles in 2012 (source: Quintegia). It should be noted that 
while we are now focusing on data referring to the Italian market, this 
trend is broadly similar to other markets.
5 Changes at the structural level: retailer concentration
This kind of economic pressure has triggered a trend towards retailed 
concentration: more and more dealerships cannot survive in the new 
economic situation while bigger (and more financially solid) players 
look for scale economies through some acquisitions. Such concentration 
has been partly facilitated by manufacturers who, beginning to recog-
nize that they had pursued strategies of territory coverage that led to 
too many intermediaries during stages of market growth, have started 
aiming at a lower number of more solid entrepreneurs with a stronger 
equity structure and more professional facilities and systems, capable 
of playing a better role as retailing partners (Buzzavo 2008).
The concentration process has accelerated further in recent years due 
to the enormous pressures created by massive drops in sales volumes. 
As shown in Figure 4, in Italy the number of sales outlets has decreased 
by 15% over a decade (from 6,130 units to 5,215 units). It should be noted 
that over the last decade some brands – particularly Asian ones – have 
entered the market and/or expanded their distribution networks: as a 
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consequence the downward trend is even greater if we look just at the 
sales outlets of more mature networks. But the concentration process 
is much more visible at the level of franchise points (-25%) and at the 
level of the number of entrepreneurs who control them (-35%), down 
to 2,250 units.
As we have seen, the ongoing concentration process is quite dramatic: 
one Italian dealership entrepreneur out of three has exited the distribu-
tion industry over the last decade. It is also interesting to look at the 
degree of concentration in sales by the largest players operating in the 
market. Figure 5 shows the market share (in volume terms) of the top10 
and top50 dealers in the Italian market. Both shares have increased by 
about 60% in the last decade.
It should be observed that the degree of concentration, albeit grow-
ing, is still rather low when compared to other industries. We would 
argue that there are a few reasons behind this (Buzzavo 2008). On the 
one hand the automotive distribution industry has been influenced by a 
quite peculiar regulatory framework («Block Exemption») that defines 
the scope and operation of vertical restraints (Tongue 2010) that led 
manufacturers to prevent too much consolidation among retailers so to 
keep enough control over the distribution system. On the other hand it 
should be said that scale economies at the dealer level are rather mod-
est: there are no significant scale advantages in purchasing (at least for 
Figure 4. Trend in franchised dealerships (Italy) 
Source: Quintegia (2013)
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the time being) and it is not easy to achieve synergies across different 
sales outlets and different brands, at least not in the same level as for 
other industries. This rather low level of concentration compared to 
other industries is consistent with a persistent nature of family-owned 
businesses that still characterizes automotive distribution across many 
markets worldwide.
6 Manufacturer strategies and the distribution dilemma
Manufacturers, who in the past saw retailer concentration as a threat 
to their degree of control over the distribution system, are starting to see 
the benefits of retailer concentration (hence of a reduction in the num-
ber of intermediaries), although the strategic direction is not yet well 
established across all players. Some manufacturers (particularly French 
and German ones and with specific emphasis in their domestic markets) 
have tried to maintain a certain degree of control by using dealerships 
of their own (factory-owned stores). But this strategic option of direct 
distribution is an exception in Europe, with just 3% of dealerships being 
factory-owned (and none in the usa, due to very strict franchise laws that 
protect dealerships). The few existing cases often serve as a solution 
Figure 5. Market share (by volume) of top 10 and top 50 dealers in Italy 
Source: icdp, Quintegia (2013).
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for high-cost metropolitan areas (where costs would be too high for an 
independent entrepreneur) and/or as marketing and retail laboratories 
in order to maintain a touch-point with the end market.
While factory-owned stores do not seem a viable solution, at least for 
a reasonable time span, manufacturers are quite interested in explor-
ing the options to leverage Internet-based channels that could provide 
them with greater potential for customer access and dialogue. So far, 
Internet-based approaches have not yet shown a solid case on how to 
establish a new distribution system for manufacturers: in most cases 
these tools act as important complements to dealer activities rather 
than as substitutes of their role in the chain (Bailey 2012). Future evo-
lution will depend not just on technological aspects but rather on a set 
of elements including customer attitudes and legal frameworks. On the 
whole, it seems that both through owned-stores and through digital 
channels manufacturers do not seem in a position to have a strategic 
alternative to the franchised distribution channel, at least for a while. 
Besides the financial and organizational burden associated to running 
a direct distribution scheme, there are important issues relating to 
holding the necessary competences that retailing and all the relevant 
activities involve.
Figure 6. Dealer satisfaction in their relationship with manufacturers (Italy).
Source: Dealerstat.
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One interesting insight into the disequilibrium that has grown inside 
the distribution system can be grasped by looking at dealer satisfaction 
data in their relationship with manufacturers. As previously highlighted, 
industry transformations have placed more and more emphasis on the 
role of the dealer as a value-creating and value-adding player in the 
automotive chain (Parment 2008). This has driven dealer satisfaction to 
become more and more important to ensure the dealer’s commitment 
towards brand support and the pursuit of customer satisfaction (Buz-
zavo, Pizzi 2005; Nadin 2009). As figure 6 shows, over the past decade 
Italian dealers have been rather satisfied with the competitiveness of 
the products of the brands they represented (with a rating constantly 
above 3.5 on a 1 to 5 scale with 5 being the highest level of satisfaction), 
while the satisfaction with the profitability of their franchise has been 
receiving a negative rating (below 3, that represents neutrality), and, 
more importantly, with a downward trend.
The evolving features of the industry have led to a situation that un-
dermines the sustainability of the franchised distribution system and 
calls for more substantial action. The next part looks in more detail at 
the business model of franchised dealers and how it is evolving.
7 The traditional business model of franchised dealerships
Business models have become a popular concept both in the strategic 
management literature and among practitioners over the recent decade. 
To a considerable extent the growing diffusion of the concept stems from 
its capability to represent a more operational translation of the notion 
of strategy and to better capture the way in which the overall architec-
ture of the business generates a profit. Most contributions in academic 
literature, starting from the seminal works on the subject by Timmers 
(1998), Amit and Zott (2001), and Magretta (2002), revolve around the 
fact that a business model is broadly based on three major elements: 
«who are the customers», «how is the company intending to provide 
value to them», and finally «how is the company extracting value out of 
it». As many have pointed out, this approach inevitably finds its roots in 
the works of Drucker (1954) when defining a business.
Early introduction of the business model category took place within 
the domain of information management and ict contexts. As a matter of 
fact, the term grew very popular during the Internet boom in the 1990s, 
and it became a building block of almost every company operating in 
the Internet environments during the fervid years of the e-business 
revolution. At that time, it was typical for companies to develop innova-
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tive ways of arranging production and distribution activities, and the 
business model category acted as a sort of interpretative (as well as 
normative) element to discuss the way in which the firm was going to 
generate value and extract it from target customers. Business models 
then rapidly spread outside e-business contexts and gained a key spot 
within the theoretical and practical frames of business strategy (Oster-
walder, Pigneur 2010; Teece 2010).
The usefulness of a business model, however intended, is to draw at-
tention towards the identification of the basic constituents of a strategy, 
and particularly of the way in which a firm does business at the system 
level: how it creates value and how it aims at capturing it from its target 
market. Within the scope of this work we can consider a business model 
as made of the following components:
1. the target: who is the target of the company;
2. the offering: what is the company providing the intended target with;
3. the chain of processes involved, both inside and outside the company, 
that are generating the offering in question;
4. the profit model: how a company is extracting value from the target 
customers in a profitable manner.
As conditions change in a given industry, firms are required to adjust 
their business models accordingly: this implies taking decisions that 
determine changes in one of the components or in more than one, de-
termining a new combination. This leads to situations of business model 
innovation or «strategy innovation» (Casadesus-Masanell, Ricart 2011) 
where a recombination takes place in order to achieve dynamic consist-
ency with the new context.
The automotive distribution system provides an interesting opportu-
nity to look at how the typical traditional business model of automotive 
dealerships (that represent the key link between manufacturers and 
customers) must evolve in accordance with the changes in the competi-
tive scenario. The business model that has characterized the rise of the 
dealer system is no longer sustainable in the new competitive context: 
this determines a drive towards business model innovation along some 
key dimensions.
Let’s now draw some considerations on the characteristics of the 
traditional dealership business model. It should be underlined that this 
exercise implies some necessary simplification. As a matter of fact, when 
considering the entrepreneurial foundations of the business, it is not 
surprising that when one looks in close detail at franchised dealers one 
finds a considerable variation in terms of size (units sold, total turno-
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ver), number of brands represented (size of brand portfolio), number of 
outlets, geographic scope, ownership and governance structure, not to 
mention management style, rate of adoption of new technologies, etc. 
This means that franchised dealers, even when operating under the um-
brella of the same manufacturer brand, feature a considerable degree 
of variation and are far from homogeneous. Also, variations exist across 
different European markets (Buzzavo, Volpato 2003). 
All this considered, and bearing in mind this necessary simplifica-
tion, we could sketch a standard model of the building blocks of the 
traditional business model adopted by franchised dealers that is quite 
representative of the Italian situation (see Figure 7).
Automotive dealerships are assigned exclusive distribution rights for 
vehicles of a given brand in a territory: traditionally, sales territories 
have enjoyed a considerable degree of protection, so that customers in 
the area, unless they were prepared to travel to great distances, rep-
resented a sort of «natural» market. The dealers’ offering has been 
typically based on the sale of vehicles, with the provision of after-sales 
service (warranty work, maintenance, repair) and parts generally featur-
ing as a support activity to the sale. It must be noted that dealerships 
have been exploiting some additional businesses for some time. This is 
the case of service (that for example has traditionally been a stronger 
component of German dealers), parts (that has represented an important 
stream of revenues for some Italian dealers) and used cars (where uk 
dealers tended to be more actively involved). But while these streams 
Element
Target (customers) New car customers within the sales 
territory
Offering 
(product provided)
Sale of new vehicles of the repre-
sented brand (with selective provi-
sion of after-sales support, parts 
sales and used cars)
Chain 
(value building)
Order management, finance man-
agement, delivery management
Profit model 
(value capture)
Predominantly the margin on new 
vehicle sales (considerably influ-
enced by the manufacturer)
Figure 7. Traditional dealership business model (standard features)
Source: own elaboration.
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have existed for a while and have acted as profit generators capable of 
supporting down-cycles, they have generally been subservient in busi-
ness model design to the fixation on «moving the metal», particularly 
in the eyes of the manufacturers.
It should be noted that given that dealers’ focus has traditionally been 
on new car sales, a wide network of independent players operating in 
vehicle servicing and repair has grown to meet the demand that has 
increased along with the increase in vehicle park. Similarly, the limited 
degree of involvement of franchised dealers in the used car business has 
allowed many independent players to grow in this sector. 
On the whole, the profit model is centred upon the margin that is made 
on the difference between the selling price (that the customer pays) and 
the cost paid to the manufacturer: such margin, after the costs (struc-
tural and operational ones) borne by the dealer, generates a profit (it 
should be noted that in Italy the reliance on new car profits is consider-
able, while in other markets such as Germany and the uk dealers had 
started earlier on to support their companies through after-sales profits).
8 Elements of business model innovation
As we have said, many pressures have undermined the viability of 
traditional dealerships, creating pressure to transform their business 
model (Amit, Zott 2012). We will now explore how individual elements 
of the business model are evolving in order to adjust to the new context.
With respect to the target, the new business model requires dealers 
to become much more proactive, to operate a finer level of segmentation 
and to broaden the target.
The attitude of being more proactive, in line with the much diminished 
territorial protection, implies the use of more professional marketing 
techniques (such as geo-marketing) plus the exploitation of new ap-
proaches that move away from mass-marketing in favour of targeted 
initiatives, also levering the potential of new technological tools (i.e. 
using social media). Secondly, a finer level of segmentation depends 
on the need to investigate in greater detail the profile of the custom-
ers, their needs, and their willingness to pay for specific products and 
services. This means a major departure from a traditional way (usually 
reinforced by less professional salespeople) of conceiving customers 
as subjects merely in search of the lowest possible price. While such 
a view of customers induces greater discounts, at the expense of re-
tained margins, it also inhibits the search for opportunities to extract 
customer’s willingness to pay by providing a more tailored response to 
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their preferences and offer them value elements other than price in the 
overall transaction with the dealership. Broadening the target relates 
to the need for dealerships to consider not just new car customers as 
targets, but also used car customers and service customers, in order to 
feed their customer portfolio and business activities that have evolved 
from secondary to new car sales to being fundamental.
With respect to the offering provided, the major building block in in-
novating the business model is a re-conceptualization of the dealer busi-
ness, where new car sales are not the dominant portion (along with other 
elements such as accessories) and where the dealership is a portfolio of 
businesses revolving around customer mobility. This implies the need to 
take advantage of business possibilities that include new car sales, used 
car sales, finance and insurance provision, service and repair work, parts, 
accessories, sale of extended maintenance packages, rental services, and 
any other possible revenue stream associated with the above. This deter-
mines a gradual reduction in the dealership’s dependency on the new car 
business that is on the one hand highly volatile, and on the other hand 
highly dependent on the manufacturer. The high volatility is associated 
with the swings in demand in line with key variables such as disposable 
income and consumer confidence. The high dependence on the manufac-
turer and the low degree of dealer control over the new car business is 
considerable because: volumes are heavily determined by the market and 
pushed by manufacturer objectives, buying prices are set by the manu-
facturer, selling prices are set by the manufacturer (and influenced by 
market conditions, in terms of discounts), operating costs are heavily in-
fluenced by manufacturer policies (in terms of required brand standards).
With respect to the chain of activities, dealers must adapt their ac-
tivities and processes to the nature of the offering that has been just 
described above. While the traditional business model requires dealers 
essentially to focus on managing the order-to-delivery pipeline, in the 
new context dealers must enhance their ability to manage processes 
revolving around customers in a proactive way (e.g. lead management, 
geo-marketing techniques, etc.). For example, they should improve their 
ability to manage customer data from prospect to sale, they should devel-
op capabilities to manage the processes involved in the broader set of in-
gredients included in the automotive offering, and so on. To some extent, 
the new situation is pushing dealers to evolve from «hunters to farmers» 
(Kiff 2000). While in the traditional business model the dealer is basically 
required to be a sort of passive subject implementing with attention to 
detail the policy specified by the manufacturer, in the new situation the 
dealer must become an active agent defining its own set of processes, 
steps and indicators for the more complex set of situations involved.
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This leads to some considerations on the profit model at the dealer-
ship: with the development of other business streams, dealers reduce 
their dependency on manufacturers and can exploit varying ways of 
capturing revenues (and profit margins) with greater control, where 
the shape of the business portfolio to pursue becomes an integral part 
of the dealer’s own strategy depending on its capabilities and on the 
exploitation of market opportunities. While in new cars the structure 
and the operating standards and procedures are heavily determined 
by the manufacturer (whose interest is often to enhance the branded 
experience rather than to ensure an adequate level of dealer profit), in 
the other set of businesses dealers can take more autonomous decisions 
in their cost structures and operating processes. In other words, their 
structural choices and processes will be shaped on the basis of the ex-
pected revenue streams, so to ensure (at least in principle) the desired 
profit margin. To some extent, more and more dealers aim at gaining a 
Element Traditional Innovative
Target New car customers within 
the sales territory
More proactive attitude 
(also outside the territory), 
finer segmentation (aiming 
at willingness to pay) and 
broader target (i.e. used 
cars, services, etc.)
Offering Sale of new vehicles of the 
represented brand (with 
provision of some after-
sales support)
Broad mix of businesses to 
stabilize business, increase 
strategic autonomy and 
increase share of customer 
wallet
Chain of activi-
ties
Order management, 
finance management, de-
livery management
Prospecting and lead 
management, database 
management, customiza-
tion capabilities, follow-up 
procedures
Profit model 
(value capture)
Margin on new vehicle 
sales (considerably influ-
enced by manufacturer)
Margins on all business 
segments (less influenced 
by manufacturer and more 
dependent on autonomous 
choices) 
Figure 8. Features of business model innovation in automotive dealerships
Source: own elaboration.
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greater share of the customer wallet, often adopting a logic of business 
provision «from cradle to grave» by aiming at all the revenues (and 
profit streams) related to all the spending revolving around the auto-
motive purchase and ownership experience throughout their lifetime 
(Bloemer, Lemmink 1992; Huber, Hermann 2001).
Some of the most relevant dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997) for 
automotive dealers seem to reside on the ability to continuously adjust 
the business offering to the appropriate customer segments. The fact 
that the business contains a highly local dimension makes it difficult for 
manufacturers (or large retail chains) to appropriate the value that lies 
in the transaction (unless they manage to achieve considerable volume 
discounts in purchasing). Clearly, dealers must invest in the processes 
and information systems in place to accumulate (and use as necessary) 
the relevant customer information, with more effective learning capa-
bilities (Nonaka 1991).
On the whole, effective dealers are asked to manage the set of inter-
related businesses by achieving a proper cross-functional fit by taking 
advantage of complementarities, so that they become less and less «lo-
cal vehicle shifters» on behalf of the manufacturers, and more and more 
«intelligent customer managers», acting as a key link in the automotive 
distribution chain.
9 Perspectives
We have tried to operate some simplifications by sketching out the 
common drivers that are affecting the transformation in the dealership 
business model.
There are some important issues to be addressed in perspective.
The first issue relates to how automotive distribution will evolve in 
different geographies. Europe is still not a single market, and more dis-
tant markets are undergoing different stages of development. In China, 
for example, the strong growth in demand has triggered an explosion 
in the number of dealers that somehow mirrors what has happened in 
mature markets over the last century. Different geographic situations 
and market life-cycles will determine different paths of evolution for 
automotive distribution.
The second issue relates to the pace of the transformations. There are 
some critical elements that characterize the auto industry as rather dif-
ferent from other industries (i.e. high average unit price, low frequency 
of purchase, high safety implications, considerable need for after-sales 
care, need to trade-in a used car, etc.). To a great extent, these differenc-
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es have provided a sort of insulating mechanism from transformations 
that have affected retailing in general. How automotive retailing will be 
shaped by leaps induced by the digital revolution and to what extent it 
will mirror developments in other sectors cannot be fully grasped at the 
moment and remains to be seen.
The last point relates to the extent to which the degree of differentia-
tion across business models will be driven by the type of brand repre-
sented (i.e. volume, premium, low-cost). As a matter of fact, manufactur-
ers have varying degrees of influence to coordinate the whole system 
architecture depending on a set of factors including the strength of the 
brand (Dietl et al. 2009). As discussed throughout this chapter, automo-
tive dealership entrepreneurs have been willing to accept a subordinate 
position in the past in exchange for satisfactory profit levels. Now that 
those profits have been eroded by the new context quite some time ago, 
the manufacturers’ capability to retain a significant degree of control 
over the distribution chain rests on their ability to adjust the economic 
foundations of the distribution business model before it is too late.
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New ventures in old industries:  
disrupting or embedding?1
Vladi Finotto
abstract The chapter builds the case for a reconsideration of the concept 
of entrepreneurship and of innovation by new ventures to fit the current trans-
formations of the car and mobility industries. Through a synthesis of the debate 
on the social embeddedness of entrepreneurship and the reconstruction of the 
history of Pagani Automobili – an Italian producer of high-end sportscars – the 
chapter calls for the adoption of a perspective that recognizes venture creation 
as the mobilization of extant resources and competences rather than as a process 
of disruptive entry. Ultimately, the chapter proffers a view of entrepreneurial 
change that is embedded in, and relies on the mobilization of, the history of the 
industry. Such a view could guide the assessment of the potential of emerging 
ventures in the car and mobility industry as well as policy and industry initiatives 
to answer the enduring uncertainty affecting firms and clusters.
1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs in mature industries do not enjoy the privilege of hav-
ing numerous alternative routes to introduce novel business ideas and 
to convey them to the market. It is often the case that they must come 
to terms with – or are kept at bay by – existing industry hierarchies and 
architectures. Persistent institutional arrangements and «rules of the 
game» dramatically shrink the opportunity landscape. Resistances to 
novelty – either deliberate and due to the vested interests of incumbents, 
or latent and given to the lack of intelligibility of novel business ideas – 
often frustrate novel business ideas and concepts. 
The history of the car industry seems to corroborate such a state of 
affairs. With remarkable development costs, long development cycles, 
1. The author thanks Michele Bottoni and expresses his sincere appreciation for his 
collaboration in the reconstruction of the case and for his support in the process of data 
collection.
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a strong global competition and trends towards consolidation and con-
centration, the industry represents the epitome of such a closure to 
innovation by new ventures. The recent failure of what appeared to be 
the «next big thing» among policy makers and students of the industry’s 
transformation is Better Place. As we write, the ambitious venture pro-
posing a complex mix of electric vehicles, innovative battery technology 
and infrastructure has ousted his founder, has burned an impressive 
amount of cash and is being dismissed by the same media and commen-
tators that chanted its potential when it was created under the auspices 
of important political figures, industry experts and academics (Gunther 
2013; Reed 2013).
Nonetheless, attempts by entrepreneurs to redefine the logic of mo-
bility and to challenge the car culture increased rather than settling 
out of discouragement. Recent analyses on the future of mobility (see 
for instance Wells 2010; Calabrese 2012) point to the end of the techno-
logical monoculture of the car and of the parallel monolithic industrial 
structure. On the contrary they prefigure a future industry landscape 
characterized by technological diversity and the coexistence of hetero-
geneous mobility solutions. 
Expectations of industry analysts are characterized by the belief in 
the role of outsiders – founders of new ventures coming from different 
industrial backgrounds and experiences – entering the industry and 
disrupting its logic, displacing incumbents through to radical innovation 
and the establishment of novel business models. Such expectations are 
indebted to an overall view of entrepreneurship and of the entrepreneur 
as agents of radical change that «make things happen» in spite of re-
sistances and power by incumbents. In this chapter I argue that such a 
perspective is to be disputed for two main reasons: the first is eminently 
theoretical and is rooted in recent advancements in entrepreneurship 
studies; the second eminently practical and related to the development 
of policies and industry initiatives aimed at recognizing and fostering en-
trepreneurial ventures that promise to leverage upon extant resources 
and competences. 
In particular, the chapter aims at downplaying the traditional «heroic» 
and disruptive narrative on the entrepreneur and the parallel agentic 
attributions that characterized the recent debate on entrepreneurship. I 
claim that such a perspective underlies the incessant quest for the next 
«maverick» and revolution to come in the automotive industry, a quest 
that risks to precipitously discard the potential deep-rooted within the 
industry itself. On the contrary I aim at proffering a more nuanced and 
embedded view of entrepreneurship in mature settings such as the au-
tomotive industry, to claim that analysts, industry representatives and 
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policy-makers need not to look far from the industry to recognize – and 
ignite – the potential for change. In particular I maintain that entrepre-
neurs succeeding in endeavours that are deemed as infeasible according 
to prevailing industry wisdom, concretely «make it happen» by solicit-
ing the active contribution of incumbents, by obtaining legitimation 
from them, and by capitalizing on their competences and commitment. 
I advance the perspective that entrepreneurship in these settings is 
often a collective endeavour, and that the substantial engagement of 
incumbents in the endeavour is crucial for novel ventures to establish 
and prosper. Such a vantage calls for a reconsideration of the role of 
incumbents in supporting – or directly igniting – transformations in 
the way the industry thinks about mobility and provides solutions to 
emerging needs and constraints, through novel business models and 
conceptions. For extant players, clusters of firms and institutions, such 
a scenario means that, if adequately reinterpreted and leveraged upon, 
competences, technologies and ultimately jobs in the auto industry could 
find viable development paths into the future. To support the point, I 
present a longitudinal analysis of the venturing process and the even-
tual success of a niche manufacturer of high-end sportscars located in 
Modena: Pagani Automobili. 
2 Perspectives in entrepreneurship: what use in the car industry?
2.1 A knowledge gap
Scientific analyses of the automotive industry in economics and man-
agement have been largely oblivious of theories of venture creation 
and of entrepreneurship. Similarly, empirical analyses in the field of 
entrepreneurship have been rarely investigating the automotive industry, 
privileging on the contrary high-tech and high-growth sectors. Such a 
mutual lack of consideration was indeed justified by the characteristics 
of the industry in question. Automotive is characterized by a number of 
factors of inertia and resistance to change, such as sunk costs in every 
segment of the value chain, the lack of incentives for the development of 
novel infrastructures for new mobility solutions, a substantial stickiness 
of the worldwide market with the traditional idea of individual mobil-
ity, political considerations related to the sector’s relevance in terms of 
employment and many others. 
Despite such a discouraging scenario, the industry currently witness-
es the proliferation of a host of experimentations and entrepreneurial 
attempts carried out by new entrants. Some of these ventures are de-
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veloping business conceptions that focus on alternative propulsion sys-
tems – electric vehicles – and related infrastructures such as in the case 
of Tesla Motors, a venture founded and financed by important players 
in the it and software industry partnering with Lotus; similarly, Detroit 
Electric is heading to the market with a novel concept of a compact 
electric sportscar developed on a Lotus platform. Other interesting ex-
perimentations, such as Local Motors, aim at making custom car-making 
possible by matching designers and local producers of small batches of 
vehicles. Those who believe in a future scenario in which mobility will 
not be dominated by the car monoculture (Kemp et al. 2011) are placing 
their expectations on entrepreneurial initiatives leveraging on access to 
mobility services and mileage rather than to privately owned cars – as in 
the case of car sharing services offered by the like of Zipcar and other 
local ventures. 
Whether the future of mobility will be populated by these or different 
firms or business models is currently disputed. What interests the most, 
though, is whether the evolution of the industry will be characterized by 
the displacement of extant players and by the marginalization of extant 
competences and technologies or not. To put it simply: will the future 
of mobility benefit a host of novel players such as Tesla, Zipcar, Google 
with its project on electric driverless cars, or does it have in store a role 
for firms and workers currently involved in car production?
The rhetoric of entrepreneurship as an agent of radical change would 
have analysts and commentators opt for the displacement scenario. As it 
has developed in the last 20 years, entrepreneurship theory, indebted to 
assumptions taken from economics (Shane, Venkataraman 2000; Kirzner 
1973), would lead us to see the current crisis of the automotive indus-
try as a misallocation of resources and technologies in the market for 
mobility. In turn we would be brought to consider entrepreneurial entry 
as a disrupting force that will re-equilibrate the market. Such a view, 
nonetheless, has been disputed recently by researchers in entrepre-
neurship: far from being a linear and entirely disruptive process setting 
off extant players, entrepreneurship has been theorized, described and 
interpreted as a more nuanced and incremental process largely drawing 
from, and capitalizing on, extant competences, resources and social net-
works. In order to make my case, I will briefly synthesize the evolution 
of theoretical frameworks in the field of entrepreneurship. 
2.2 Disputing the «linear» and agentic view of entrepreneurship
The vitality of entrepreneurship as an area of research and as a res-
ervoir of theoretical frameworks for policies aimed at generating eco-
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nomic growth and job creation is due to the recent establishment of a 
clear research agenda for the field. It largely draws from the seminal 
work of Shane and Venkataraman (2000) that provided a definition of 
entrepreneurship that has come to dominate the literature in the last 
decade (Baker, Pollock 2007; Baker, Nelson 2005; Steyaert 2007). Ac-
cording to these authors, entrepreneurship is the set of processes that 
take place at the intersection between (objective) profit opportunities 
and enterprising individuals. In particular, entrepreneurship is a pro-
cess entailing the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportuni-
ties carried out by individuals that «notice [opportunities] in a wave of 
alertness» (Steyaert 2007, p. 460). Once the opportunity is discovered 
and evaluated, agents design consistent means-ends chains to exploit it, 
securing access to valuable resources that allow the attainment of clear 
and pre-determined goals. 
The assumptions underlying such a perspective have been largely 
criticized by a host of contributions sharing an explicit rebuttal of the 
rationalist framework underlying Shane’s and Venkataraman’s proposal 
(Foss, Klein 2011; Klein 2008). Emerging process-theories of entrepre-
neurship such as the perspective of effectuation (Dew et al. 2008; Saras-
vathy 2001) and that of entrepreneurial bricolage (Baker, Nelson 2005) 
provide with a more iterative and complex view on entrepreneurship and 
are currently central in the theoretical and empirical development of the 
field (Fisher 2012; Steyaert 2007; Johannisson 2009). While an exhaus-
tive review of these emerging approaches goes beyond the scope of this 
chapter and is alien to the aims of the volume, a summary of their tenets 
and of their assumptions is beneficial for the argument I want to develop. 
Emerging approaches to entrepreneurship differ from the «dominant» 
view based on opportunity discovery for its critique to the fundamental 
assumptions of the latter, namely: 
1.  The assumption that opportunities are exogenous, objective and 
waiting to be discovered is untenable, given that individuals are 
bounded in their ability to gather and process information and that 
information is unevenly distributed in society (Hayek 1949). Moreo-
ver, the trigger for technological, political and social shocks often 
lies inside the boundaries of the economy rather than outside them 
(Alvarez, Barney 2007). Proponents of alternative views and concep-
tualizations of entrepreneurship turn to the idea that opportunities 
are created by actors who enact selected portions of the environment 
and act upon them to gradually and incrementally obtain information 
and generate actionable knowledge (Baker, Nelson 2005; Sarasvathy 
2004; Weick 1979); 
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2.  The logical and chronological segregation between design and exe-
cution assumed in linear accounts on entrepreneurship – design pre-
cedes action – is discarded in favour of a recursive dynamic involving 
action and environmental feedbacks conducive to the refinement of 
both ends and needs in the process (Baker, Nelson 2005; Sarasvathy 
2001). In other words, entrepreneurial action, especially in the pre-
formation phase of a venture, is often non teleological and triggered 
by general aspirations (Dyer et al. 2008; Rindova et al. 2009) and 
by the incessant feedback loop ignited by exploratory actions by the 
entrepreneur in order to make sense of the environment; 
3.  As a partial consequence of the previous points, entrepreneurship 
is often the result of the mobilization of extant resources in order 
to generate options for future action rather than well-focused re-
search of valuable resources aimed at attaining a precise goal. As 
a bricoleur (Baker, Nelson 2005; Lévi Strauss 1962; Stinchfield et 
al. 2012), the entrepreneur leverages upon the means at hand – her 
competences, acquaintances, material resources that are easily ac-
cessible – and devises potential future states that can be obtained 
through them rather than the other way around; 
4.  The overemphasis on individual agency risks to be detrimental to 
the understanding of entrepreneurial processes: «real-world» en-
trepreneurship is often a collective endeavour resulting from the 
mobilization of a number of stakeholders since the inception phases 
of a business idea (Hjorth 2004; Jack, Anderson 2002; Wiklund et al. 
2011). Thus exhaustive analyses of entrepreneurship and effective 
practices need to take into account the role of extant social resources 
to figure out how to create value out of social resources.
2.3 Entrepreneurship as a collective  
  and socially embedded phenomenon
Empirical and theoretical work in the field of entrepreneurship is 
increasingly focused on uncovering the dynamics and processes en-
tailed in the «collective nature» of the venturing process. Thorough 
analyses of the role of social networks are not exotic to the field. On 
the contrary an array of investigations have tackled the role of social 
relations in conveying valuable resources to aspiring entrepreneurs. 
Emergent approaches, though, differ for the specific angle they take on 
the role of social contexts in the entrepreneurship process (Harryson 
2008; Jennings et al. 2012). The distinction is subtle but nonetheless 
crucial: networking does not consist of instrumentally bringing valu-
able resources detained by stakeholders at the service of an (ex-ante) 
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envisioned venture. On the contrary the venture itself emerges in the 
social spaces within which stakeholders self-select into the making of 
an entrepreneur and enlarge the possibility landscape of that making 
(Sarasvathy 2001; Garud, Karnøe 2001). 
As Jack and Anderson (2002) put it, embedding is an important mecha-
nism in entrepreneurial processes – one that should be put under close 
analytical scrutiny – in that it allows entrepreneurs to gather value out of 
their anchoring within social structures (local clusters, strategic groups, 
value chains and the like). Moreover, it is through social embedding that 
entrepreneurs come to create opportunities, thanks to the contributions 
coming from stakeholders that share the values, aspirations and identi-
ties of an individual that is perceived as legitimate. Garud and Karnøe 
(2001) argue that while in hindsight entrepreneurship can be interpreted 
as the result of the radical deviation of entrepreneurs from logics and 
practices of specific social contexts, its outcomes are rather the result 
of entrepreneurs becoming embedded in social contexts and mobilizing 
a variety of actors. Indeed, such a mobilization occurs before the entre-
preneur even starts to think about a venture; the venture itself emerges 
out of stakeholder involvement deriving from embedding. 
An embedded view of entrepreneurship maintains that venturing – and 
in particular innovative venturing – is the result of processes of mindful 
deviation (Garud, Karnøe 2001) in which entrepreneurs exercise judge-
ment in stretching the legitimacy they gained through embedding to 
coalesce collective efforts towards novelty. Out of theoretical jargon, 
the perspective encourages analysts to open up their definition of entre-
preneurship in order to recognize that it can be endogenous to specific 
fields rather than solely disruptive and resulting from entry by outsiders. 
If the collective and «embedded» view on entrepreneurship is to be 
taken seriously also by practitioners and policy-makers in the car indus-
try, it conduces to reconsider the apparent distance between the schol-
arly discourse on entrepreneurship, emphasizing innovation and radical 
deviations from «business as usual», and a strict path-dependent view 
of the evolution of the car industry. We could reconsider the evolution of 
the industry if we framed entrepreneurship as an emergent process par-
ticipated and enabled by extant players coalesced around novel business 
conceptions advanced by embedded entrepreneurs. Venture creation 
and novelty development, from this perspective, do not displace extant 
competencies and investments made by players in automotive supply 
networks. On the contrary I aim at proposing an idea of innovation by 
new ventures that leverages upon, and recombine, the repertoire of 
skills, competences and technologies that already exists and that is cur-
rently locked-in in the prevailing car monoculture. To provide a concrete 
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example of how embedded entrepreneurship benefits from resources of 
extant social networks and how it is conducive to the creation of value 
for incumbents and traditional players, I sketch the history of Pagani 
Automobili, a producer of high-end sportscars located in Modena. 
3 The car that should not be
3.1 Embedding and mobilization in the history of Pagani Automobili
What follows is a synthetic account of the unfolding of a peculiar and 
highly successful venture in the market for high-end luxury sportscars. 
The account given in this chapter is a selection of an array of empirical 
evidence gathered for an in-depth case study of the firm that is currently 
under development. The narrative offered in the section is based on the 
empirical evidence gathered from repeated interviews with the entre-
preneur, his collaborators and one of the firm’s strategic suppliers, and 
from the analysis of archival material (compiled in Morelli, Racca 2010; 
Bottoni 2012) and over 700 articles in industry publications. 
Born officially in 1993 and publicly presenting its first car in 1999 – 
the Zonda – Pagani has gained the attention of experts, enthusiasts and 
clients both for the quality of the product and for the rare economic 
sustainability of its business. The carmaker iconic status – dispropor-
tionate if compared to the actual market share it controls – is effectively 
synthesized in a review appearing on the Independent right after the 
first presentation of the Zonda in 1999: 
[At the Geneva Motor Show in April] this year, one machine was attracting 
more attention than any other. It was a brand-new, pounds 190,000 sports car 
that outdid even the Lamborghini Diablo for sheer outrageousness. Its bodyshell 
was made entirely of advanced carbon-fiber composites, like a Formula One car, 
it was capable of 210 mph, and the quality of its detail engineering, according to 
those present, was as good as any car in the world. It was the belle of the show. 
[…] What marks Pagani out as different is […] that he seems to realise making 
cars successfully is primarily about business, not glory. This is a serious opera-
tion [Sanai 1999].
Although a small producer of exotic sportscars (it delivers an average 
of 20 cars per year), Pagani has succeeded in becoming the most sought-
after and evocative marque in such a niche, counting on thousands of 
enthusiasts worldwide and enjoying a recurrent coverage by major pub-
lications and experts in the automotive industry. Such a visibility and ex-
traordinary brand recognition are due to the peculiar mix of technology, 
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luxury, performance and exclusivity of the cars it manufactures. What 
follows is a non-exhaustive synthesis of the fundamental characteristics 
of the Zonda – the first model produced by Pagani since 1999 – and later 
of the Huayra – the recent model launched in 2012: 
1.  The Zonda was the first commercial car to be built entirely with 
carbon fibre and composite materials. The use of these materials for 
the chassis and for the monocoque – hitherto used only in prototypes 
and Formula 1 cars – allowed the firm to develop a vehicle which was 
lighter than those of the competitors (1,250 kilos) and faster than 
many of the sportscars on the same segment. These materials con-
ferred to the car also unmatched performances in terms of resistance 
and shock absorption. 
2.  The Zonda stood out also for its particular design. While sportscars 
like Ferraris and Lamborghinis privileged performance over comfort 
and elegance, the Zonda – and later the Huayra – was conceived as 
a comfortable car to be driven without compromising on speed. The 
car was larger and longer than the average sportscar to provide the 
driver and the passenger with plenty of room to drive comfortably. 
Its interiors are designed and realized on the clients’ specifications 
and the firm sources high-quality leather and materials eminently 
from Italian suppliers. The car can be fully customized according 
to the client’s requests and the process of design and development 
requires more than 9 months in order to be completed. 
3.  The technological content of the car – the sole central cell is built on 
13 patents developed by the firm – made it one of the most advanced 
in terms of safety and performance in the segment. 
4.  The marque is one of the few – the other notable case being Swedish 
Køenigsegg – that succeeded in making the production of high-end 
hypercars (as these cars are often called) a profitable business de-
spite low production volumes and the absence of financial backing 
from a larger automotive group. Although not directly comparable, 
producers of high-end sportscars are controlled by larger automotive 
groups, such as Fiat for Ferrari, and Volkswagen for Lamborghini 
and Bugatti. An array of other firms have tried to produce bespoke 
sportscars with mixed results at best for the lack of financial viability 
of the business, such as Bugatti (before being acquired by Volkswa-
gen), Spyker and McLaren.
Two elements make the history of the marque remarkable. The first is 
that such an achievement was attained by a self-taught Italo-Argentinian 
car designer who worked his way from a small repair laboratory in his 
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Argentinian hometown to the design and styling of major Lamborghini 
models and ultimately to the design and production of the Zonda and 
the Huayra. The second is related to the timing of entry and to the fact 
that he succeeded despite the widely held scepticism of incumbents on 
the viability of such a business and of the entire underlying concept. The 
years in which the entrepreneur started his firm were in fact signed by 
a severe financial crisis – the early 90s, the years of the first Gulf War 
and of the compression of demand for cars due to the financial crisis 
of 1987 –; proponents of similar business ideas fell one after the other 
(Montezemolo 2003). As the entrepreneur puts it, the market was not 
properly promising. While I was developing the project [in 1990-1993] Cizeta 
failed, the same happened to Bugatti, McLaren developed the S1 and then closed 
its production. Consider Bugatti: they closed with a huge debt, the equivalent 
of more that 50 million euro and closed their operations after they received ad-
vanced payments from clients all over the world. In that situation nobody really 
believed we were going to create and sell our cars without any serious financial 
backing [Personal interview to Horacio Pagani]. 
Adopting a design entirely based on carbon fibre and composite ma-
terials was seen as an unsustainable choice: in front of enduring market 
uncertainties, the investment in specialized technologies seemed unjus-
tifiable. While experimenting with these technologies in the late 1980s 
as a designer in Lamborghini, Pagani’s projects to develop a novel car 
based on carbon fibre and composite materials was frustrated by the 
scepticism of managers: if Ferrari, the benchmark at the time, was still 
doing the tubular structures of the monocoque in aluminium and was 
still producing car bodies by «beating» metal sheets rather than using 
an autoclave for composite materials, there was no reason to engage in 
such a risky adventure (Morelli, Racca 2010). 
The success of Pagani in delivering his car notwithstanding the re-
sistances and scepticism of extant players would lend itself to be inter-
preted through a narrative of the volitive entrepreneur making it happen 
against all odds and despite the general lack of trust by incumbents. An 
in-depth analysis of the history of both the entrepreneur and the marque 
suggests that that was not the case and that, on the contrary, the indus-
try played a crucial role in the establishment of Pagani Automobili. I 
will briefly sketch, through some vignettes, the process of embedding 
that allowed Pagani to ultimately design and sell his car. The narrative 
articulates along three major phases in the development of both the 
concept and the venture: the early years in which the young Pagani 
gained a prominent position in the Argentinian automotive industry 
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(the 1970s); the phase in which he worked – first as an employee and 
later as a consultant – with the new product development division of 
Lamborghini in Italy (the 1980s and the early 1990s); the establishment 
of Pagani Automobili and the presentation of the Zonda at the Geneva 
Motor Show in 1999 (1993 onwards). 
3.2 Industry apprenticeship: from the periphery to the core  
  of the Argentinian car industry
The young Pagani, fascinated by the then growing automotive industry 
in Argentina and willing to work on car design, established a workshop 
in his hometown, Casilda, where he mainly worked on the modifications 
of vans for the local agricultural industry and on the production of one-
shot prototypes of minimotos, buggies and caravans. Being a drop-off 
from college and lacking a formal education in design, he undertook an 
apprenticeship that passed eminently through the acquaintance and the 
collaboration with local mechanics and repairers. Many of his original 
creations (minimotos, buggies, rudimentary cars) were attained through 
the refurbishment of spare parts provided by local mechanics and the 
use of their tools and machinery. Tinkering with these materials and 
technologies, and the support of local practitioners, allowed him to apply 
the competences and knowledge he had been acquiring through industry 
publications regarding the latest news in car design coming from Italy 
and from the work of car designers such as Pininfarina and Bertone. The 
quality of some of his realizations gained him the recognition of local 
exponents of the automotive industry – mainly working on tuning and on 
car modifications. Their interest in the experimentations undertaken by 
the young passionate designer made them contribute with their labour 
and machines to his creations. In turn, the presentation of his creations 
in local fairs and industry events gained him an increasing demand for 
modifications and original projects. 
As the workshop gained prominence in the area of Casilda, Pagani 
and a host of collaborators and friends embarked in the development of 
a fully functional Formula 2 car out of second-hand materials and refur-
bished components. Built during idle time and as a side project, employ-
ing refurbished components and pieces of other vehicles, the car was ul-
timately finished. The young entrepreneur, lacking an engine, presented 
the finished cars to the Argentinian subsidiary of Renault. Managers 
of the French company appreciated the quality of the finished artefact 
and decided to provide the young designer with an engine to allow him 
to take part into the Argentinian Formula 2 circuit with an official team. 
The quality of the car, its design and some original and innovative solu-
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tions that were deployed by the designer gained him the recognition of 
Oreste Berta, the most important figure in the Formula 2 circuit at the 
time. It was Berta that saw the potential and the strong drive of Pagani 
and that presented him to Manuel Fangio, former Formula 1 champion 
and then manager of Mercedes Argentina (Morelli, Racca 2010; personal 
interview to Horacio Pagani). Once Fangio understood the motivation 
of Pagani, he recommended the designer to Lamborghini in Italy, who 
ultimately offered him a job in the early 1980s. 
3.3 The years in Lamborghini and the experimentation  
  with composite materials
Landed in Italy, the designer rapidly gained a crucial position in the 
Lamborghini team dedicated to novel concepts and new materials. The 
young employee had the chance to work on a special Lamborghini pro-
ject aimed at exploring the properties and qualities of composite ma-
terials. A side project financed by public funds, the development of the 
car was not considered crucial by the management of Lamborghini. 
The outcomes of such an experiment, though, surprised engineers and 
product managers. The car developed by the unit guided by Pagani 
was fully functional, aerodynamically innovative, lighter than any other 
sportscar on the market. During the tests, the car set a speed record, 
330 km per hour, seen as impossible at the time (1985). A fter the crash 
test, though, the company decided not to produce the car, since it was 
seen as economically infeasible and, most of all, «outside of the logics 
of the industry» (Vittorio Balboni, Lamborghini engineer, interviewed 
in Morelli, Racca 2010).
The refusal by Lamborghini to continue to experiment with novel ma-
terials made Pagani opt for an exit from the firm: he continued working 
with the company as a consultant for the redesign of the Diablo and the 
Countach but at the same time he started advising other firms and work-
ing with composite materials and carbon fibre. Although Lamborghini 
did not believe in the potential of novel materials, Pagani’s proposals 
for the realization of cars’ particulars and components in composite 
materials were ultimately accepted by the Italian brand. Often the ten-
ders and calls for components launched by Lamborghini were answered 
by Pagani who provided the firm with the designs as well as with full-
fledged prototypes materially presented to Lamborghini’s managers. In 
the meantime his consultancy gained visibility both in the automotive 
industry – where he worked for Ferrari, Renault, Berman, Dallara – and 
for firms from different industries – e.g. sporting equipment: Rossingol, 
Lange – interested in these novel materials. Being a supplier and a con-
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sultant for a number of firms in the Emilia Romagna Motor Valley gave 
him the access to the infrastructure and technologies of firms such as 
Dallara – their wind gallery, for instance – and to the informal contribu-
tions and encouragement of many industry representatives. Even though 
many of them were dubious about the viability of the novel materials he 
was experimenting with and ultimately with his idea of producing yet 
another niche sportscar, they were engaged in the process to different 
degrees thanks to the appreciation of the results the designer was ob-
taining. As Dallara puts it, 
My impression is that the events developed beyond any of his expectations and 
initial ambitions. […] At the beginning he was in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. Nonetheless he adventured in this wonderful project that is probably the 
last one in romantic automobilism. […] In Pagani one can see the dream of the 
last Don Quixote, but he did not fight against windmills: he faced his objectives 
and eventually succeeded [G.P. Dallara, founder of Dallara, interviewed in Morelli, 
Racca 2010].
3.4 Towards the Zonda: mobilization and legitimation
During the second phase of his professional history, Pagani went back 
to his initial ambition of designing and producing his own sportscar. The 
refusal from Lamborghini to actually realize his project brought him to 
produce designs and initial projects without a clear goal in mind. These 
designs and preliminary elaborations were presented to Manuel Fangio, 
who had become a friend and a confident of Pagani. The detailed designs 
of the car gained Pagani the collaboration of Fangio and of other fig-
ures of his entourage in the development of gradual refinements of the 
original project. Fangio actually believed in the potential of the car and 
had enough evidence of both the competence of the designer and of his 
resolution. Beyond providing him with valuable insights and technical 
assistance in refining his project, Fangio interceded on behalf of Pagani 
with the then head of amg, a division of Mercedes that produces high-end 
engines for the German automaker. In 1992 an amg engineer – Dieter 
Zietsche, currently Chairman of Daimler ag – and his team analysed both 
the designs Pagani has been producing and the various models (1:5 and 
1:1) of the car he had been realizing and testing in wind galleries. 
The overall quality of the project and the advanced state of its develop-
ment, witnessed by the realization of full dimension models, convinced 
amg to supply Pagani with an amg engine. Pagani was, and still is, the 
only non-Mercedes marque sporting amg engines. While the original 
engine for the Zonda was chosen among those that amg was producing 
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at the time (specifically a Mercedes-Benz M 120 E 60, 12 V 60° cylinders, 
5,987 cc), the Huayra saw the development of a dedicated engine by 
amg. The involvement of Fangio, his collaborators and amg in the pro-
ject, in turn, determined the increase of legitimation the entrepreneur 
had among producers of components and technologies, and gained him 
the collaboration of an array of specialized module producers (Brembo, 
Xtrac and others) as well as the coalescing of small local suppliers of 
materials willing to follow the firm in the production of bespoke cars. 
The entire development of the car took from 1992 to 1999, the year in 
which the first exemplar of Zonda was presented – after another one 
was destroyed in the crash tests – at the Geneva Motor Show. The pres-
entation of the fully-homologated car gained Pagani the attention of 
industry representatives and the specialized press. More importantly, 
it set Pagani as the must-have for sportscar collectors worldwide. As 
it was effectively stated by The Independent’s article, Zonda «was the 
belle of the show». 
A fter having produced more than 200 Zondas, the firm presented the 
Huayra at the end of 2011, and received 90 orders in advance, for which 
it is planning to double its production facilities. 
4 Lessons from the case of Pagani Automobili
The previous section compiled a selection of the number of occasions 
in which Horacio Pagani succeeded in obtaining the support and active 
contribution of a variety of embedded actors – such as Mercedes amg, 
Lamborghini, Dallara, the Argentinian mechanics, Fangio, and many oth-
ers – to produce a supercar. Although a thorough narrative of the unfold-
ing of the project goes beyond the scope of this chapter, the vignettes 
and the synthetic description of the phases of Pagani’s history should 
have provided the reader with an idea of «how he succeeded» despite 
resistances and scepticism. In particular he succeeded despite the initial 
scepticism of many of the actors located in Modena, who considered the 
project infeasible and untenable since its costs – let alone its exploratory 
solutions – were not justified by the situation of the market, the endur-
ing crisis and the industry-wide tension towards standardization and 
increase in the number of vehicles manufactured and sold. Despite their 
scepticism, they all contributed, to different extents, to the realization 
of the car, in what appears to be a successful example of mobilization 
of distributed agency.
The recurring trait of the story is the embedding of Pagani into differ-
ent layers of the global automotive industry: first in Argentina, where 
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he gained the trust and collaboration of local mechanics and repairers 
thanks to his creations, and later from the core of the car industry of 
the country and of its more representative figures (Berta and Fangio); 
secondly in the Italian cluster of sportscars manufacturers, where he 
was offered to experiment with novel concepts and materials and where 
he was supported by local firms and practitioners despite the «official» 
scepticism around his idea and the concept of a novel sportscar; finally 
through the establishment of a company that leveraged upon the legiti-
mation and the credibility he gained among a variety of relevant actors 
in the industry that concretely contributed to the ultimate finalization 
of the design and its production. 
Prefiguring the potential trajectories of the industry is impossible, 
especially on the basis of a single case, whose objective has been that 
of identifying processes of embedding and mobilization. Nonetheless 
the case and the lessons previously distilled from it allow to speculate 
ultimately on the meta-conditions conducive to transformations by en-
trepreneurs mobilizing incumbents and their repertoire of competenc-
es. These factors are presented as a conclusion to the chapter and as 
signposts both for future scholarly investigations on the issue and for 
policy-makers and practitioners in developing their way out of the cur-
rent situation of the car market. 
A first element that stands out is the importance of experimentation 
– often a blind one – as a means to create a variety of possible future 
outcomes. Seen from the angle of small and medium-sized enterprises 
in the automotive supply base, this means multiplying the opportuni-
ties and the efforts to engage in activities intended to increase their 
knowledge base and to test the solidity of institutional constraints 
and «ways of doing things». From a policy-making perspective the 
importance of experimentation as a means to create networks of en-
trepreneurs and incumbents requires to complement extant policies 
aimed at «sustaining» the industry along the traditional logics with 
measures and initiatives aimed at stimulating deviant research and 
development activities. 
A second element that needs to be stressed is the importance of ter-
ritories and of consolidated social networks as the conduits of mobili-
zation and networking around emergent projects. Mounting evidence 
points to the need for a revision of the means to stimulate innovation 
and economic growth – and industrial renovation – through the promo-
tion of entrepreneurship. In particular a host of analyses point to the 
ineffectiveness of traditional models of incubators and science parks. 
As the story of Pagani shows, mobilization occurs not through the crea-
tion of artificial loci for entrepreneurs to develop their innovations, but 
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through daily and situated collaboration and interaction. From this point 
of view, policy schemes aimed at institutionalizing the territory as an 
incubator and at promoting a number of distributed networking initia-
tives could reserve promising avenues of development. While incubators 
and technology parks are not to be discarded as engines of innovation, 
much more attention needs to be devoted to the promotion of a variety 
of occasions and means to develop social networking in wider areas 
characterized by the resilience of given industrial cultures. 
A third element that emerges from the case and that needs to be taken 
into careful consideration is the role of practice as a device to mobilize 
incumbents around emerging endeavours. Mobilization of actors such 
as Fangio, amg, Lamborghini and Dallara did not happen because of the 
quality in the designs and business plans of the nascent entrepreneur. 
On the contrary it occurred because of the recurrent convergence of the 
entrepreneur and of his perspective partners around material solutions 
and working prototypes he presented. In a variety of instances, scepti-
cism by incumbents was won, and their support obtained, thanks to the 
presentation of working artefacts that invalidated the preclusions and 
prejudices associated with a lock-in in institutional logics. As a general 
lesson for practitioners and policy-makers this means that a renewed 
attention needs to be attributed to education and training processes that 
provide workers and entrepreneurs with skills relating to the concrete 
realization of prototypes and artefacts as a way of bridging among dif-
ferent languages and cultures and as blueprints for the development of 
seemingly promising solutions. 
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The evolving features of the automotive industry
Francesco Garibaldo
abstract Tectonic movements are jeopardising the traditional picture of the 
players in the automotive industry as well as the role of the automotive products 
in assuring people mobility. Where do these movements come from? This chapter 
deals with the critical issue of change, trying to highlight the key driver of the 
recent evolution of automotive industry.
1 The main features of the new global car industry
Tectonic movements are jeopardizing the traditional picture of the 
players in the automotive industry as well as the role of the automotive 
products in assuring people mobility. 
Summing up an updated understanding of the actual situation of the 
global car industry these are the key points:
 - The car industry is now fully and evenly globalized, which means that 
the processes of structuring and restructuring capacity are inter-
twined and distributed on a global scale.
 - The whole industry is in a process of strategic change and reposition-
ing whose main driver is the innovation – sometimes a breakthrough 
one – of products, services, processes and work organization; 
 - The structure of this industry is more and more a mix of a traditional 
volume industry1 and a network-like industry, in the meaning of the 
network economic, in general related to consumers utility and to 
the transaction costs of the supply architecture, specifically in the 
alternative engines segment. The weight of the two components is 
1. With huge capital investments and since the 1980s a broad product segmentation. It 
leads to a different mix of economies of scale and of scope and to new production technolo-
gies supporting the modularization of the design of the cars.
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very different depending on the product segment in which each oem 
is operating. It means that two countervailing processes are affect-
ing the industry as a whole. On the one hand the strategic attitude 
of firms to internalize the factor of externalities, i.e. to reduce their 
potential for uncertainty, increasing their command of the structural 
interdependence, which is at the origin of externalities (Antonelli 
1992, p. 15); on the other hand, the irreplaceable benefits coming out 
of the externalities, of the complementary assets and technologies, of 
the collaborative manufacturing, etc., to produce and distribute the 
required innovation. This is a never-ending dynamic because for each 
step in one direction a new level of externalities, of non-appropriabil-
ity of the knowledge resources will be created.
 - The consumption externalities are growing, and this is making in-
teresting the idea of utilizing the paradigm of open innovation with 
customers (Piller, Ihl 2009).
 - The footprint of the industry, in this sense, is broader and broader, 
including a large part of all R&D outcomes in many different fields, 
as well as the technological advances and the know-how coming from 
traditionally very different industries. It means that the traditional 
boundaries between industrial sectors are blurring and/or deeply 
changing.
 - The supply chain is in a very similar deep process of change. In this 
process the market powers of the different actors is rapidly polar-
izing between two poles: the ones able to gain and maintain a strong 
profitability position in the value chain and the others more and more 
pushed in a process of full commodification and of their manufactur-
ing / services contributions, that is a perfect interchangeability of each 
of them with the others.
 - The winners in the supply chain are system integrators and/or com-
plex subsystem producers and/or designers with a dynamic capability 
of developing the product/process/service they control both incremen-
tally and, sometimes, also through innovation.
 - These processes contribute to the selection of new players on the 
edge of the innovative trends, such as the new engines makers or the 
new mobility services providers. These new actors can challenge the 
incumbents in some niche markets.
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2  The limits of the car-driven model of mobility  
 and the rise of a new culture
The global financial and economic crisis dramatically compounded the 
situation, particularly in Europe because of the choice in favour of auster-
ity measures affecting the volume markets, that is the A, B and partly C 
segments – as a matter of fact 2012 was the fifth consecutive year of sales 
decline. If the unit of analysis is the single firm, in Europe there are diver-
gent trends among the main oems: for instance Volkswagen, also in the 
C segment, and bmw are growing, unlike the French ones, Fiat and Ford. 
Enrietti (2013) quotes the data reported in the figures.
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According to the Financial Times, also the operating profits show the 
existence of divergent trends: from a continuous growth in the period 
2007-2012, as in the case of vw (more than ten billions euro) and bmw 
(quite eight billions euro), to a stable situation of revenues (Daimler, 
roughly five billions), to a reduction for Fiat and losses for psa Peugeot 
Citroën and Renault. 
Therefore it is no accident that Fiat and psa, for instance, are in a so 
dire situation.
3 A strategic manufacturing sector
In spite of this situation, the eu has definitely stated, in the second 
final report by the «Cars 21 High Level Group»,2 released in June 2012, 
that the automotive sector «remains of strategic importance and a cor-
nerstone for the eu industry and economy, providing quality employ-
ment to millions of workers in the eu». It means, more in details, that 
the sector, maintaining a positive trade balance due to a strong export 
portfolio of high-quality and high-technology vehicles to third markets, 
should have a «strong manufacturing base in the eu», should lead in 
technology, namely in «the propulsion technologies» and «in alternative 
powertrain concepts», should rely on «a strong industrial network char-
acterised by a flexible and integrated supply and distribution chain» and 
eventually on «a workforce in both manufacturing, R&D and servicing 
that is trained and prepared to work with a multitude of technologies». 
The report stresses also the key role of the car industry in transferring 
to and receiving from other industries: technologies, know-how, and 
skills. These objectives are the basis for the cars 2020 Action Plan for a 
Competitive and Sustainable Automotive Industry in Europe,3 the plan 
set up by the Commission on November 2012. 
4 eu 2020 and the challenges for the car sector
The plan should also be consistent with the general European ob-
jectives of smart sustainable and inclusive growth, known as eu 2020, 
whose main target is to cope with the climate agenda. Traffic congestion 
2. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/automotive/files/cars-21-final-
report-2012_en.pdf (2013/02/20).
3. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0636:FIN:EN:PDF 
(2013/02/20).
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and pollution are already leading, in the eu countries, to more and more 
restrictive standards on the limit of co2 emissions. The contribution of 
the transport sector to the eu’s co2 emissions is now up to 29%, with an 
increase of nine points since 1990. According to the European Environ-
ment Agency, «cars are responsible for 14% of the co2 emissions, that is 
the largest source of transport emissions, representing around half of 
the total»;4 reducing this level of emission is therefore a key objective 
of the eu 2020 plan. According to the seventh T&E report, on December 
2012, in 2011: «The eu imported approximately € 300bn worth of oil 
every year, or € 800m every day […] Transport is responsible for about 
two thirds of oil use. Cars are the single biggest consumer of oil in the 
eu, responsible for using around half of transport sector demand and 
hence a third of all oil, hence about € 100bn worth of imports per year» 
(T&E 2012).
In the search for new technologies the Europe’s energy dependence 
is therefore also at stake. These standards are pushing the oems and 
the specialized suppliers to invest in innovation on the powertrain, and 
on new materials in order to reduce vehicle weight; as a matter of fact, 
«every per cent vehicles are made lighter typically results in 0,7% lower 
fuel consumption and co2 emissions». 
The targets to be reached by 2020 are therefore depending on the 
weight of the vehicles the entire industry will produce «in 2015 com-
pared with the average weight of the vehicles the entire industry will 
produce over the 2011-2013 period». According to the T&E report, al-
most all the eu manufacturers, but Daimler, are in the top 9 on the track 
to achieve the 95g/km of co2 emission, but only two, Fiat and psa, are 
among the three front runners; Toyota is the only non-eu producer to be 
in the group of the nine and among the three front runners, Hyundai is 
tenth in the ranking but is supposed to reach the target.
5 The search for alternative powertrains solutions
The strategic decisions on the technology to adopt on powertrains are 
already well-defined and distributed along some parallel trajectories 
such as: a) more efficient traditional engines, b) alternative engines 
utilizing non-renewable sources, such as methane and liquid gas; or c) 
renewable sources, such as hydrogen as fuel, or to produce electricity, 
in a fuel cell (fcev) as Hyundai, Toyota and the new uk’s government 
4. http://www.transportenvironment.org/what-we-do/cars-and-co2/background.
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planned (Tighe 2013); and methane, as a renewable source, such as the 
case of the Audi e-gas project; d) mixed solutions such as Hybrid Elec-
tric Vehicle (hev), Plug in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (phev); e) pure battery 
electric engines (bev). The new vehicles with alternative electric engines 
should also be designed according to new geometries, namely in the 
case of the electric engines, especially concerning the battery power 
packs and new safety rules. This will lead to important consequences on 
the work content of the new vehicles and therefore on the employment 
levels and the skills required. 
The oems are, to some extent, in an uncertain situation on what power 
train technology to adopt because of the mix of high investments, uncer-
tain regulations and consumers’ difficulties to afford the higher prices 
required by adopting the new technologies.
The recent case of the decisions taken by the London authority to 
change the rules for the exemption of cars, with low emissions, from the 
city’s congestion charge is a clear example of the uncertainty, even for 
consumers, in taking a well informed investment decision. 
Uncertainty is the rule. Each of these scenarios implies huge invest-
ments, not only in designing the new products, but also on new plants, 
new skills, and even total redesigning of the supply chain. To afford this 
uncertainty the main oems are choosing a product portfolio strategy, 
trying to accommodate these different perspectives. This strategy is 
very expensive and based on a strong and structural segmentation of 
the market. To be affordable it should reach the maximum geographical 
expansion to make each niche profitable.
6 Difficulties and opportunities
The drive for innovation is primarily a social and cultural one: the 
search for a smart and clean solution for people’s mobility, especially 
in urban environments. Notwithstanding this strong social and cultural 
push there are economic and technical difficulties to overcome, in par-
ticular for the cases c), d), e), and, at the same time, opportunities for 
new business models and for new ways of storing and distributing elec-
tricity from renewable sources. Firstly there is an issue about the adop-
tion by the consumers of vehicles that are still more expensive to buy, 
even though the total cost of ownership (tco) is lower. Secondly there is 
an issue about the lower autonomy due to the different energy density 
for the case e). Thirdly there is an issue about the storage inside the 
vehicles, for the case c), and about a brand new distribution chain to be 
built for the cases c) and e); for instance the cost for building a hydrogen 
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infrastructure was estimated in 5 billions euro.5 Fourthly there is an is-
sue about extra weight for all the cases c), d), e). All these economic and 
technical problems are taken into considerations by the various oems 
and each one has different solutions in the pipeline. 
A strategic objection to the choice of affording so important costs and 
difficulties is related to the concept of the fuel life-cycle analysis, nor-
mally shortened in «Well-to-Wheels» (wtw) analysis (Edwards, Larivé, 
Beziat 2011); the wtw can be divide into two parts: «Well to Tank» and 
«Tank to Wheels». There is a general consensus on the fact that the 
solutions c) and e) produce zero emissions in the Tank-to-Wheels part, 
but the hydrogen and/or the electricity should be produced, transported 
and distributed in the Well-to-Tank part of the pathway: 1) producing and 
transporting the primary fuel, 2) producing and distributing the road 
fuel, 3) fuelling the vehicle. 
For this reason the actual comparison between traditional internal 
combustion engines (ie) and electric engines (phev and ev), based both 
on batteries (bev) and fuel cell (fcev), should take the wtw analysis into 
consideration. In Europe the most comprehensive, and widely used as a 
benchmark study, is the one conducted by the European Consortium jec, 
built by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (jrc), concawe 
(oil industry consortium), and acea (auto industry consortium), already 
at its fourth version.
A research utilizing this database, and other international sources, 
outlines the likely scenarios. A study commissioned by Transport & 
Environment, Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace European Unit 
and wwf Germany in 2010 concluded that:
The well-to-wheel environmental impact of evs and phevs is largely determined 
by the type of electricity production used to charge the batteries. If electricity 
is produced from lignite or coal, well-to-wheel co2 emissions are typically higher 
than or equal to the emissions of a comparable ice car. When the electricity 
comes from gas-fired power plants, emissions are significantly lower. Electric-
ity from renewable sources, such as wind, solar or hydro energy, would result in 
zero co2 emissions per kilometre [Kampman et al. 2010]. 
A more recent research presented by gm (2012) and based on the jec 
data states that 
5. A Portfolio of Power-Trains for Europe: A Fact-Based Analysis, available at http://
www.fch-ju.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Power_trains_for_Europe.pdf, last visited 
27/06/2013.
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Fuel lifecycle ghg (greenhouse-gas emissions) for conventional diesel and 
cng were within the range of conventional gasoline and gasoline strong hybrids. 
Biofuels and biomethane blends could further reduce lifecycle ghg for these 
internal-combustion engine options. The bev, plugged into electricity with the 
ghg footprint of the average mix of the eu grid, provided ghg about half that of 
conventional gasoline and 30% below that of a strong gasoline hybrid. If the bev 
were powered with wind electricity, fuel lifecycle ghg would be zero. wtw ghg 
of the Extended Range ev, like the bev, depends on electricity ghg footprint, but 
also depends on charging and driving behaviour. 
Summing it up, this research confirms that the problem of the wtw 
analysis is fully on the wtt part and that some opportunities are already 
available, without including solutions more ahead of the available tech-
nology. 
But what is very important for the thesis of this paper, based on these 
recent research, are, on the one hand, a set of field collected data, and, 
on the other hand, an opportunity for innovation.
The field data show that the Chevrolet Volt extended-range electric 
vehicle «Reveals that two-thirds of all Volt miles driven were performed 
with electric energy in ‘ev’ mode» allowing «significant replacement of 
petroleum-based fuel (60% to 80%) by electricity». Besides: 
Data of Opel Ampera test vehicles used by engineers over several months 
show that, in this sample, 45 km per day can be driven in ev mode. This is more 
than the average gasoline ice vehicle in Germany, 31 km per day. The Ampera test 
vehicles were driven 72 km per day, which exceeds the average driving distance 
of diesel passenger cars in Germany of 15 km per day. 
It seems that the problem of the autonomy should be reconsidered in 
the framework of the product segmentation concept, that will be ana-
lysed in the next section of the paper.
The opportunity for innovation comes from the problem of the storage 
of the electricity produced from renewable sources, such as wind power, 
whose main feature is a strong fluctuation from a maximum to zero. 
The problem is how to build «buffers», for the excess energy, in order 
to provide energy back to the grid. There are many different technolo-
gies available and according to the already quoted gm study the most 
promising is the hydrogen storage. It is also possible to use batteries 
as storage devices (Grid-to-Vehicle, g2v); this is the more intriguing in-
novation possibility. Unfortunately
This requires significant improvements to battery costs and lifetime – the lat-
ter is typically expressed in number of charging cycles. Using them for this type 
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of concept thus reduces the number of kilometres that can be driven with them. 
This option may therefore be costly and potentially unattractive for car owners, 
but concerns may be overcome in the longer term if battery development is suc-
cessful, and the benefits outweigh the cost.
The options described above need a lot of innovation. They depend crucially 
on smart grids and the possibilities for smart metering – the infrastructure, me-
tering systems and standards need to be developed.
In both cases new relations between different economic sectors are 
coming to the fore with a growing need for coordination, through public 
policies, and for innovative business models. It is therefore possible to 
outline different business models: a) utilities driven, with a new role of 
the power utilities that are engaged in designing and building smart 
grids, b) oems-driven, dominated by the actual incumbents; c) energy 
supply arbitrage, such as the Better Place attempt, whose performance 
was totally unsuccessful.
7 Product segmentation
From the point of view of the product segmentation the situation looks 
like a patchwork of different combinations of product segment, firm’s 
specialization, national markets, incomes distribution and dynamic, and 
eventually cultural shift between different generations of consumers, 
namely the new trends among the youngsters. However some main 
global trends can be observed. 
Firstly, a significant trend is the affluent style of consumption of the 
new global middle class emerging in the new developing countries such 
as, for instance, China. But if the global production is divided in two sub-
systems – the so-called bric countries vs. us, Japan and Germany – the 
shift is very impressive because the bric countries are up to 27-28 mil-
lions vehicles, of which China alone 18 millions, and the others together 
up to 22-23 millions. It leads to new trade flows from Europe to these 
countries; those flows can be intercepted only by the oems that are spe-
cialized in producing cars in the E, F, S and also J segments, which are 
the ones with the highest level of economic returns. The overall effect of 
this shift and of the divergent trends, vis-à-vis the economic crisis, is to 
forecast a decline of the European world market share of vehicle sales, 
from 29% in 2004 to 20% in 2020. This situation created, on the other 
hand, new opportunities, in those third markets, that can only be seized 
by offshoring there the production process as a whole, mostly through 
joint ventures with local producers. It implied a deep and extended 
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process of structuring and restructuring the global car value chain; in 
Europe this means, also, that the supply chain is more and more interna-
tionally integrated, therefore components and subsystems are increas-
ingly sourced from other parts of the world.
Secondly, there is a global accelerated process of urbanization. The 
majority of people is living now in an urban environment. This leads 
to a fundamental split of the car market in two different spheres, one 
primarily looking for all-purposes vehicles and the other primarily look-
ing for single-purpose vehicles. It implies both product innovations and 
business model innovation.
In general terms the car industry needs a continuous process of in-
novation regarding products and business models, as well as productive 
and organizational models, but in this new situation it needs a strategic 
rethinking also because of some social and cultural new trends.
8 Megatrends
In a more general perspective there are some non-industrial trends 
that are very critical for the future of the car industry.
The negative demographic trends, particularly in most eu countries, 
largely compounded by a cultural shift among the youngsters on the 
usage of cars and the desire for physical mobility. In the us «Driving, 
as measured by vehicle miles travelled, began to plateau in 2004, and 
in 2007 fell for the first time since 1980» and young Americans «are, 
increasingly, not bothering to get driver’s licences. From 2000 to 2010, 
the percentage of 14 to 34-year-olds without licences rose from 21 per 
cent to 26 per cent, according to the Federal Highway Administration». 
These trends are occurring «in other developed economies including 
the uk, Germany, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Sweden (although not 
in Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, Switzerland or Spain)» (Skapinker 
2012). This entails the search for new business models and new products.
A crisis of the traditional model of a personal ownership of the car: 
Zipcar, recently acquired by avis, and other car-sharing services have 
been more successful than traditional car rental companies at reacting 
to the trend towards the declining car ownership in many industrialized 
countries. «We believe this is a major step forward to reaching our goal 
of fundamentally revolutionising personal mobility», said Scott Griffith, 
chairman and chief executive of Zipcar (Gelles 2013). This entails the 
search for new business models. 
A crisis of efficiency and efficacy of the mobility based on cars in met-
ropolitan areas because of congestion and of the social costs of pollution. 
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It is impossible to work congestion out, in a structural way, without an in-
tegrated approach of urban planning, of the introduction of smart shared 
vehicles and their integration in a hybrid mobility platform, based on ict-
based technologies, made up of public systems and car-sharing schemes. 
This entails the search for the integration of different kind of knowledge, 
of different professions, of different economic activities with the overall 
task of improving the mobility of people.
9 The search for a new paradigm
A cultural shift is needed from car to mobility as the actual product. 
What people are more and more looking at is the utility value of the 
car, that is its capability to deliver mobility in an efficient and effective 
way, as a collective as well as a personal right. Cars were at some point 
in the history of mobility more effective and efficient for mobility than 
other goods (D’Eramo 1995, p. 96). At a certain point an insoluble con-
flict arose between the specific modality for realizing the mobility in a 
given period and its actual utilization either collectively or individually. 
In short, there has been a split between the utility value and the goods 
exchange value. At this point the conditions are determined that allow 
for a transformation and, when it takes place, the drive is so powerful 
that the process doesn’t stop, even before the destruction of the non-
amortized fixed capital – a case in point is the destruction of the tram-
ways or the urban sprawl created to make way for the car – or before 
the vested interests however powerful they may be. 
In other words, if cars are a by-product of the real product, that is 
mobility, and if mobility today is for the majority of mankind an urban 
mobility, then the focus is on designing together the city and the infra-
structure for mobility; cars are just part of a broader system. Besides, 
each new design implies the search for new products to support mobility 
and of new industrial processes to build them. 
This entails the necessity of a vertical integration between the clas-
sical car sector and a newly emerging urban design and management 
sector. 
10 A transition
The car industry still represents the best instance of industrial ra-
tionality, the industry with the highest manufacturing employment rate 
both for the developed and for the developing countries; in short, it is a 
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strategic industry. The amount of direct and indirect investment by the 
State, households and private capital in the car industry is enormous. 
What is increasingly crisis-ridden is the car seen as the prime and most 
rational means for assuring mobility both inside and towards the cities. 
The way to cope with this strategic crisis is to develop a transition to a 
new equilibrium of the means assuring personal mobility and the role 
of cars. This entails a new industrial perspective: 
 - The search for a new business model in the car industry.
 - The development of the hybrid manufacturing model (Bryson 2010), 
also in the car industry.
 - A closer integration between the strategic goals pursued in the dif-
ferent social and economic activities affecting the mobility system 
and the nature of the mobility system (Chiao 2011). For instance the 
decision to stop the urban sprawling implies the choice of «vertical 
shaped» cities; to cope with clean energy production and utilization 
leads to a portfolio of solutions for people mobility and goods delivery, 
based on clean smart vehicles and new infrastructures such as eleva-
tors, escalators, cable-ways, but also to recover old means as bicycles 
(Brillembourg 2011).
 - The development of an urban mobility platform utilizing ict technolo-
gies and communicating with smart vehicles (Sassen 2011).
 - Publicly available clean smart vehicles, based on a web-shaped net-
work. 
The required change is very complex and cannot only rely upon mar-
ket dynamics; public planning and public investments are required both 
on urban planning and renewal, on basic infrastructure, for instance a 
publicly available system of recharging for electric cars and an ict-based 
urban mobility platform, on industrial policies, for instance how to ac-
commodate the industrial transition, and on environmental policies, and 
eventually on R&D policies on new technologies (Kleinert 2013).
11  Forma Urbis and Infrastructures (Garibaldo 2012)
The specific feature of the infrastructures depends on many different 
issues, for instance: 
 - The degree of physical embeddedness of the inherited Forma Urbis, 
for instance: middle age or modern cities. In Perugia escalators are 
very effective as well as in Ferrara bicycles are; etc.
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 - The size of the city: in Italian middle towns downtown is an area 
smaller than the passenger area of the Frankfurt airport. It means 
that escalators, and/or moving sidewalks can be effective solutions. 
 - The interaction of gps, electronic mapping and smart vehicles allow 
the setting up of an integrated platform to manage traffic.
This means that on the user side there is the possibility of a portfolio 
of mobility modalities within as well as outside the urban environment.6
This leads to a portfolio of solutions that need a new infrastructure of 
services, new vehicles based on new powertrains that should be clean, 
that is zero emission designed. It implies a deep restructuring of the car 
industry and of its business models, as well as of a new set of employees 
skills and competencies.
12 Industrial policies
A set of European industrial policies should be a coordinated ef-
fort ecologically-oriented in different fields, such as energy, urban 
planning, industrial renewal and technologies, in order to guarantee 
an efficient and effective mobility of people and goods. These poli-
cies should rely on and enrich the industrial inheritance of the car 
industry both as industrial and technological knowledge as well as of 
people skills and competencies. This is possible utilizing part of this 
inheritance for the renewal of other industrial sectors, for instance 
the energy production. It means to manage a long industrial and social 
transition.
The idea that the future will be without cars is totally unrealistic; 
utilizing cars will remain an effective and efficient solution in non-
urban areas and in a specific proportion and with new business mod-
els, for instance the possibility to buy hours of utilization instead of 
a car, even in urban areas. The main big change will be the on-going 
new segmentation that will overcome the idea of all-purposes cars in 
favour of specific-purposes cars, that is cars designed for a specific 
environment, such as cities. This is the other side of the concept of a 
portfolio of solutions. 
To accomplish a social responsible industrial transition means also 
to reach a different proportion between export and internal market in 
6. See: the Japanese experience of smart communities as described by the paper pre-
sented at the 21st Gerpisa colloquium, June 2013, by Bruno Faivre D’Arcier and Yveline 
Lecler. Dijk 2012; Begley, Berkeley 2012.
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Europe. If Europe will bet on a complete renewal of the mobility system 
in its many big urban conurbations there will be a new operative space 
for the car industry. This means to deploy new products.
13 Integrated systems and the role of R&D
Urban integrated systems are made of public (buses, underground 
trains, cable cars, etc.) and publicly available systems (escalators, mov-
ing sidewalks) as well as private systems (the traditional private own-
ership, but also the new leasing systems) of mobility. They can be inte-
grated on the side of centralized governance systems such as mobility 
platforms, as well as on the side of the individuals through the possibility 
to buy a mobility carnet, made of a portfolio of means such as the pos-
sibility to use a car when needed or a bicycle or a motorbike, perhaps 
even electric.
This perspective requires huge public investments in education, to 
support the process of industrial restructuring and renewal, and in R&D 
in the fields of batteries, fuel cells, nuclear fusion as well as new urban 
infrastructures.
14 A new role for the suppliers
The typical supply chain in the car sector is structured in thousands 
of second-tier suppliers, hundreds of first-tier suppliers, and dozens 
of system integrators and/or specialized suppliers, therefore dealing 
with sub-systems and modules. In this configuration the typical oem 
manufacturing footprint is: assembly, powertrain and stamping. The key 
suppliers, system integrators and specialized industrial and services 
suppliers, normally are not bound to single oems, but they supply many 
of them. This leads to the rise of a web of suppliers that develop an in-
house specialized know-how and/or knowledge and product/services 
innovation. It means that part of the dynamic of the innovation in the 
sector is no more within the control and the ownership of each oems, as 
a competitive margin against the others, but distributed in this new in-
dustrial structure. An industrial structure whose main features are very 
consistent with network economics, namely as a situation in between 
market and hierarchies, which is a network of firms (Antonelli 1992). As 
Piller and Ihl analysing the open innovation paradigms potentialities, 
state (2009, p. 11): 
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Today the common understanding of the innovation process builds on the 
observation that firms rarely innovate alone and that the innovation process 
can be seen as an interactive relationship among producers, users and many 
other different institutions […]. As a result, the early Schumpeterian model of 
the lone entrepreneur bringing innovations to markets […] has been superseded 
by a richer picture of different actors in networks and communities […]. Innova-
tive performance today is seen to a large extent as the ability of an innovative 
organization to establish networks with external entities [Piller, Ihl 2009, p. 11].
In the same direction goes the concept of complementary assets and 
technologies by Teece (2006) and the case study by Dedrick, Kraemer 
and Linden (2008). 
The car industry is characterized by high complexity and high volume 
at the same time; there are 20,000 detailed parts with about 1,000 key 
components to be managed, which means that the possible end-items 
configurations are, theoretically, up to millions, and actually several 
thousands. 
So complex is the task to be achieved that there was a shift of rel-
evance, within manufacturing, in favour of the supply chain. This is the 
reason why it is the supply chain that makes the difference in the ability 
to successfully control final markets and market share; this is also the 
message from a special report of the Financial Times (2011/26/01).
It should be elaborated more in depth on this point. On the one hand 
there is the integration of functions and processes to make a car, involv-
ing only some suppliers, and the management of the material flow of 
parts, involving the supply chain as a whole; on the other hand, there is 
the process of managing the overall supply chain as an integrated value 
chain, which is up to the oems and involve all the actors, at all the levels, 
of the supply chain. These two sides, the material side, that is the flow 
of parts, subsystems and modules, and the value side, that is the cash-
to-cash cycle, should be each other coherent and synchronized, taking 
into account also the global span of the supply chain. 
This is also the reason why, in the attempt to manage demand variabil-
ity, downstream to the dealers and the final market, and global supply 
chain, upstream to the assembly lines, on the one hand the oems need 
collaborative schemes, through the supply chain, with the consequence 
of letting fade traditional organizational boundaries, in favour of closer 
integration upstream and downstream. On the other hand, according 
to a jda report (Kelly 2012) the basis of competition has moved away 
from operational efficiency in a given functional area to the operational 
efficiency of the overall value chain. A rough measure of operational ef-
ficiency associated with manufacturing and the supply chain is shown 
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in the equation below. This «return on supply chain» subtracts R&D 
and depreciation costs from cogs and then uses the result to calculate 
a margin against revenue.7
The same report states that the major remaining costs contained in 
the above equation are materials and operational/transformational costs. 
This is only a relative measure since costs will still contain some level of 
non-supply chain costs such as warranty and financial services. It does, 
however, give some sense of the operational and purchasing efficiency 
of carmakers.
These two requirements, the financial one and the non-financial one, 
can be jointly optimized only if there is a synchronization of the sales and 
marketing requirements and forecasts with parts flowing in from suppli-
ers. This leads to a strong pressing on the suppliers in terms of flexibility.
Going back to the overall picture of the relationship between oems and 
suppliers it can therefore be stated that there are two opposite macro-
requirements to balance. On the one hand, a strong push for reducing 
the operational autonomy and to squeeze the revenues of the suppliers 
to improve the performance of the overall supply chain, as an integrated 
value and productive chain. On the other hand, the oems need a col-
laborative relationship with their suppliers to manage complexity (Liker, 
Choi 2004). What the oems are trying to do is to enjoy the collaborative 
part, and the connected offloading of the investments to the suppliers, in 
order to retain as much control as possible over the innovation dynamic 
and improve the performance of the overall supply chain, that is to retain 
a strong control over the operative costs and over the collaborative and 
coordination costs.8
15 Conclusions
In this new paradigm what happens to the industrial structure of the 
car industry? To be more specific, what kind of role for the suppliers can 
be devised?
To give an answer to these questions a step backward should be taken 
to the section on the main features of the new global car industry. The 
7. Return on Supply Chain = (Revenue - COGS - R&D - Depreciation) ÷ Revenue (cogs is 
for the cost of goods sold: supply chain costs including material costs, R&D, Depreciation). 
8. A good example, related to Apple and hp, can be find at http://www.google.it/url?sa
=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fweb.mit.
edu%2Fis08%2Fpdf%2FDedrick_Kraemer_Linden.pdf&ei=908bUbWoFsXotQblnoDgBQ&usg=AFQjC
NG9RwzSnZl3-M6NKxbaS90EZX2tJg&bvm=bv.42261806,d.Yms/ ( 2013/02/ 20).
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growing weight of the role of networks as a structural feature of this 
industry, together with the growing need of market and product seg-
mentation and the diffusion of decentralized loci of innovation imply that 
the process of change of the car industry cannot be moulded only by the 
oems and by the existing leading oems. There are many alternatives sce-
narios available to the existing players, both industrial and law-making 
ones – as the usa and French cases show. So complex is the network of 
reciprocal interactions that the actual reshaping of this industry will be 
a collective endeavour. It can be the outcome of a wild market selection 
or of a social regulated process of adaptation and transformation.
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Industrial policies for sustainable mobility  
in the leading european automotive countries
Giuseppe Calabrese
abstract The role of the automotive industry is currently being renegotiated 
in a society that requires to return to the question of politics, states and the 
importance of regulation and taxation as these issues are likely to play a major 
role in determining outcomes for automotive companies and territories. Euro-
pean Union approach followed the usual path, with the institution of regulatory 
requirements that increasingly restrict the sale of new vehicles, the setting of 
specific limits on emissions, and the provision of direct support for basic re-
search. Current industrial national policies of European countries have been for 
the most part non-interventionist and concentrated on improving the business 
environment. Nevertheless, some countries were able to covertly support their 
respective national automotive sectors in contradiction to community directives. 
This chapter presents three European country studies, each of them with its own 
particularity: Germany, France and Great Britain.
1 Introduction
Finding new methods of propulsion for cars is currently a subject of in-
tense debate, driven by the issue of global warming and more generally 
by the demand for sustainable development in the automotive industry.1
The evolution of powertrains is undoubtedly influenced by the path 
dependency of countries and carmakers’ trajectories in terms of flexibil-
ity and inertia. Three lock-in factors of path dependency can be detected, 
i.e. business models, consumer attitudes and policy regulations:
1. In this chapter, alternative vehicles (avs) include alternative fuels, compressed natural 
gas (cng) liquefied petroleum gas (lpg) and biofuels, as well as alternative engines pow-
ered by electric batteries either exclusively, i.e. electric vehicles (evs), or partially: hybrid 
vehicles (hevs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (phevs), and range-extender hybrid electric 
vehicles (rehevs).
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The carmakers’ business models are generally characterized by risk aversion 
and by return optimization through continuous improvement and cost cutting. 
The current automotive business model is characterized by a lack of profitabil-
ity (Nieuwenhuis, Wells 2003), given that profit comes mainly from the sale of 
vehicles and not from their use (Ceschin, Vezzoli 2010). 
The internal combustion engine (ice) satisfies most consumers in 
terms of performance and predictable costs. Those who prefer clean 
and fuel-efficient engines and are willing to pay slightly higher purchase 
prices represent only a niche market (Dijk, Kemp 2010). Consumers 
care a great deal about fuel consumption but very little about vehicle 
emissions.
As for the European Union (eu), measures to develop avs have fol-
lowed the usual path, with the institution of regulatory requirements 
increasingly restricting the sale of new vehicles, the setting of specific 
limits on emissions, and the provision of direct support to basic research. 
The focus has been on new vehicles, while the reduction in pollutants 
from vehicles currently in use has barely been considered.2 Step by step, 
the Euro 1 to 6 regulations have mainly favoured incremental innovation 
of the ice rather than radical innovations (Oltra, Saint Jean 2009). In the 
course of time, R&D financing has moved from fuel cell vehicles (fcvs) 
to other types of avs, because the time-line for introducing fcvs is still 
largely undefined and their success is still very uncertain in relation to 
costs, infrastructures, hydrogen generation and storage. Albeit with 
greater determination, the recent cars 2020 action plan also follows this 
line. The Commission proposes a massive innovative push by streamlin-
ing research and innovation under the European Green Vehicle Initiative. 
The major challenge for policy units and policy-makers across Europe 
is the promotion of technologies which should be driven by environmen-
tal concerns rather than business and consumer considerations. New 
patterns of travel and vehicle ownership also contribute to fragment the 
market and add further complexity to the picture. 
The aim of this chapter is to present a detailed description of the 
industrial policies of the main European countries involved in sustain-
able mobility (Germany, France and Great Britain) in relation to the 
emerging industrial scenario. Some key questions are: Which are the 
main schemes adopted by these countries? Do some distinctive features 
emerge? Is it possible to provide some evaluations in itinere? In particu-
2. In the eu, 34% of vehicles in use are more than ten years old.
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lar, this chapter focuses on a scarcely implemented, even though tran-
sitional, measure to reduce local pollution, that is cng and lpg vehicles.3
The chapter is structured in six sections in addition to this Intro-
duction. The next section illustrates different public policy options for 
sustainable mobility in the automotive sector, at the national and local 
level. Sections three, four and five briefly present the existing policies in 
the three main European countries: Germany, France and Great Britain. 
Section six highlights the absence of significant policies for cng and lpg 
vehicles in the three countries. These measures might represent an im-
mediately viable option to reduce pollutant emissions. Finally, section 
seven introduces some conclusions and evaluations.
2 Different public policy options for sustainable mobility  
 in the automotive sector
At the European Union level, three major policy areas impact on sus-
tainable development in the automotive industry: common standard 
regulations on exhaust and co2 emissions,4 safety,5 and recycling.6 This 
barrage of increasingly stiff regulations is driving a substantial change 
and presents a challenge for the global car industry, although regula-
tory regimes for cars remain differentiated around the world. Some 
markets have specific safety tests and others have specific cycles for 
testing emissions (Ryan, Turton 2007; Sperling, Cannon 2007). The 
3. In this context, some observations on Italy will be presented.
4. The legal framework consists of a series of directives (each being an amendment to 
the 1970 Directive 70/220/eec) which are mandatory in all member States. Since the Euro 2 
stage, eu regulations have introduced different emission limits for diesel and petrol vehicles. 
Diesel vehicles have more stringent co standards but are allowed higher nox emissions. 
Petrol-powered vehicles are exempt from particulate matter (pm) standards through to the 
Euro 4 stage, but vehicles with direct injection engines are subject to a limit of 0.005 g/
km for Euro 5 and Euro 6. A particulate number standard (p) or (pn) is part of Euro 5 and 6. 
Carmakers will have to reduce co2 emissions from new cars to 130 grams per kilometer by 
2012/2015, with an additional 10 gram reduction coming from «complementary measures» 
including a greater use of biofuels. A new objective of just 95 grams per kilometer has been 
set for 2020. This will be conditional on an impact assessment. Penalties will be imposed 
on a sliding scale. Manufacturers that exceed their target by more than 3 grams will pay 
95 euro per excess gram. Lesser transgressions will be charged between 5 and 25 euros. 
From 2019, penalties will always be 95 euro.
5. euro ncap tests which originated in the uk but are now backed by the European Com-
mission, seven European governments, as well as motoring and consumer organizations 
in every eu country.
6. The End-of-Life Vehicle Directive came into force at the beginning of 2007.
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differences in fiscal regimes are even more pronounced. The European 
Union sees the proposal of the cars 2020 action plan as an attempt to 
overcome the clear lack of political leadership in the automotive sector. 
The case of the 2003 biofuel directive is a typical example. Indeed, only 
Sweden has adopted the directive to replace fossil fuels with biofuels 
and support flexi-fuel vehicles. Another example are bottom-up requests 
from Germany, France, Spain and Portugal which have urged the eu to 
support transnational development projects on electric mobility and to 
define standards for the charging system. As a matter of fact, much of 
the automotive-specific effort has been directed through programmes 
to fund collaboration among companies and research organizations in 
order to reduce life-cycle emissions (MacNeill, Bailey 2010). 
In this contest, most of the industrial policies of European countries 
have been non-interventionist and concentrated on improving the busi-
ness environment (Bailey, Driffield 2007). In the manufacturing arena, 
national policies have shifted away from sector-specific support towards 
general support to all manufacturing sectors and from vertical towards 
horizontal industrial policy measures.
Nevertheless, some countries have been able to covertly support their 
respective national automotive sectors in contradiction to community 
directives. It is worth pointing out that, at the end of the 20th century, 
France and Italy were the only countries involved in the av sectors. In 
the last few years, however, other countries have concentrated their ef-
forts based on their own specific carmakers and energy structures, as 
in the case of evs. Countries such as Denmark, France and Israel, which 
are now establishing attractive schemes for evs through R&D incentives, 
could potentially generate a huge competitive edge for their domestic 
automotive and power industries.
Yet, unless other governments act promptly in order to provide ade-
quate incentives for consumers to purchase these cars, and for investors 
to provide the necessary infrastructure at affordable prices, avs may get 
off to a false start. The isolated and top-down experience of California 
is particularly significant. California introduced a legislation that made 
it compulsory for carmakers to sell at least 2% Zero Emission Vehicles 
by 1997, rising to 15% in 2003, but the mandate was gradually reduced 
and it disappeared in 1998.
Each of the three European countries studied in this chapter displays 
its own peculiarities:
 - In Germany, public support to alternative powertrains and fuels focus-
es on R&D and related demonstration projects. While in the German 
automotive industry the shift towards alternative powertrains and 
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fuels struggles to gain momentum, in spite of numerous programmes, 
energy and resource efficiency seems to have rather different effects.
 - In France, one of the strengths of the 2009 plan, and of the subsequent 
initiatives launched in 2010, was the creation of collective expecta-
tions that evs might characterize a scenario of significant change. The 
problems, hesitations, corrections along the way and delays that have 
been accumulating since 2011 are progressively eroding this capital 
of confidence and enthusiasm. 
 - The British government’s policies intend to be non-discriminatory 
among international businesses which might invest in Britain. Con-
crete policy measures in low carbon vehicle infrastructure and in-
novation aim at being even-handed. At the national level, policy is 
«technology neutral» as regards which ultra-low or low carbon vehicle 
technologies should receive public funding and support.
One of the most popular schemes pursued by industrial policies is to 
launch fleet renewal programmes, including market incentives and car 
scrapping schemes. Scholars and practitioners have different opinions 
on the matter. However, above all in Europe, these incentives are seen 
as a measure intended to modify customer requirements and distort 
the market, leading only to limited, short-term benefits, because people 
are not actually encouraged to buy more cars but just to purchase new 
vehicles earlier than they would normally do.
Nevertheless, according to ihs Global Insight (2010), scrapping 
schemes have been remarkably successful and they have also been the 
main measure that 13 European Union member States, which together 
represent 85% of total vehicle sales, have enacted to tackle the financial 
crisis. In ten countries, the primary objective has been to provide gen-
eral economic stimulus, whereas the secondary objectives have been the 
renewal of the European car fleet and benefits for road safety. However, 
political intervention greatly depends on the types of alternative vehi-
cles taken into account, since the gap between their purchase price and 
that of conventional vehicles varies considerably and, in the case of evs, 
it is particularly wide. For example, the Mitsubishi i-MiEV, one of the 
best evs available, costs more than 36,000 euro, whereas a comparable 
conventional car costs less than 10,000 euro. This shows why govern-
ment subsidies have not significantly boosted ev sales in Europe. Such 
discrepancies highlight the apparently weak influence of incentives on 
purchasing decisions even when the incentives are significant.7
7. Main incentives for buying an ev: Denmark 20,588 €; Norway 17,524; Belgium 10,907; 
Portugal 9,442; Spain 6,500; uk 6,400; Italy 5,000.
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In the comparison between ices and evs, another aspect that must be 
considered is usage cost. The price of the energy used hints at a situation 
of competitiveness between electricity and petrol,8 but this aspect does 
not yet seem to be appealing enough.9 Moreover, the prices of electricity 
and petrol include different levels of excise duties to which the coffers 
of the various States are highly sensitive.10
Finally, and more generally, policy response to sustainable develop-
ment should aim at the implementation of measures capable of (Ceschin, 
Vezzoli 2010)
 - encouraging companies to shift their business models by adopting 
use-oriented (for example, leasing, sharing, pooling) and result-ori-
ented (for example, pay per service unit schemes, integrated mobility 
schemes) services; 
 - changing agents’ behaviours (for example, public procurements, con-
sumer awareness);
 - supporting demonstrative pilot projects (for example, promising busi-
ness models without direct market pressure);
 - involving universities and research centres in supporting knowledge 
transfer and the dissemination of information. 
3 Germany: essentially R&D support and local demonstrations
German sustainable mobility and transport policies are usually 
planned and structured as industrial and technology policies. Several 
government actors shape the sustainable mobility policy: the Ministries 
for Transport, Environment, Economics, Education and Research, as 
well as the agencies for Environment, Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technol-
ogy, Electric Mobility, and Energy (Heymann et al. 2011).
8. It is obvious that, if oil prices are low, consumers will tend to buy ice vehicles; however, 
when other conditions are met (battery prices decrease, public utility companies provide 
suitable infrastructures, and the eu sticks to its 95g/km co2 emissions target for 2020), the 
future of avs will be much brighter. In this context, the proposal to add extra excise taxes 
on oil prices to reach a permanent and fixed level seems sensible.
9. For example, in the case of the Smart model, the ev version consumes 12.2 KWh/100 
km and the unleaded petrol version consumes 4.4 liters/100 km. Using the average prices 
quoted in Europe’s Energy Portal (www.energy.eu), the usage cost of the Smart ev is 24.3% 
that of the ice version in France, 27.5% in the uk, 35.5% in Italy, 43.2% in Spain, and 47.9% 
in Germany.
10. If governments imposed on electricity the same level of taxes collected from petrol, 
the percentages would be: France 66.5, uk 61.8, Italy 66.4, Spain 57.1, and Germany 79.6.
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In Germany, the measures and targets for sustainable mobility con-
cern mainly the implementation of a regulatory framework and R&D 
support. The National Platform for Electric Mobility (npe) stands out 
among these actions.
Policies for sustainable mobility are strongly shaped by the political 
multi-level system, in which the main policy instruments are different 
taxes, such as energy and electricity taxes, quotas for biofuels, tempo-
rary rebates, low emission zones, incentives schemes to improve the 
economy, such as the scrapping bonus scheme, and indirect support to 
evs. Especially the scrapping scheme, as well as reduced working hours 
and temporary work, mitigated the effects of the crisis on the German 
automotive industry. In contrast to the scrapping scheme incentives 
available during the crisis years of 2009 and 2010, no purchase bonus 
was introduced for buying evs. 
As for demand incentives, Germany is less active than other European 
countries. The only form of direct support to ev owners consists in a few 
hundred euro in tax reductions (jato Dynamics, 2011).
The government supports R&D for sustainable mobility through a 
range of federal programmes, such as the third transport research pro-
gramme «Mobility and transport technologies» and, above all, the «Na-
tional innovation programme for hydrogen and fuel cell research» (nip). 
The nip was launched by the four above-mentioned Ministries, by 
means of a public-private partnership planned for 10 years from 2007 
to 2016 (nip 2011). The Government and companies will invest 1.4 bil-
lion euro in total. The now GmbH agency was founded to coordinate 
the programme, which includes two parts: phase 1 (until 2010) mainly 
focuses on hybrid technology, energy storage, system and grid integra-
tion and alternative fuels, whereas phase 2 (until 2015) places greater 
emphasis on fuel and hydrogen technology. As part of this programme, 
the Clean Energy Partnership (cep) was established in December 2002 
as a political-industrial collaborative initiative (energy firms, carmakers 
and public transport companies). The cep is the largest demonstration 
project on hydrogen mobility in Europe, and its core is a series of work-
ing groups in which firms representatives work on precise tasks. Results 
are regularly reviewed by a steering committee (nip 2011). Two times a 
year, a plenary meeting votes on overall strategic questions.11
From 2009 to 2013, the National Platform for Electric Mobility (npe) 
will provide one billion euro in support of R&D measures to make Ger-
many a leading country in electric mobility. The npe aims at one million 
11. At the time of writing, 137 vehicles of 12 different models have been tested. 
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registered battery evs and 500,000 fcvs by 2020. The npe benefits from 
industrial, labour and environmental policies, and brings together rep-
resentatives from industry, science, politics, trade unions, and society 
(Bundesregierung 2011). 
The programme comprises three phases: phase 1 until 2014, market 
preparation (R&D and lighthouse projects); phase 2 until 2017, market 
uptake for evs and infrastructures; phase 3 until 2020, mass market-
ing with business models and renewable energy integration. Its two 
pillars are:
 - Lighthouses: limited thematic clusters, such as battery, powertrain, 
ict & infrastructure, recycling.
 - Showcases: technologies and partial solutions will be integrated into 
comprehensive concepts and visions, pooling resources and increas-
ing investment security.
Within the npe framework, 4 billion euro will be invested to reach the 
aforementioned project objectives in the market preparation phase. A 
package of coordinated measures to strengthen research and develop-
ment and support the market start-up phase and the application of in-
novative technologies in so-called «showcase» projects is required to 
achieve the shared goals.
The npe has been complemented by some government programmes 
for electric mobility, such as projects focusing on ict (the development of 
intelligent vehicles with an ict-based system architecture; the intelligent 
integration of evs into energy supply systems; an intelligent transport 
infrastructure to raise efficiency, autonomy, and safety) or car sharing 
(like the Car2go mobility concept launched in Ulm or Car2gether in the 
wider Ulm area and in the Aachen city region).
Finally, the Ministry of Transport selected eight «model regions» via 
a call for projects,12 in order to support a public policy programme on ev 
fleet testing with 130 million euro total funding (now 2010). The project 
was structured along overarching research lines and platforms in which 
actors from science, industry, and local authorities collaborated to speed 
up the development of infrastructures and to increase the number of 
available evs. In addition, these demonstration projects were meant to 
raise public awareness of the advantages of electric mobility. Not only 
research and development for passenger cars were supported, but also 
the whole spectrum of different modes of transport. 
12. Hamburg; Bremen/Oldenburg; Rhein-Ruhr with Aachen and Münster; Rhein-Main; 
Saxony with Schwerpunkten, Dresden and Leipzig; Stuttgart; Munich; Berlin-Potsdam.
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In total, the deployment of more than 2,800 vehicle units was planned 
before the end of the programme in December 2011. Vehicle deploy-
ment was accompanied by the installation of 2,500 charging points. The 
program aimed at establishing local conditions for electric mobility: 
interconnected mobility systems which are adapted to different local 
needs. The idea to support model regions was based on the principles of 
systematic regional development and of electric mobility being created 
and practised in local processes. To achieve this goal, a cluster approach 
was adopted as the most appropriate method to support not only car-
makers but also local smes and transport enterprises. 
German actors consider the model regions programme to have been 
successful (bmbvs 2012). In terms of ev market development scenarios, the 
testing projects have shown that commercial transport will be the most 
promising field for ev integration, with evs being adopted for commercial 
fleets. As for private use, evs are expected to penetrate the car market only 
in the medium term and their first area of use will be urban and commuter 
traffic. In rural areas evs have been received surprisingly well and changes 
in mobility culture are likely to develop also across different generations. 
There is still uncertainty about the efficiency of public and private 
charging points, and through testing, semi-public charging infrastruc-
tures have proven to be the most effective in meeting demands. The 
model regions programme has caused a trickle-down effect, triggering 
a project multiplication and providing additional research funding at the 
regional and local level.
With its new call for projects on «electric mobility showcases» in 
November 2011, the government aimed at continuing comprehensive 
testing of electric mobility requirements in four German regions13 char-
acterized by different conditions. The government supports cooperation 
projects to which both the federal States and firms contribute with 180 
million euro. It is probably no coincidence that the three largest German 
carmakers have their headquarters in these areas.
4 France: focus on electric vehicles
The ongoing crisis has had a major impact in France, with immediate 
consequences on unemployment and trade balance. This has provided 
the conditions for ambitious industrial policy actions to promote the 
development, commercialization and use of avs.
13. Berlin-Brandenburg; Bayern-Saxony; Niedersachsen and Baden-Württemberg/Stutt-
gart.
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The aims have been firstly to strengthen the competitive advantage of 
French carmakers in comparison to other European carmakers manufac-
turing much more polluting vehicles, and secondly to keep the produc-
tion in France, since the innovative nature of evs ensures higher value 
added also in the lower car segments (Hildermeier, Villareal 2011).
The decision-making process has been influenced by other factors: 
 - Renault (15% of whose capital is held by the French State) is the first 
and for the moment the only carmaker to have developed a full range 
of evs; 
 - France has a strong environmental movement, currently in opposition, 
and a determined Minister for the Environment, Jean-Louis Borloo;
 - co2 emissions deriving from the production of electricity are low, since 
78% of electricity comes from nuclear power and 12% from renewa-
bles;
 - France is characterized by the presence of other important actors in 
the automotive and battery industries, as well as in the service and 
infrastructure sectors.14
In addition to demand-incentive instruments, such as bonus/malus 
and the «prime à la caisse» scrapping scheme, especially since 2009 
electric mobility has been promoted through 14 measures, which in-
clude support to R&D on batteries, the development of the charging 
infrastructure in public and private car parks, and the development of 
alternative solutions for individual mobility. The national target set for 
2020 is to achieve the conversion of 5% of vehicles in use to evs, equiva-
lent to about 2 million cars (Ministère de l’Écologie, du Développement 
Durable et de l’Énergie 2009). 
ev R&D is mainly financed by the Agence de l’Environnement et de 
la Maîtrise de l’Énergie (ademe), managed by the Ministries of Econo-
my and Research. ademe has received 400 million euro to support new 
eco-efficient technologies in the form of «demonstration projects» and 
through poles of competitiveness,15 and has funded 11 projects, includ-
14. evs (Renault, psa: Ligier, Venturi, Heuliez, Eco&Mobilité, Bolloré, fam Automobiles, 
Lumeneo, Renault trucks, Gruau), batteries (nec, Batscap, Saft, Dow Kokam, pvi, Valeo); 
services (Norauto, Freshmile, Veolia, VULog, Veolia, sncf, Suez, Keolis); infrastructures 
(edf, Total, Vinci).
15. A pole of competitiveness operates in a specific region and is an association of busi-
nesses, research centres and training institutions engaged in a cooperative action around 
innovative projects. The two most important poles for the development of sustainable 
mobility are Move’o and the Pôle Vehicule du Futur. Although a key role should be played 
by the regions, in truth Move’o is conditioned by Renault and the Pôle Vehicule du Futur 
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ing five on evs, but also researches on hevs, electric buses and urban 
microcars. 
Moreover, in 2010 with the «grand emprunt» law ademe received 
750 million euro to support the development of new green technologies, 
and 250 million euro were allocated to research on batteries, with the 
explicit aim of developing a French battery industry. One of the most 
important projects was the setting up of a battery manufacturing plant 
in Flins (Renault-Nissan alliance), with an initial capacity planned for 
2012 of 100,000 batteries a year. However, the project has encountered 
several difficulties which have led some players to withdraw from it.
In 2010 a plan for the implementation of the electric charging infra-
structure was defined. It includes three phases: 18,000 charging points 
in the first two years; 900,000 private charging points and 75,000 pub-
lic ones (of which 15,000 fast-charging) by 2015; and 4 million private 
charging points and 400,000 public ones (of which 75,000 fast-charging) 
by 2020. Moreover, the plan envisaged that about 60,000 evs or hevs 
would be put on the market in 2011-2012, which represents a crucial 
amount to promote economies of scale in the supply of the electric charg-
ing infrastructure (Ministère de l’Écologie, du Développement Durable 
et de l’Énergie 2011).
Finally, the policies which support the development of sustainable mo-
bility are partly delegated to the local and regional levels. They mostly 
consist in electric mobility demonstration projects, based on the Parisian 
model of AutoLib, aimed at providing a basic infrastructure of charging 
stations in urban areas and at making available to the public a fleet of 
electric vehicles at discounted usage prices. More rarely, the objective 
of these projects is delivering goods by ev to an urban area (La Rochelle, 
Lyon, Paris) and restricting the access of non-electric commercial vehi-
cles to cities (Calabrese, Vervaeke 2012). 
At the time of writing, the evaluation of these policies is inconsist-
ent (Jullien, Pardi 2013). On the one hand, the national coordination 
of the 2009 plan by the Ministries for Industry and Ecology has made 
it possible to clearly define the synergy between environmental objec-
tives (sustainable mobility - reduction in pollutants) and industrial objec-
tives (technological innovation - keeping/developing the production in 
France). The focus on the development of evs and of a national battery 
industry in line with Renault’s strategy has gained widespread support 
thanks to its great consistency in environmental and industrial targets, 
in spite of the European technological neutrality approach.
by psa. Indeed, this is a strategy to bypass the European directives about directly financ-
ing an industry.
automotive in transition
150 giuseppe calabrese
On the other hand, results are slow to appear. In all three areas, the 
plan has accumulated significant delays, and it is already clear that the 
targets for 2015 and 2020 in terms of market, supply and infrastruc-
ture will not be met. The main problems concern the supply of evs and 
especially of batteries. The Renault factory in Flins has experienced 
major and inexplicable delays. Should Renault prove unable to ensure 
in-house production of the batteries, the entire business model on which 
the electricity supply of the French carmaker is based would have to 
be reshaped. 
Of course, if this involution continues, it will represent a great shock 
for the national plan to develop avs. It is no coincidence that, although 
a large consortium of companies for the acquisition of evs has been set 
up, at the moment the assessment is not positive and the vehicles are 
not yet fully available, not least because the infrastructure is develop-
ing extremely slowly. This is the classic paradox of the chicken and the 
egg: without an extensive charging infrastructure a mass market for evs 
cannot develop, but without a substantial fleet the cost of developing the 
infrastructure is not sustainable.
5 Great Britain: a technology neutral position
The main feature of the British car industry is its international charac-
ter. Extensive foreign ownership combines with the absence of a small 
group of dominant players around which government policy can easily 
centre. There is no major national manufacturer for the British govern-
ment to support, and the distribution of production and sales is com-
paratively diluted across a range of competing carmakers, compared 
to other major car-producing economies in Western Europe. For these 
reasons, national policies towards the car industry are heavily weighted 
in favour of measures to attract inward foreign direct investment and 
to be non-discriminatory among international businesses which might 
invest in Britain (Coffey 2006).
Similarly, concrete policy initiatives to support alternative vehicles 
and promote sustainable mobility at the national strategic level tend to 
focus even-handedly on measures to develop a supporting infrastructure, 
and to provide financial inducements to promote the uptake of alterna-
tive vehicles. This will facilitate all carmakers and related businesses in 
implementing low carbon technologies (MacNeill, Bailey 2010). 
Likewise, regional level policies within Britain aim to allow carmakers 
who are active in different areas to develop their own priorities. No at-
tempt is made to provide central directives to steer decisions on which 
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non-conventional engine technologies – pure electric, hybrid, hydrogen 
– constitute the best way forward. In this respect, policy is avowedly and 
explicitly «technology neutral» (Coffey, Thornley 2013).
The main government departments responsible for the industry are 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department 
for Transport, which has established an Office for Low Emission Vehicles. 
Of particular note is the Technology Strategy Board, a «business-led» 
innovation agency which oversees competitive fund awarding for com-
mercial projects. A key role is also played by deliberative bodies and 
national forums, the most important of which is the Automotive Council, 
established in 2009 and tasked with identifying strategic investment 
priorities, amongst other things.
Temporary policy measures aside, the economic downturn has given 
considerable impetus to Britain’s emerging strategic orientation to-
wards alternative vehicle technologies and sustainable mobility (hm 
Government 2009).
A range of policies on taxation – vehicle excise duties, company car 
taxes, and capital allowances –, combined with grants to private16 or 
public17 fleet buyers of ultra-low or low carbon cars and light commer-
cial vehicles, are being used as key elements in British policy towards 
alternative vehicle technologies and sustainable mobility, with fairly 
direct carry-over to bus services. The national policy also focuses on 
«business-led» innovation; a wide set of individual and collaborative 
projects have gradually been funded to support development in ultra-low 
or low carbon vehicle technologies.18 Moreover, even though not specifi-
cally targeting investment in R&D involving alternative vehicle technolo-
16. To reduce upfront costs to consumers, grants have been allocated to a range of «ultra-
low» carbon vehicles, with discounts from the manufacturers’ listed price of maximum 
£ 5,000 for new cars and £ 8,000 for vans.
17. The Low Carbon Vehicle Public Procurement Programme offers financial support to 
public sector organizations for the procurement of low carbon vehicles for public sector 
fleets. In the first stage of the initiative, funding was provided to support public fleet trials 
of over 200 electric and low co2 emission vans. At the moment, a £ 3,400 grant per van is 
provided for the first 500 units purchased for each fleet.
18. The Low Carbon Vehicle Innovation Platform, launched in 2007, provides match 
funding from the government to private sector projects, awarded on a competitive basis 
for tenders submitted to pre-publicised rounds. For example, in September 2010 matched 
funds for £ 24 million were awarded to 6 collaborative projects; while in June 2011 a total 
of £ 500K was awarded to fund a set of feasibility studies on the recycling and reuse of bat-
teries for low and ultra-low carbon vehicles. The projects cover the whole range of vehicle 
technologies and practical technology applications. Some examples include an electric taxi 
produced by lti and Smith Electric Vehicles and a collaboratively developed range-extender 
unit currently used by Jaguar.
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gies or sustainable mobility, the general tax environment is intended to 
encourage research and development initiatives with positive spill-over 
effects on firms other than those directly engaged in these sectors. 
However, there are concerns as to whether tax changes, partially 
driven by austerity, might undermine the progress made so far in devel-
oping evs and hevs.
At the same time, although still in its early stages, the development of 
the electric infrastructure is now well underway and it is being combined 
with large scale driver-focused research.19
Hydrogen and fuel-cell applications, which have hindered the com-
mercial availability of evs and phevs to private and business users, have 
also become an active focus of attention. However, the national policy 
stance remains avowedly «neutral» as to which branches of technology 
ought to be preferred.
The sector of heavy-duty vehicles is a difficult area for politics to nego-
tiate, owing to its heterogeneity and to issues concerning cost-effective 
transport vis-à-vis weight and distance. This remains true despite the 
relative prominence of dual and bi-fuel conversions.
At the regional level the policy framework is consistent with the over-
all character of the British automotive industry, where a large number 
of oems are pursuing their own particular strategies on products and 
technology, with facilities based in different sub-regions of the national 
economy. 
With respect to the low carbon economic sector as a whole, the vision 
that informs regional policy within Britain is one of devolved decision 
making in areas where identifiable comparative advantages exist at the 
regional or local level. These regional or local activities are to be nested 
in turn within an evolving national policy framework which encourages 
low carbon business and green innovation. The different areas, regions 
and localities of Britain should identify their own particular challenges 
and exploit their own specific capabilities (Harper, Wells 2012).
To better achieve this goal, in 2009 a major policy initiative was 
launched to identify and develop the so-called Low Carbon Economic 
Areas, to accelerate low carbon economic activities in areas where the 
19. The Plugged-In Places programme offers matched funding opportunities to public-
private partnerships supporting the installation of charging points around Britain. It started 
with three major pilot schemes for London, Milton Keynes and the North East of England, 
and eight regional (and greater city) schemes are now operating (covering the East of 
England, Greater Manchester, the Midlands, Northern Ireland, and Scotland). The pro-
jects include efforts to improve night-time off-peak home recharging as well as practicable 
workplace recharging schemes combined with targeted on-street infrastructures near 
supermarkets, retail centres, car parks, etc.
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existing geographic and industrial assets provide major strengths. These 
were initially envisaged as partnerships of regional and sub-regional 
bodies, to be led by Britain’s Regional Development Agencies, which 
were established in 1998, abolished in 2010, and partially replaced by 
the Local Enterprise Partnerships.
Not all of the designated Low Carbon Economic Areas have a remit for 
automotive development, but three of the areas are of particular interest 
(Berkeley et al. 2012): 
 - The North East of England, which is the designated region for ultra-
low carbon vehicles. Previously, the local Regional Development Agen-
cy achieved considerable success in: using its own financing capability 
to boost the region’s electric charging infrastructure; contributing 
to bids for matching funds for projects submitted to the Technology 
Strategy Board; helping establish a Low Carbon Vehicle Research and 
Development Centre by involving the region’s five local universities in 
a collaborative endeavour. The local dominance of Nissan means that 
ev technologies are the leading technological paradigm currently at 
play. The region is host to a growing cluster of ev specialists, including 
Smith Electric Vehicles, Britain’s oldest electric vehicle manufacturer 
and producer of a range of commercial vehicles, and more recently 
to emerging businesses like Liberty Electric Vehicles. A number of 
smaller entrant players are also developing electric vehicle technol-
ogy platforms. 
 - The Midlands, which is the designated region for advanced automo-
tive engineering. Despite initial suggestions that hydrogen technolo-
gies would be a key remit, the general thrust has instead been broader, 
reflecting the local businesses’ great commercial interest in evs and 
hevs. This approach is also ascribable to the presence of a strong 
university research base, including Warwick and Birmingham uni-
versities.
 - Wales, which is the designated region for hydrogen and low carbon fu-
el technologies. Unlike the English regions, Wales is a country within 
Great Britain with its own national assembly and, as such, unaffected 
by the abolition of regional agencies. The decision to make Wales a 
Low Carbon Economic Area centring on hydrogen and low carbon fuel 
technologies is a broader remit, in the sense that it is less specifically 
focussed on vehicle technologies and sustainable mobility, although 
these are included.
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6 A shelved transition opportunity: cng and lpg vehicles 
The main target of the policies described in the previous sections is 
essentially industrial and only secondarily environmental. As a matter of 
fact, in order to immediately reduce local pollution, cng and lpg vehicles 
should receive more consideration, although this measure should not 
be considered a permanent solution. The price and performance of cng 
and lpg vehicles are comparable to those of petrol vehicles, but they 
greatly reduce local pollution (20-30% fewer greenhouse gasses) and 
are characterized by much technical expertise (Volpato, Stocchetti 2010). 
Moreover, due to a dramatic drop in the price of natural gas, which is 
likely to remain lower than that of conventional fuels for decades to 
come, as long as governments keep excises down, consumers and above 
all fleet operators20 will have access to an alternative fuel that can slash 
operating costs.
More specifically, the most promising avs able to reduce local pollu-
tion seem to be those of the cng type, in particular when old vehicles 
are equipped with cng devices. Policy-makers should intervene by im-
plementing regulations (exploiting environmental and safety benefits 
as opposed to supporting traditional vehicles); through technology (by 
improving energy performance, and incorporating cng into hevs); and 
by supporting demand (not adjusting excise duties and promoting the 
conversion of cars already in use). The fundamental issue is the expan-
sion of the distribution network, which is limited in Italy and almost 
non-existent in other European countries, except Germany. Recently, 
Italy has allowed cng filling through the home network. This could break 
the vicious circle created between cng distributors, who do not want to 
expand the network because of low demand, and consumers, who are 
not willing to buy cng cars because of the lack of filling stations.
The German government’s strategy of 2004 envisaged a potential 0.5-
1% natural gas use in 2010, and 2 to 4% by 2020, corresponding to about 
1.4 million natural gas vehicles in 2020. But this potential is far from be-
ing fully exploited: in 2012 the share of natural gas vehicles was below 
0.3%. In Germany, natural or biogas refills are compensated for under 
the current tax law until 2018. About 30% of total costs can be reduced 
in this way, which means saving about 50% compared to diesel and 60% 
compared to gasoline. There are now 880 public stations, expected to 
rise to 1,300, which would represent about 10% of the 14,500 German 
filling stations. In its Energy Concept of 2010, the government decided 
20. While there are not yet enough cng and lpg filling stations on the roads, fleet opera-
tors can install an indoor filling station through the methane network.
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to further support cng vehicles. It will examine how biomethane can be 
used more efficiently in the fuel mix. To this end, in 2010 a large number 
of firms along the value chain came together in an «initiative on natural 
gas mobility» in order to present policymakers with a number of initia-
tives and requirements.
In France, on the other hand, State actions have focused on evs, thus 
excluding other technological solutions for sustainable mobility, also 
because their market share is very marginal. In 2012, the percentage of 
sales was: 0.5% lpg, 0.3% ethanol, and 0.05% cng. However, the case of 
lpg is interesting, because, despite the number of filling stations being 
limited (1,750), the inclusion of lpg in the 2009 ecological bonus system 
produced a significant growth in sales (3.4% of the market), confirming 
the potential of this technological solution. Its subsequent exclusion 
from State aids is due to the strategies of French carmakers, which focus 
on evs (Renault) or on all hevs (psa).
In Great Britain, initiatives in support of gas fuels are still limited at 
this stage, although a role for larger vehicles has been clearly identi-
fied. In fact, while relatively few new vehicles are sold in Britain, the 
number of dual fuel and bi-fuel vehicle conversions is more substantial, 
particularly amongst larger vehicles, including heavy goods vehicles. 
Efforts have been made to build the infrastructure for the fuel needs of 
cng and lpg vehicles. However, these technologies are not receiving the 
same amount of State support that evs have seen. Early grant-assisted 
projects, supported by the Department for Transport, entailed awards 
for pilot projects intended to develop natural gas/biogas stations and 
infrastructures and to assist with the delivery of gas blends. Grants were 
awarded to a small number of projects and involved relatively modest 
sums. Examples included a temporary cng filling station demonstration 
project, in collaboration with Mercedes Benz, and other more permanent 
initiatives for the construction of compressed and liquid gas filling sta-
tions. As a matter of fact, the comparatively greater importance which 
is being given to evs and phevs with respect to public infrastructure sup-
port suggests that cng and lpg vehicle technologies are identified as im-
mediately relevant to larger vehicles, rather than cars or lighter vehicles.
7  Conclusions
Technological change is not a deterministic process; its use is condi-
tioned by social and economic factors (Dicken 2011). The use of a new 
or emerging technology is typically dependent on business enterprises 
electing to maximize profit, market share or investment opportunities 
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by developing technological advantages. However, in the case of avs, 
the process of change is being driven primarily by policies at the re-
gional, national and supranational levels. Initiatives such as the Kyoto 
Protocol and eu carbon emission regulations have established the policy 
framework for automotive producers, forcing them to provide a range of 
different vehicles to meet targets set by environmental regulations. At 
the regional and national levels, policy-makers are interpreting these 
regulatory structures and creating the environment in which carmak-
ers must operate. This has included national initiatives to promote the 
use of avs, for example vehicle subsidies and the widespread roll-out of 
charging posts for evs. At the regional level, the policy-makers’ deci-
sion to introduce the use of congestion charges and the creation of Low 
Emission Zones has also benn useful to generate pressure from below 
on producers. 
However, in a broader perspective, public policies should take into 
account the industrial scenario in the making. 
The current short-term scenario seems to be one of diversity (Frey-
ssenet 2011). Italy is mainly focused on lpg and cng vehicles and the 
same is true for Russia, which counts on its large amount of natural gas 
reserves, while Sweden concentrates on biomethane (ngva 2012). Out-
side of Europe, Brazil is the traditional leader in biofuel in terms of all 
car sales. The large amount of nuclear power installed has led France 
to focus on electric vehicles, whereas Germany promotes electric and 
hydrogen vehicles.
Nevertheless, other scenarios can be hypothesized: one of progres-
siveness, involving a smooth transition from the ice to fcvs, or one of 
rupture, with the immediate adoption of hevs or, even more radically, evs.
The three national cases presented above seem to show a trend to-
wards a progressive scenario in the cases of Germany and the uk, and 
towards one of rupture in the case of France, which is influenced by the 
strategies of its national carmakers. Renault is more prone to a rapid 
transition to evs, psa and virtually all other carmakers in the world prefer 
a gradual evolution through hevs. The latest hints by the French govern-
ment show that the prospect of a rapid transition towards evs, clearly 
advocated in the 2009 national plan, is today much more uncertain. Both 
in Germany21 and in Great Britain22 the expected targets are far from be-
ing met, due to a dwindling consumer interest. Above-mentioned targets 
21. One million electric cars on German roads by the end of the decade, but only 3,000 
electric cars were sold in Germany last year compared to a total market which exceeded 
3 million.
22. The numbers of avs in circulation is just over 1.1% of new registrations.
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have been pursued in different ways: in Germany through R&D support, 
and in the uk through purchase subsidization of new hevs or evs. 
The nature of these public policies is essentially industrial and only 
secondarily environmental. In fact, according to the author, in the per-
spective of a progressive scenario, cng and lpg vehicles should receive 
more consideration.
Another measure analysed in this chapter concerns the roll-out of 
charging points and other infrastructures to promote the use of avs 
amongst consumer in the three countries. Alongside consumer promo-
tions, substantial investments have been made in demonstration pro-
jects and in actively encouraging automotive producers to engage with 
avs in terms of R&D, marketing and advertising. 
These projects are financed primarily through the resources provided 
by national governments (or the federal government in the case of Ger-
many), and are mainly public-private collaborations for the dissemina-
tion of evs. Policy-makers consider these policies successful but their 
impact is quantitatively limited. The current number of evs or electricity 
charging stations available to the public is negligible in comparison to 
the fleet of cars circulating and with respect to the infrastructure needed 
for the development of an ev mass market.
The main focus of the demonstration projects is to support initiatives 
by the State and by the major industrial players. It is a way to gather 
information on the behaviour and needs of potential ev consumers. The 
impact on the media of these projects can pave the way for a more 
widespread use but, in any case, it is important not to confuse the inter-
est aroused by these projects and their practical impact on sustainable 
mobility.
It would actually be an illusion to think that the transition to the elec-
tric mobility can emerge spontaneously from decentralized initiatives 
of this nature. Only a massive, long-term and central industrial policy 
at the European level may allow this kind of transition to support the 
development of battery technology, the charging infrastructure and the 
market acceptance.
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Crisis in the automotive industry  
and territorial development:  
Fiat and its suppliers in Southern Italy
Francesco Pirone
abstract The chapter deals with local production systems in which there are 
automotive assembly plants. It focuses on the effects that the strategic choices 
of location and allocation of production among assembly plants have on local 
development. The effects on the supply chain – the part of suppliers located 
in the regional economy – are analysed. The disciplinary approach used is the 
one of economic sociology, in particular the approach of comparative political 
economy. The analytical categories used are taken from studies of local produc-
tion systems and governance of local economies. The paper presents the results 
of a case study related to the Fiat assembly plants and manufacturing suppliers 
in Southern Italy. The empirical study has analysed the strategic choices of Fiat 
and the effects they have had on the local supply chain and territorial develop-
ment. The analysis focuses in particular on the transformation of the supply chain 
of Fiat in Southern Italy (qualitative and quantitative dimension) as a result of 
the economic crisis and Fiat’s strategy in the period 2010-2012. The analytical 
dimensions that are considered are: aspects of production, employment and 
labour relations, innovation, institutions and local governance.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the relation between the territorial configu-
ration of the automotive industry and the development of regional 
economies; it focuses on the analysis of the configurations of local pro-
duction systems in relation to the existence of an automotive assembly 
plant and the proximity to few manufacturing suppliers as well. The 
research aims at understanding the connections between the business 
strategies of the sectorial big players and the development of regional 
economies. This work is based on a case study about Fiat assembly 
plants and manufacturing suppliers in Southern Italy. The first part of 
the paper outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework of this re-
search through the employ of the economic sociology approach – with a 
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special focus on the New Political Economy (Crouch et al. 2001) – and 
the categories of analysis related to the studies about local production 
systems and governance of local economies. The second part presents 
an analysis of the economic and institutional characteristics of the au-
tomotive industry in Southern Italy. This analysis has a specific focus 
on two crucial features: the first one is on the effects of the automotive 
industry’s development on the modalities of social embeddedness; the 
second one is on the consequences of the strategic decisions taken 
by the automotive big players at a local level. Given this framework, 
the research examines the results of a specific study about the effects 
of the strategies adopted by Fiat to contrast the economic crisis and 
their consequences over the development of the automotive supply 
chain in Campania region. The third part of the work shows the main 
results of an empirical research about the reconfiguration of the supply 
chain in Campania after Fiat’s decision to assign a different product 
mission to the Pomigliano d’Arco assembly plant, and its effects over 
the development of the regional economy. These transformations af-
fect the products, the production processes, the configuration of the 
supply chain and the whole local production system directly. The last 
part focuses on the elements explaining the connection between the 
restructuring processes of the automotive industry at a global level, as 
well as their effects on the reconfiguration of local production systems 
at a local level.
2 The automotive industry and the territorial development:  
 a theoretical and conceptual framework
Before the crisis, the strategies of the carmakers were set up around 
the continuous reorganisation of the outsourcing processes and the 
regulation of the relations with the suppliers (Bonazzi, Negrelli 2003). 
Original equipment manufacturers (oems) focus their activities on the 
development of some key technologies, while the subsystems are de-
signed in collaboration with a small group of first-tier suppliers – which 
in turn are related to second- and third-tier suppliers for the develop-
ment of simpler products and parts. A long-term relation occurs between 
oems and their suppliers for the development of strategic parts: the aim 
is to take advantage of the relationship as a source of mutual learning; 
for this reason, this specific relationship stands outside the dynamics of 
market. It is regulated by principles which aim at fostering the innova-
tion and the inter-organizational learning, which is achieved through 
the sharing of savings, risks and benefits deriving from the innovations. 
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The permanent cost reduction and the achievement of higher quality 
standards are the targets of such dynamics.
The hierarchisation of the structure of the supply chain goes through 
the adoption of specific strategies which vary widely from one producer 
to another. Thus, the supplying relations experience different paths of 
institutionalisation according to the specific socio-institutional configu-
rations, which can be explained through the «national regimes of regu-
lation» (Kochan et al. 1997; Freyssenet et al. 1998; Boyer, Frayssenet 
2005). The analysis at the local level revealed that the global players 
can organise their external operating environment: they can decide the 
horizontal configuration of the labour division between firms. Such deci-
sions are taken according to the local institutional environment.
Yet before the crisis – again – the automotive supply chain underwent 
a process of constant rationalisation, which affected the whole industry 
at different paces; indeed, it is the most important shift towards an inter-
company and territorial production reorganisation. These trends have 
been summarised in six points by Volpato (2006):
1. the demand for cost reduction of the supplied parts, which includes 
the incentive to delocalise the production to the low-wages areas;
2. the power of the first-tier suppliers to organise the underlying supply 
pyramid, in order to simplify the commercial relations of the oems 
and to concentrate the responsibility for the quality control of the 
manufactured parts to the first-tier suppliers;
3. the specialisation of the oems on the activities related to the design of 
the vehicles general architecture; the global players delegate or share 
the production of innovations and the coordination of the supply chain 
to the suppliers which produce integrated systems;
4. the attempt to generalise the just-in-time supply system as a transi-
tion to a bto (build-to-order) organisation – in line with the «pull-type» 
supply chain management;
5. the development of a modular design architecture, in order to reduce 
the investments in the assembly plants and to decrease the overall 
assembly time;
6. the shift towards a new time-based competition – the increase in the 
rate of innovation through the participation of the suppliers to the 
involved processes; the ability to decrease the time-to-market; the 
reduction of the product life-cycle.
The notion of «enterprise network» represents a point of overlap 
between the analysis of the transformations of the post-Fordist firm, 
and the theories about the local models of production organisation. In 
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particular, the «New Political Economy» theory (Crouch et al. 2001) 
reveals how the development of the «production networks» made the 
companies more dependent from the local production system in which 
they operate. The importance of the institutional frameworks is linked 
to the production networks capability to offer external economies – both 
tangible and intangible – to the companies.1 These resources have been 
defined by Les Galès and Voelzkow (2004, p. 11) as «local collective 
competition goods». The external economies make it possible to explain 
the companies’ economic performances and their different territorial 
development; they increase the productivity rate and the innovation 
capability, and affect the overall businesses’ competitiveness.
The «networked firms» is the only model – among all the patterns of 
local business system identified by Crouch and Trigilia (2004) – to en-
compass the analysis of the organisational features and the governance 
of the local production systems in the automotive industry. Indeed, this 
model «includes medium and large-sized enterprises which maintain a 
relatively stable relationship with a thick network of small sub-suppliers 
that are placed in the same local business system. The ‘networked firms’ 
[…] bases their flexibility and innovation capability on this specific kind 
of sub-supply relationship» (Crouch, Trigilia 2004, p. 309). In these pro-
duction systems large enterprises produce directly the collective compe-
tition goods in the production system itself, or within a first-tier supply 
network – and they create the so-called «club goods». However, there is 
an indirect need for collective goods since the competitiveness of large 
automotive firms relies on a highly specialised and qualified network of 
sub-suppliers. Their presence is only possible within institutionalised 
contexts in which local collective competition goods are available. The 
focus of this research is about local development; thus it is necessary to 
analyse the interdependent relation between large enterprises and local 
institutional context. As Pichierri wrote: 
on the one hand, large enterprises are seen as «strategic decision-makers», 
which aims at becoming more independent from local specificities and policies. 
[…] On the other hand, the re-emergence of «regional economies» and the 
«regionalisation of production» argues that localisation of production cannot 
abstract from the local presence of skills, human and organisational resources 
which allow a «flexible and specialised» production – because of this specific 
economic phase characterised by the final crisis of mass production [2002, p. 24].
1. Intangible external economies are related to cognitive and normative resources – like 
the implicit knowledge, the specialised languages, the social conventions and trust; on the 
other hand, tangible external economies include infrastructures and services.
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To better assess the different paths of organisation adopted by local 
production systems in the automotive industry, it is useful to recall the 
analytical scheme of the «models of production» (Boyer, Freyssenet 
2005) – a scheme which belongs to the Regulation School and that is 
dedicated to the automotive industry. The analysis of the evolution of 
the «models of production» rejects the existence of a single, national 
trajectory even within the same accumulation regime («growth model»). 
Indeed, the production models vary within a single path of national de-
velopment: they are the result of the interaction between the strategies 
of profits adopted by firms and the regulatory framework. This perspec-
tive underlines the variability of the production models, which are the 
result of specific profit strategies of firms – this is the case, for example, 
of different producers doing their business in the same area –; but it 
tells nothing about the presence of different organisations of production 
within the same firm and at the local level – this is the case of Fiat and 
its Italian plants.
Under this light, it is useful to adopt the point of view suggested by 
Bardi and Calabrese (2006) and to focus on the impact of the automotive 
industry over the models of regional development. The two authors per-
ceive the presence of several territorial, socio-productive configurations 
in Italy, and they classify them under three ideal type (pp. 214-220): (a) 
the supply base, (b) the industrial district, and (c) the production chain. 
Bardi and Calabrese show that a firm can develop several models of 
production, that are variously linked to the territories and depend on the 
institutional features of the local context. Their analysis reveals that Fiat 
developed several territorial configurations in Italy; such configurations 
can be linked to their own typology: sata Fiat plant (which is located in 
Basilicata region, Southern Italy) is an example of supply base – indeed, 
the plant has been specifically designed to achieve this configuration 
(Bubbico, Pirone 2006); the production chain located in Piedmont region 
(northern Italy) evolved towards the industrial district configuration 
(Bianchi et al. 2001; Enrietti, Whitford 2006); while the Emilia-Romagna 
region developed the automotive production chain (northern Italy) – this 
chain is specialised in the manufacture of some mechanical parts, and 
has strong inter-sectoral relations (ipl Emilia-Romagna 2005). However, 
it is not correct to ascribe the nature of the three paths of development 
only to the territorial model of the organisation of production; hence, 
they all must be connected to the different places that the three local 
configurations occupy in the local labour division.
The social regulation of local production systems cannot explain by 
itself the existence of various dynamics of territorial development: it 
is necessary to take into account the place that such dynamics occupy 
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within the global value chain. Thus, the regional differentials of de-
velopment are linked to the spatial organisation of the value chain: in 
particular, they are connected to the strategies of localisation adopted 
by the global players (both carmakers and mega suppliers), and to 
the territorial reorganisation of the supply chain (Whitford, Potter 
2007). According to the latest research conducted by Dunford and 
Greco (2007) – which investigates regional development and the local 
division of labour through a case study of Fiat production network in 
Basilicata and Piedmont – the regional differentials of development can 
be related to the different places that both territories occupy within 
the value chain; so, the differentials are the result of the centralisa-
tion of the highest value-added activities commanded by Fiat and its 
first-tier suppliers.
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the transformations in the auto-
motive value chain in order to better assess the effects that the different 
strategies of localisation produce at local level (Gereffi et al. 2008). The 
fragmentation of the value chain is mainly caused by the transforma-
tion of the role of the oems. According to Jürgens (2006), today more 
than half the total value of the production is located within the activi-
ties performed by firms specialised in the manufacture of technological 
and specific parts – whereas, by the end of the 1990s, oems were at the 
top of the production process and retained only the largest share of the 
entire value produced. From the point of view of the territorial develop-
ment, the transformation of the value chain implies an upgrading of the 
geographic areas in which those activities are located.
3 The economic and institutional characteristics  
 of the automotive industry in Southern Italy
The analysis of the articulation of the national automotive industry 
reveals a long-term trend of concentration of the assembly activities in 
Southern Italy (Mezzogiorno). This trend emerged with the downsiz-
ing processes in the early years of the 1970s, and then it gained new 
strength from the restructuring cycles and the new investments per-
formed by Fiat at the beginning of the 1990s.2 But its consequences on 
2. Fiat acquired Alfa Romeo in 1987 and then restructured its plants in Pomigliano d’Arco 
and Pratola Serra; the investments have been performed in order to build two factories 
located in Melfi (sata – Società Automobilistica Tecnologie Avanzate) and Pratola Serra 
(fma – Fabbrica Motori Automobilistici), in the middle of the 1990s. This trend has been 
confirmed by the latest restructuring of Pomigliano d’Arco (2011) and Melfi (2013) plants.
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economic and production development reveal some ambiguous features. 
On the one hand, the trend had positive effects over regional economies 
involved in the downsizing processes, in terms of economic and employ-
ment growth; on the other hand, the expansion and qualification of local 
production and entrepreneurship networks suffered the presence of 
such a large firm. Despite the will of the policy makers, the downsizing 
processes had small results in terms of innovations, economic relations, 
capital accumulation and entrepreneurial capabilities.
Although the presence of Fiat plants had significant economic and 
employment implications, it did not promote the growth of the entrepre-
neurship of the local automotive sub-supply chain – as Bubbico (2007) 
outlines in his research about Mezzogiorno. There are two main reasons 
behind this process: generally, local firms placed at the lowest levels of 
the supply chain did not increase in number; moreover, production and 
technological needs of many local manufacturing firms were subjected 
to specific strategies of production which were designed by companies 
headquartered in the manufacturing regions of northern Italy or even 
abroad – most of which were subsidiaries of multinational companies 
– and that did not take into account the particular needs of the local 
contexts.
Fiat assembly plants are all located in Central and Southern Italy – ex-
cept for its historical Mirafiori plant in Turin – while the 75% of all the 
2,692 firms manufacturing parts (Osservatorio della Filiera Autoveico-
lare Italiana cciaa di Torino 2011) have their registered offices in tradi-
tional manufacturing regions of Central and Northern Italy (Piedmont 
37%, Lombardy 19%, Emilia-Romagna 10%, Veneto 8%). This specific 
territorial configuration exposes the southern chain of the automotive 
industry to a double risk:
 - a decrease in value produced by regions where an assembly plant is 
located, but where a high quality sub-supply chain is absent;
 - an increase in the traditional heteronomy of southern automotive 
industry.
Nowadays, it seems that these risks are becoming more and more 
important for the outcome of Fiat latest strategies: indeed, the Italian 
carmaker remains the major player in the national automotive industry; 
and a large share of firms located in Southern Italy – which produce 
components and subsystems – rely heavily on Fiat.
The current conjunction exposes the southern automotive chain to 
a high risk of pauperisation. The analysis of the transformation of the 
automotive value chain (MacDuffie 2001; Sturgeon et al. 2008) shows 
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that the share of value produced by the assembly activities decreased 
much to the advantage of the upstream production of components. Such 
process is due to the reconfiguration of the division of labour among the 
firms located along the value chain, as a consequence of the adoption of 
new models of production organisation. Over the last decade, the south-
ern automotive industry has been vulnerable and subordinated to the 
power of companies located at the top of the value chain; the causes are 
rooted in the weakness of the local institutional context and entrepre-
neurship, in the adoption of inefficient industrial policies along with the 
implementation of specific business strategies – which were designed by 
the big national player and did not meet the southern sub-supply chain 
need for enforcement and qualification. The economic crisis worsened 
the structural weakness of the Mezzogiorno automotive: Fiat did not 
meet the production targets set in April 2010,3 when Fabbrica Italia 
was presented (Fiat 2010; Volpato 2011), and the volumes of vehicles 
assembled in Italy decreased;4 moreover, the decision to delocalise Fiat-
Chrysler investments outside Italy5 is having negative effects over such 
negative trend. These business strategies reveal the existence of a dy-
namic of restructuring which could lead to a downsizing process, due to 
the extent of the production overcapacity.6
3. In particular, Fiat did not double the number of vehicles produced in Italy by 2014.
4. According to the Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (oica), 
671,768 vehicles have been produced in Italy by 2012 (59% passenger vehicles, 41% light 
commercial vehicles): it represents a decrease by 15% compared with 2011, and a decrease 
of 48% compared with 2007 (1,284,312 vehicles produced: 81% passenger vehicles, 19% 
light commercial vehicles).
5. During the last two years, the most important production investments made by Fiat 
in Europe – except for the investment made to save Chrysler group – are: Tychy plant in 
Poland (to produce the new Lancia Y); Kragujevac plant in Serbia, ex Zastava (to produce 
the minivan Fiat 500L available with 5 and 7 seats, which was the former «L0» project as-
signed to Mirafiori plant); Pomigliano d’Arco plant in Italy (to produce the new Fiat Panda). 
Moreover, Fiat closed Termini Imerese plant and the product mission for Mirafiori plant is 
yet to be defined.
6. Some data about the crisis in the European car industry: according to European 
Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (acea) 12.5 million vehicles have been sold in 2012 
(-7.83% compared with 2011), while 1.4 million vehicles have been sold in Italy (-19.82% 
compared with 2011).
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4 The economic crisis, Fiat strategy and the restructuring  
 of the automotive supply chain: the case of Campania
The automotive industry in Campania presents some distinctive fea-
tures compared with the other regions in Southern Italy: it had histori-
cally a larger dimension and a complex organisation, due to the inter-
action with a stronger and locally developed manufacturing structure. 
During the decade of Fordism, the effects of the automotive industry 
over regional economy and local employment development have been 
important, even though they exposed to the typical «pendulum effect» 
– that is, the alternation between phases of economic expansions and 
contractions, which is a typical feature of the automotive industry due 
to the specific product life-cycle.
The case of Campania is part of the debate about the relation between 
the local automotive industry and regional development, and it can be 
explained through the traditional model of analysis of the indotto (that 
is, the activities and industries linked to the local automotive sector). 
Here, the evolution of sub-suppliers7 showed a restricted development 
– in terms of market, functions and features – and then the traditional 
pattern of captive suppliers prevailed. A captive supplier depends on a 
monopsonist firm or other small buyers; it is very close to its sales mar-
ket; it is admitted into the value chain as much as it is able to contain 
production costs. In Campania, the majority of first-tier suppliers did not 
perform as production knots between the buyer and the local sub-supply 
network or chain; on the contrary, they are turned to the thick produc-
tion chains and districts located in Central and Northern Italy, or they 
prefer to import from low-cost countries (Izzo 2006).
Through the analysis of the impact of the sectoral employment on the 
regional industrial employment, and the evaluation of some basic eco-
nomic indicators related to the local automotive industry – such as the 
sectoral impact on regional exports, the productivity and value added 
levels – the importance of the local automotive industry stands out for 
the economy of Campania. Starting from 2007, the automotive industry 
in Campania underwent a deep restructuring process for two reasons: 
the decision to assign a different product mission to the Pomigliano 
d’Arco plant made by Fiat; the ongoing economic crisis, which broke 
out in 2008.
7. The evolution of sub-suppliers is based on five steps: a) the increase of the inner 
efficiency; b) the strengthen of the network relationship with other firms; c) the improve-
ment of business functions; d) the introduction of new products or the enlargement of the 
portfolio; e) the market internationalisation (Giunta, Scalera 2010).
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Traditionally, employment in the automotive industry had a relevant 
weight on regional industrial employment – which maintained a high 
growth rate in spite of a sectoral contraction;8 but in the last triennium 
the incidence of the automotive production on exports, as well as the 
total amount of value added, has reduced, especially for sub-suppliers.
In 2010, Fiat assigned the production of the Nuova Panda (an A-seg-
ment vehicle) to the Pomigliano plant; in order to adapt the pre-existent 
assembly line – which was designed to produce C and D-segment pas-
senger car vehicles – to the production of this new model, a restructuring 
process took place and lasted for 18 months (Fiat wanted to start the 
production by January 2012). Therefore, the Pomigliano plant underwent 
a downgrading process: today, it has only one assembly line to produce 
one model – while it had two assembly lines to produce three different 
models before the restructuring – with a total production capacity of 
250,000 cars per year in 2014.
The Nuova Panda has been marketed in 2011. «Fiat Panda» sales in 
Europe reached about 185,000 units in 2012, but the data includes the 
«Panda Classic» sales – which is the previous model produced in Tychy 
plant in Poland. Production data gathered about Pomigliano plant allow 
to estimate that the total production does not exceed 140,000 units – a 
result which is far from the 2012 sales target of 230,000 units.9 This 
outcome is influenced by the delayed market entry of the Nuova Panda 
range of products – in particular the gpl, methane and bi-fuel engines 
which are Fiat customers most favourite motor vehicles – and the «can-
nibalisation effect» generated by the «Panda Classic» high performance 
sales (whose production ended in December 2012), and the discounts 
offered on the Punto model sales.
The analysis carried out so far on the companies which operate within 
the Pomigliano plant reveals the existence of a broader downsizing pro-
cess, as well as a rationalisation of the outsourcing activities; indeed, 
the number of third-companies working on the inside of the plant (intra-
moenia) is decreasing, and only those firms specialised in industrial 
services seem to survive for two main reasons: 1) manufacturing activi-
ties have been insourced, then rationalised and integrated in the latest 
8. There were about 14,063 employees employed on permanent contract in the automo-
tive industry by the beginning of 2012, with an incidence of 6.5% on industrial employment 
and a large number of employees on redundancy payment (cigs – Cassa Integrazione Gua-
dagni Straordinaria) (Pirone 2012).
9. Statistical data from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (acea) da-
tabase show that Fiat sold 28,326 Nuova Panda vehicles in Europe in the first two months 
of 2013.
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organisational model – which provides a higher level of automation; 2) 
Fiat headquarters in Turin holds all the non-industrial activities. On the 
other hand, there is a significant decrease in the number of workers, as 
well as an insufficient use of the workers still working on-site – as the 
large use of the lay-offs (cig) show. The production of the Nuova Panda 
allowed only a small part of the workers on redundancy payment to come 
back to work; indeed, the plant shows a higher level of automation as 
the consequence of the latest technical and organisational innovations. 
This scenario lets us suppose that the production process will probably 
require a little number of workers to run once it will reach its full speed 
– unlike the large number of workers needed to manufacture the previ-
ous Alfa Romeo vehicles.
The dynamic of change of the regional activities linked to the auto-
motive industry has been directly influenced by the business strategies 
adopted by Fiat. The first difficulties appeared in 2008, when the pro-
duction volumes of the local suppliers rapidly decreased due to the un-
certainty generated by the lack of a product mission for the Pomigliano 
plant – a situation which lasted two years; then, after the assignment 
of the new product mission, a restructuring process involved the whole 
supply chain for other two years. So, a process of selection had modified 
the structural features of firms and their market repositioning for four 
years – it had reconfigured the local activities linked to the automotive 
industry, which have been downsized and shows different functional and 
technological features.
At the turn of the 21st century, the production expansion of the 
Pomigliano plant did not create a strong supply network which could 
emancipate itself from the leading firm. Only a few firms were able to 
benefit from this relationship, and then strengthen their technological 
and commercial capabilities. In fact, the share of components supplied 
for the production of the previous Alfa Romeo models by firms located in 
Campania never exceeded the 10-12% of the total (Pirone 2010). This is 
due to the fact that, historically, the industries linked to the Pomigliano 
plant had a low degree of development; indeed, the supply network – 
which was reshaped by the restructuring processes of the 1990s – was 
composed for the most part by those firms outsourced by Fiat. These 
firms could only perform the outsourced activities in a position of quasi-
dependence by Fiat. Thus, this local supply network seems to be an 
«imploded network» (Izzo 2006), a folded network of firms which is un-
able to point to a non-captive market, despite the presence of local firms 
which manufacture highly competitive components.
Starting from 2008, the regional suppliers had to face a double chal-
lenge: the first one was to diversify their products and to vary the plants 
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supplied; the second one, to start the restructuring investments required 
to adapt their production facilities to the platform of production of the 
Nuova Panda, in line with the organisational model adopted by the Fiat 
plant in Pomigliano.
As a consequence, regional suppliers followed two different paths. 
First, some firms closed their activities because they could not trail 
Fiat restructuring process: some of them, basically firms with more 
resources, were able to delocalise their activities, while the weakest 
firms went out of business10 in Campania (because they were tied up to 
a single buyer, they had a more fragile financial structure and difficul-
ties in access to credit, and they could not resort to the welfare safety 
net to guarantee workers’ income). Generally, these firms were owned 
by national or international enterprises, which decided to substitute 
the local suppliers (second-tier suppliers) for the benefit of those firms 
located in low-wage countries (like the «production platform» in East 
Europe, South-East Asia and Northern A frica).
The second path has been followed by firms which were able to re-
place themselves on time over Fiat national and international supply 
chain: they were able to perform new product investments to produce 
the Nuova Panda model. These firms are not entangled in a «captive 
monopsonist relationship» with the Pomigliano plant: yet in 2008, they 
had supply relations with Cassino, Sevel (Atessa) and Sata (Melfi) Fiat 
plants. But even these firms will be bound to diversify, once the Nuova 
Panda production will reach its operating speed: indeed, the production 
of supply parts for an A-segment vehicle implies a low level of profit 
per unit produced – and the only way to make the investments profit-
able through the economies of scale is to reach the production volumes. 
These firms certainly can export towards the Tychy plant in Poland but – 
according to the logic of the economies of scale – the opposite hypothesis 
cannot be excluded: that is, the current supply chain linked to the Tychy 
plant11 (Balcet, Enrietti 1998; Domański, Gwosdz 2009) can supply a big 
share of its parts to the Pomigliano plant. Indeed, according to Istat data 
about trade flow between Campania region and Poland, the «automotive 
parts and engines» («Parti ed accessori per autoveicoli e loro motori») 
10. Lower production volumes generated a domino effect which oppressed the local sub-
suppliers: they were highly dependent on large buyers who pushed them to constantly lower 
the prices, while there was an increase in raw materials and purchase costs.
11. Tychy plant in Poland is the most important factory – in terms of scheduled and real-
ised volumes of production – for the A-segment platform of production: indeed, the Polish 
plant produces the Fiat 500, the new Lancia Y, the Fiat Panda «classic» and the new Ka 
(since the production line are shared with Ford).
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commodities sector shows an import amount of 5.7 million euro and an 
export amount of 12.9 million euro for the year 2011; while in 2012, the 
first year in which the Nuova Panda was produced, the import increased 
tenfold (61.5 million euro) and the export slightly decreased (11.3 million 
euro). These trends suggest that the restructuring process of the local 
suppliers did not improve their competitiveness against the suppliers 
of Tychy plant, while the production of the Nuova Panda constituted an 
important business opportunity for the Polish production platform which 
benefited from the presence of Fiat Poland.
The study about the regional industries linked to Pomigliano plant 
shows that the Nuova Panda model did not generate any improvement 
in production and employment of local suppliers (Bubbico, Pirone 2011). 
On the other hand, some important signs confirm the existence of a 
downsizing process as well as the reduction in employment levels which 
affect the first-tier suppliers – which are the strongest firms from which 
the other sub-suppliers depend on – and the whole regional automotive 
industry as well.
5 Concluding remarks: the restructuring  
 of the automotive industry and the regional development
The economic crisis boosted Fiat organisational restructuring and 
geographical relocation; the analysis carried out so far illustrate why 
it is necessary to focus on the regional scale to study the effects of Fiat 
strategy along these two paths (Sabel 1989; Storper 1997). This meth-
odological choice is based on the literature about the territorial devel-
opment, since the production and allocation models depend on the spe-
cific institutional features of the local societies in which such economic 
processes are located. As the case study shows, Fiat strategic choices 
have been taken according to the national regime of regulation (that is, 
the «model of growth» of the Italian industry), and they embody specific 
features on the local scale – even if the merger with Chrysler gives a 
new global structure to the Italian carmaker. In particular, Fiat is the 
only mass producer who has its own assembly plants in Italy: according 
to the terminology of the Regulation School, Fiat represents the only 
«model of production» for the Italian automotive industry – even if Fiat 
configuration and its response to the crisis follow specific patterns of 
local development. As a consequence, while the variable linked to oems 
models of production is not so relevant for the Italian case, the regional 
contexts of regulation acquires a crucial importance. Thus, it is essential 
to investigate about the different regional models of production, which 
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originate from different local strategies of profit related to the features 
of the Local Production System (Crouch et al. 2001).
This case study illustrates that Fiat organisational restructuring fol-
lows a model of path dependence – as for the stages of development of 
the industry. The research retraced the historical evolution which al-
lows to understand the regional automotive embeddedness (Granovetter 
1985). As in a producer-driven value chain (Gereffi et al. 2005), the stra-
tegic decisions taken by Fiat influence the way in which the production 
network anchors to the Campania institutional context; such process 
generated a network of «captive suppliers» which gravitates towards 
Fiat plants: that is, a «chain of dependency» made up of sub-suppliers 
which are dependent on a much larger buyer. Given this situation, the 
restructuring of the local business network – caused by the economic 
crisis – was completely dependent on Fiat strategies.
The long course of the reconversion of the Pomigliano plant ended 
with the allocation of the Nuova Panda; this specific decision had two 
important effects over the local industry: the quantitative reduction in 
number of firms; the qualitative downgrading of firms within the global 
value chain. This process can be analysed within the global value chain 
theory (Humphrey, Schmitz 2002):
1. The production of the Nuova Panda required the Pomigliano plant to 
use new technologies of process to seek higher productivity rates: it 
is not possible to observe the same dynamic of innovation within the 
local suppliers.
2. The new production has a lower value added and is less diversified; 
there is a general pauperisation of the local suppliers, as well as a 
diffused technological and organisational simplification.
3. Due to the specific attention given to the local manufacturing activi-
ties, there is a reduction in the management of local corporate func-
tions; indeed, a large share of services and R&D activities have been 
moved from the local production system towards the headquarters: 
these local activities are now weaker than before, as well as the re-
lated professional networks.
The regional automotive industry seems to suffer a lack of innovation 
capability. It is not simply a problem related to the R&D, or the pres-
ence of an ineffective network of firms, research centres, university and 
institutions (Etzkowitz, Leydesdorff 1997) as suggested by the Regional 
Innovation System models (Braczyk 1998; Bowen et al. 2009). In par-
ticular, the restructuring processes made the informal networks smaller 
– these networks have a crucial role as they produce and diffuse implicit 
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and practical knowledge related to the industrial processes and their 
linked activities. The informal networks are an intangible asset, they 
are rooted in the professional skills and in the social networks which 
are historically anchored to the economic processes of the regional 
automotive industry.
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Local industrial policy for the automotive industry  
in Italy: Innovation, export support and the crisis  
of the Fiat Group
Davide Bubbico
abstract In these last years local policies in support of the automotive indus-
try in Italy have increased, in order to contrast the crisis of supply chain or, in 
some cases, to support the internalization, the export and the diversification of 
production. The aim of this work is to map a frame of these initiatives and their 
distribution on the national territory. Over the years, Italian automotive produc-
tion has been concentrated in southern regions. In the north of Italy the largest 
and most qualified production of car components remained, mainly from firms 
who are export-oriented and less dependent from Fiat Group. Consequently, the 
recent crisis has had different consequences on the national territory depending 
on the different characteristics of the local automotive segment. In the article 
we analyse the consequences of these regional differences and the role of the 
national government in supporting the sole Italian automotive producer corpo-
ration (Fiat). We also consider some specific initiatives promoted in the three 
regions where the Italian production of car components is concentrated (Pied-
mont, Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna). In the conclusions we discuss a possible 
medium-term scenario in which Fiat group could decide to produce abroad high 
volumes models while keeping in Italy the production of premium brands, that 
have significantly lower production volumes.
1 Introduction
In this article, I will consider the role of the State, Chambers of Com-
merce, public institutions and employers’ associations in Italy in sup-
porting the automotive sector, particularly in relation to export and 
R&D activity. In recent years, data on exports show that the automotive 
industry has maintained a positive performance for car components, 
whilst Fiat car production has decreased and its market share in Europe 
has declined. The latter has given rise to a crisis that is most severe in 
Southern Italy, where assembly plants and supply companies are con-
centrated. These are mostly subsidiaries of larger (national or foreign) 
companies that have specialised in meeting Fiat’s requirements.
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The paper is divided into four sections. In the first one, I reflect on 
the different consequences of the crisis of the automotive sector in the 
Centre-North and South of Italy. The former includes not only the Mira-
fiori and Grugliasco establishments in Turin and the pole for production 
of luxury cars in Emilia-Romagna, but also most of the car component 
sector. By contrast, the South hosts the main assembly plants of the 
Fiat Group. By highlighting the differences between these industrial 
structures, I will seek to identify promising regional automotive policies. 
In the second section, I discuss the role of the State in supporting Fiat, 
the only domestic car producer in Italy, stressing similarities and differ-
ences vis-à-vis other European producers. A key question relates to the 
potential role of regional policy-making, which has become increasingly 
important for the automotive sector, in the absence of national policies 
for the car industry. For this reason, in the third section I concentrate 
specifically on these regional interventions. Focusing on three regions 
(Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Piedmont), I show how regional public 
bodies and industrial associations have promoted specific interventions 
to support the automotive industry, with an increasing interest in compo-
nent manufacture and the possibility of expanding their R&D activities 
in Italy and facilitating exports. Similar initiatives have been undertaken 
in certain southern regions, although they have largely failed (Bubbico 
2013). In the final section, I will make some closing remarks on the 
relationship between industrial policy and regional policies for the car 
industry. In the light of a sharp decline in the presence of Fiat in Italy, I 
will ask what is likely to remain of automotive production in Italy follow-
ing the present crisis.
2 Different consequences of the automotive crisis  
 on the Italian regional economies
In the 1980s, with the acquisition of Alfa Romeo by the Fiat Auto group, 
Italy became the only European country where car production was in 
the hands of a single producer (if we exclude Lamborghini). As a result 
of this acquisition process, supply chains have changed, largely to the 
advantage of traditional northern suppliers and to the detriment of local 
firms in the South (including the assembly plant in Pomigliano). In the 
1990s, with the construction of the new assembly plant in Melfi (Basili-
cata), car production became even more concentrated in the Southern 
Italy when compared with the previous decade (Amin 1982). 
During the same period, the Alfa Romeo plant in Arese (Milan) be-
gan to be phased out, and was closed during the 1990s. The historic 
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Mirafiori plant in Turin also experienced a progressive reduction in 
production volumes, whilst other small assembly factories in Piedmont 
(Chivasso and Rivalta) and Lombardy (Desio, former Autobianchi) have 
been closed. Although the Mirafiori plant – at least until the recent cri-
sis – retained a small share of production of various models at the end 
of their product life-cycle, and a modest quantity of new models, the 
production of cars and commercial vehicles in Italy (with the exception 
of the luxury car segment) has been definitively transferred to South-
ern Italy. This is particularly clear if one considers the output and the 
links between the plants in Cassino (Lazio), Pomigliano (Campania), Ter-
mini Imerese (Sicily) and Melfi (Basilicata), not to mention the Magneti 
Marelli factories in almost all of the Southern-Italian regions and the fma 
engine plant in Pratola Serra in the Province of Avellino. In Piedmont, 
by contrast, car production decreased from about one million in 1990 to 
just over 500,000 cars in 1997, whilst production in Lombardy declined 
from about 300,000 to just under 30,000 cars. In the South, by contrast, 
it rose from 600,000 to one million (Bubbico 2002).
The progressive reduction of the production at the Mirafiori plant 
has had a negative impact on the regional value chain, although the 
assembly plants in Southern Italy have continued to receive significant 
supplies of components from firms located in Piedmont and Lombardy 
and more generally in Central and Northern Italy (Bubbico 2003). With 
the reduction of the overall car production by Fiat, many suppliers have 
been forced to start new lines of production, or to reinforce existing lines 
that address foreign (European) markets for components or have fol-
lowed the relocation process of Fiat Auto group towards other countries.
In the 1990s, but probably starting much earlier, the car component 
industries of Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto have established a 
stronger relationship with French and German car producers, becoming 
a key area of industrial subcontracting for Germany. It is no coincidence 
that, to date, 95% of exports of automotive components (including the pro-
duction of spare parts) is localised in Central and Northern Italy, primar-
ily in Piedmont, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto (Enrietti 2008). 
In the South, however, car component suppliers have rarely penetrat-
ed these foreign markets. In some cases, exports from Southern Italy 
have become possible precisely because Fiat has explicitly commis-
sioned production for one of its overseas factories. However, these firms 
have generally remained dependent on the Fiat plants that are already 
localised in the South, not least because the number of foreign firms in 
this part of Italy is limited (although some interesting exceptions have 
been reported recently, such as the Adler Group in Naples).
The limits and weaknesses of the automotive sector in Southern Italy 
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reflect not only its exclusive relationship with the Fiat group, but also 
the weaker industrialisation of the Southern regions themselves and 
the absence of a connection with public and private research centres. 
Nevertheless Fiat took advantage of public funding in the 1980s to situ-
ate its research centres in various areas of the South (e.g. Elasis). These 
centres were largely successful, and the Fiat Research Centre in Bari, 
for example, developed the Common Rail (an industrial patent later 
sold to Bosch). What is more, the relationship between Universities and 
companies in the automotive sector has been enhanced by a range of 
institutional and economic actors. The experience of the Fiat Research 
Centre in Bari and investments by two major companies in the automo-
tive components sector (Bosch and Getrag) in the same area of Puglia 
favoured the birth of the Mechatronics District. This outcome was also 
encouraged by the presence of small and medium-sized enterprises 
specialised in the same sector (including Magneti Marelli) and by the 
existence of links with the university.
However Bari is more an exception than the norm. In the rest of the 
South, where there are Fiat plants – with the exception of Naples1 – there 
are no exchanges between the research community and industry. In Ba-
silicata, Sicily, Lazio and Molise there are practically no links between 
Fiat factories, supply firms and research centres. Only in Abruzzo, where 
Fiat has a presence with its Sevel plant (commercial vehicle production), 
a proposal was presented at the end of the last decade to establish an 
Automotive Campus involving several actors (Association of Industry, 
Regional Government, research centres, etc.), although this project was 
never realised.
The aggravation of the sectoral crisis since 2008 and the absence 
of new investments by the Fiat Group led to the closure of assembly 
plants in Campania (buses) and Sicily (cars). If we consider the low 
production volumes of the other Italian factories (including the motor 
assembly plants in Avellino and Termoli), the condition of supplier firms 
in Southern Italy is weaker than ever. The persistence of the crisis and 
the low volumes of Fiat production (particularly in Pomigliano, Cassino 
1. In Naples, Fiat’s ex-Elasis research facility provides work to 700 engineers and 100 
other employees. Similar facilities are located in Orbassano, in the province of Turin, and 
Surbo, in the province of Lecce. In March 2010, the activities of Elasis were transferred to 
seven different Fiat Group companies (Fiat Group automobiles, Fiat Powertrain technolo-
gies, Fiat Powertrain technologies industrial, Iveco, Cnh Italia, Fiat Group Purchasing and 
Fiat Item). Research facilities dedicated to the automotive sector in Campania include the 
Engine Institute of the National Research Centre in Naples and some Departments of En-
gineering at the University of Naples, as well as companies which were founded after the 
establishment of Alfa Sud in Pomigliano.
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and Melfi) could also have an impact on foreign companies which supply 
components to these factories.
The absence of an industrial plan and the continuous relocation of pro-
duction of new models to countries such as Poland, Serbia and Turkey 
(and elsewhere) threatens the automotive industry in Italy, considering 
the absence of other companies. One has only to consider that in 2012 
less than 400,000 cars and about 250,000 commercial vehicles were 
produced in Italy. This represents a reduction of 15% compared to 2011, 
the worst performance recorded in Europe. In 2002, production in Italy 
was slightly higher at 1.1 million cars and 300,000 commercial vehicles, 
but already lower than in the uk (at least for cars). In fact, compared to 
the main countries with a strong automotive tradition (in the industrial 
sense), such as France and the uk, or compared to the weaker Spanish 
car sector, Italy recorded a marked decline in production volumes. By 
2012, car production in the latter three countries had reached 1.7, 1.5 
and 1.6 million vehicles respectively. The remarkable decline of Italian 
production was due to the decisions taken by a single producer (Fiat) to 
considerably increase its productive operations in other countries, such 
as Poland and Turkey, and more recently Hungary, Serbia and Russia.
Returning to the regional policies for the automotive sector, initia-
tives promoted in recent years in the Southern regions of Italy have 
been a substantial failure. These initiatives aimed to promote coopera-
tion between companies, the diversification of clients and products and 
the development of sub-supply chains. Examples include the icarus 
project in Basilicata, the cosvin consortium and Irpinia Automotive in 
Campania, Automolise in Molise, Sub4Lazio in Lazio. Even the most 
recent (December 2011) Network Contract2 (Contratto di rete) between 
the automotive sector companies of Campania, Abruzzo and Basilicata, 
which aimed to reduce dependence on Fiat production, does not appear 
to have produced significant results.
3 The role of the national government  
 in supporting the Fiat Group
If we look at the relationship between the Italian State and the Fiat 
Auto Group, we find that this has historically been characterised by the 
weaknesses of the political system and the subaltern role of the State. 
2. It is a new instrument promoted by the Ministry of Economic Development in 2009 to 
promote the aggregation and collaboration between small and medium-sized companies 
geographically distant but operating in the same sector.
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For example, the State assisted Fiat during recurrent crises by provid-
ing income subsidies for workers made redundant due to industrial 
restructuring or by using investment funds to subsidise new plants in 
the South of Italy. Even in the current crisis, government action has 
been characterised by non-interference with company strategy. Graham 
(2010) observes that 
In the case of Italy, the Government has restricted its role to giving money to 
the automotive industry. General government policy is that no plant must be shut 
down; only a crisis putting a company at severe risk of closure would constitute 
a valid reason for giving government support. In Italy, there is no collaboration 
between the Government and companies, and unions mainly stand aside. 
The only case in which the government directly intervened was in the 
case of acquisition of the Alfa Romeo corporation in the 1960s and the 
creation of a State-owned company in the automotive sector. Following 
the privatization of State-owned companies in the mid-1980s, Alfa Ro-
meo was sold to Fiat. As a result, a monopoly of automotive production 
was created and foreign manufacturers who were interested in purchas-
ing Alfa Romeo (such as Ford) were effectively deterred.
The last and most important investment by Fiat Auto in Italy occurred 
when the company used public funding provided under law n. 64/1986 
(Integrated rules for extraordinary interventions in the Mezzogiorno) to 
build assembly plants in Melfi (cars) and Pratola Serra (motors) in the 
mid-1990s. As a consequence, production was boosted in Southern re-
gions at the expense of Turin (Mirafiori). This law also financed first-tier 
supply firms situated close to the Fiat factories, based on the organisa-
tional model of just-in-time production (Bubbico 2002).
Within the same «Programme Contract» (Contratto di programma), 
Fiat made other investments in Italy, involving component producers 
owned by Fiat such as Magneti Marelli. During this phase, Fiat was se-
riously considering the possibility of investing in other countries (such 
as Spain), and would have moved in this direction if unions had not ac-
cepted a new employment contract for the two new factories as well as 
accepting a series of other concessions.
State support to the Fiat Group should not be viewed as a policy of 
supporting a national champion, as in the French case, because the 
Italian State has never developed a strategic plan for the automotive 
industry.3 In fact, government intervention has only occurred to support 
3. Drawing on Bianchi (1995), Germano (2009, p. 60) notes that «while the French fu-
sions were favoured with the intention of guiding companies to European markets (due 
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industrialisation in Southern Italy. In this way, Fiat has had the possi-
bility of obtaining financing to reduce labour costs and conflicts in the 
historical factories of Turin (Mirafiori) and Milan (Alfa Arese). More in 
general, as Germano (2009, p. 139) observed in relation to direct State 
support in the 1970s, 
in the 1980-1990 period, frequently the State intervened in favour of the 
company with various instruments (protectionism, monetary or fiscal aids, vari-
ous kinds of incentives). Instead, in the 1991-2006 period, State support for Fiat 
declined as a result of the Europeanisation process that reduced the possibility 
of national government intervention because of the emergence of supranational 
politics for the European automotive industry. 
The various forms of national support provided to Fiat are reported 
in Table 1.
In this context, the role of regional governments has grown, as many 
areas of public responsibility for industry have been assigned to the 
regions. Only incentives for new productive investments and income 
support schemes during periods of crisis remain the responsibility of 
national government. 
to the saturation of domestic markets in which they had operated until then, the National 
Champions), the Italian fusions were almost always aimed at strengthening the firms in the 
internal market rather than international market».
Specific support Extraordinary support
Economic incentives for investments 
in Southern Italy
Transfer of loss-making firms to the 
State (e.g. Teksid)
Incentives for R&D and employment 
training
Acquisition of State enterprises 
on favourable conditions (e.g. Alfa 
Romeo)
Incentives for restructuring/innovat-
ing production and products
Ad hoc measures
Income support schemes
Tax breaks
Higher taxes for cars exceeding 
2,000cc
Table 1. Classification of State support for Fiat in Italy.
Source: Germano 2009.
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If we leave aside State incentives to consumers who purchase new 
cars or those with reduced emissions (in 1996, 2002 and 2006), public 
funding to the Fiat group has directly involved the regions in recent 
years through the system of Programme Contracts. Once the period 
of extraordinary State intervention came to an end, big corporations 
generally benefited from public funding under law no. 488/1992 (techno-
logical innovation). This law replaced the extraordinary State interven-
tion measures for the South of Italy. New productive investments with 
State contributions have taken place thanks to Programme Contracts, 
although their level has gradually decreased. The last wave of significant 
State funding to Fiat (in the early 1990s) involved the aforementioned 
assembly plants in Melfi and Pratola Serra.
Over the years, other public subsidies for specific investments were 
provided by the Ministry of Industry and by the Regions. For example, 
15 million euro of European funding for underdeveloped areas were allo-
cated by Basilicata to Fiat in order to establish a Manufacturing Campus, 
a regional research centre focused on productive process innovation. 
However, over the years, most of these initiatives have been reduced 
to veiled attempts to favour the permanence of these companies within 
the region, supporting industrial restructuring in order to reduce the 
risk of factory closures.
4 Regional support measures for automotive firms  
 in Piedmont, Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna
4.1 Piedmont
In this section, we will analyse some of the supporting actions taken by 
three key Regions in favour of automotive component production in Italy, 
starting from Piemonte (Piedmont). In most cases, these initiatives have 
been undertaken by Regions, Chambers of Commerce or associations of 
industry. Information on these measures was obtained from the websites 
of the relevant Regions, Chambers of Commerce and trade associations.
In 2011, the Piedmont Region used Regional Law no. 34/20044 (Ac-
4. The accompanying documentation to the regional Law no. 34/2004 indicates that this 
measure introduces methods and tools for planning the implementation of regional indus-
trial policies in order to better cope with the new responsibilities assigned to the Regions 
as a result of a constitutional change. Innovations introduced by this regional law consist 
in the adoption of a comprehensive policy document which: a) defines objectives, priorities 
and methods of the industrial policy, and b) defines goals over the medium term for the 
Region as well as potential beneficiaries.
automotive in transition
local industrial policy for the automotive industry in italy 187
tions for the Development of Productive Activities) to put in place a 
second «Action Programme for Productive Activities, 2011-2015». This 
programme was developed in line with guidelines by the European Un-
ion, the National Government and the regional programme for scientific 
research, environmental protection and energy, as well as involving 
representatives of trade associations. The programme defined several 
specific objectives, including: a) investments in the knowledge econo-
my and innovation; b) internationalisation of the industrial system; c) 
growth of firm size and better access to credit for high-tech firms; d) a 
strong industrial specificity of the regional economy, even if the goal is 
to promote a green energy sector; e) firm aggregation and support for 
traditional productive sectors exposed to the crisis in a broader project 
for conversion, innovation and competitiveness of the industrial sector.5
Specifically, Axis 1 of the Programme (Firm competitiveness, 204 mil-
lion euro) seeks to promote a «smart & clean automotive» platform for 
the car sector. This platform includes automotive technologies for hybrid 
motors, integration of information and communication technologies for 
future projects, the development of biofuels and the construction of 
infrastructures for a smart mobility. It also provides a means of coopera-
tion between institutions, universities and research centres, big busi-
ness and associations representing small and medium-sized companies.
Another programme related to the automotive sector is the so-called 
contratto di insediamento. This is addressed to foreign investments and 
regional companies which invest overseas (Axis 3: Internationalisation 
of enterprises, 55 million euro). The platform for a «smart & clean auto-
motive sector» refers to the regional call for technological projects for 
the automotive sector in February 2012 (30 million euro under por-fesr 
2007-2013). Regional funding, in agreement with the Ministry of Edu-
cation and Research (miur), is targeted at companies (small firms are 
preferred), research centres and trade associations. Scientific and tech-
nological intervention areas include engines with lower environmental 
impact, new materials, as well as reduction of energy consumption. Simi-
larly, another funding programme termed «Electromobility+» supports 
companies and research centres involved in transnational projects for 
industrial research and the development of a pilot project on sustainable 
electromobility (one million euro).
Already during the sectoral crisis of 2002-2003, Piedmont developed 
a project to provide a series of actions to facilitate credit for small firms 
and to support the working capital of the companies that were forced to 
5. It is important to note that the law binds firms to maintain any manufacturing plants 
that obtained subsidies in the Region for at least seven years.
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reorganise production due to the reduction of Fiat orders. Other support 
initiatives for the short term (economic incentives) and medium term 
(strengthening small and medium-sized companies with a specialised 
production) were put in place (Enrietti, Lanzetti 2003). Taking as an 
example some positive experiences at European level, it was proposed 
to establish an Agency for the promotion and development of auto com-
ponents companies in Piedmont (Enrietti et al. 2003). As Enrietti and 
Lanzetti observe (2003, p. 256), the big question faced by suppliers in 
this Region is whether it is appropriate «to leave the evolution and dy-
namics of this complex situation to market logics and firm strategies, in 
order to compensate for the lack of strategic planning by Fiat».
One of the most interesting proposals in Piedmont was the project 
«From Concept to Car», which was sponsored by the Turin Chamber 
of Commerce in 2003. This project aimed at reducing the dependence 
of local companies on Fiat, focusing on emerging markets. It provided 
support to help firms meet demands from the main international buyers.6 
Meanwhile, the Turin Industrial Union intensified its promotional ac-
tivities targeted at companies in the major automotive foreign markets 
(Brazil, Canada, China, Russia, the United States).
4.2 Lombardy
Although now devoid of automotive plants, Lombardia (Lombardy) 
maintains a strong specialisation in the automotive components sector. 
In 2008, there were at least 700 firms employing 50,000 workers in this 
Region. Of these, 300 companies supplied processes, technologies and 
systems, 32 supplied modules and 379 supplied components (Magni 
2010). As in other Regions, firms in Lombardy have a strong presence 
in foreign markets, especially in Europe and in the fast-growing mar-
kets of Asia and Latin America. At the end of 2010, only 110 out of 2,421 
industrial firms had overseas automotive factories (1.4% of firms and 
4.3% of employees). However, these firms grew rapidly between 2005 
and 2010 (around 14%). By the latter date, there were just 23 foreign-
owned automotive companies in Lombardy, accounting for just 0.6% of 
all industrial firms (Confindustria Lombardia 2011).
These data reflect the uneven process of internationalisation of re-
gional firms and the relative lack of interest amongst foreign companies 
to build factories in Lombardy. The absence of final assembly plants 
might also explain this phenomenon. Supporting the presence of re-
6. For further information, see www.fromconcepttocar.com.
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gional companies in foreign markets is one of the main axes of regional 
interventions, particularly in new markets where the automotive indus-
try is developing.
These interventions include an Industrial Automotive Pole called poli-
auto, and in 2009 the Lombardy Region evaluated this project as one of 
the seven most innovative regional productive systems.7 The purpose of 
this project – coordinated by the Department of Mechanical Engineering 
at the Milan Polytechnic, csmt (Multi-sector Technology Service Centre) 
of Brescia, aib (Industrial Association of Brescia), KilometroRosso in Ber-
gamo and ComuniImprese in Arese – is to coordinate the broad regional 
automotive cluster (second in Italy, seventh in Europe) that involves the 
Provinces of Milan, Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona, Mantova and Lecco.
At the end of 2012, the Regional Government presented a project to 
support firm internationalisation (with funding of 290,000 euro) with 
the collaboration of a special agency of the Chamber of Commerce of 
Brescia and participation by 20 small and medium-sized companies. This 
project includes iso ts certification courses and vda 6.3 for the quality 
of automotive supplies; logistics and organisation of internationalisa-
tion courses; three technology days to meet major firms in the automo-
tive components sector and business trips abroad. Analogous initiatives 
have been promoted by special agencies of other Lombard Chambers of 
Commerce, including Varese, which focused particularly on the automo-
tive and aeronautics sectors. These kinds of initiatives are common in 
Lombardy because, unlike in Piedmont, the Lombard automotive sector 
is less spatially concentrated. For example, in April 2011, the special 
agency of the Chamber of Commerce of Milan, in collaboration with 
Confartigianato and cna of Lombardy, coordinated a project denomi-
nated «Subcontracting», to promote small, specialised companies in 
foreign markets, including Germany and Sweden for subcontracting the 
production of machine tools, machinery, automotive goods, aeronautics 
and energy.
The most recent initiative for the automotive sector is contained in 
a Programme Agreement with the Ministry of Education and Research 
(miur).8 In December 2010, Lombardy and miur signed a three-year 
agreement to promote a series of industrial research projects (agribusi-
ness, aerospace, sustainable building, automotive, energy metallurgy, 
7. For further information, see www.poli-auto.org.
8. There are also protocols between large companies and the Lombardy Region, for 
example for employment training. In December 2012, the regional administration and 
Bosch signed an agreement to create an internal training programme involving placements, 
traineeships and apprenticeships.
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fashion industry, etc.).9 A total of 120 million euro was made available for 
the project, 59 by miur under the «Fund for Research Grants» (Fondo 
per le agevolazioni alla ricerca) and 61 by the Lombardy regional ad-
ministration. The regional administration procured additional European 
funding (€25.5 million) from the por fesr 2007-2013. Specifically, in the 
section that aims at strengthening production, €23 million out of €458 
million (5%) were targeted at the automotive sector through the financ-
ing of industrial research and pilot projects. In general, the funding 
provided under this programme aimed at promoting the development 
of new products, productive processes and highly-innovative services. 
This programme also seeks to facilitate cooperation between industries 
and universities on specific scientific and technological projects, via 
different forms of collaboration such as supply contracts, network ag-
gregation or the creation of meta-districts.
4.3 Emilia-Romagna
As far as the automotive sector is concerned, the case of Emilia-Ro-
magna is one of the most interesting. In this Region, there are not only 
important automotive component producers, but also assembly plants 
for luxury cars (Ferrari, Maserati and Lamborghini) and the most im-
portant Italian motorcycle factories (Aprilia and Ducati). In recent years, 
the diversification of regional production helped firms to weather the 
crisis, avoiding exclusive dependence on the automotive sector (Bardi 
2005). As in the other cases discussed above (Piedmont and Lombardy), 
an important part of regional production is export-oriented. The value 
of exports of car components (Istat code dm343) grew by 160% between 
1992-1994 and 2002-2004 (taking the average value for each three-year 
period), consolidating its share of the regional total at roughly 5%. As 
a share of national exports, the regional share in this sector remained 
above 16%, and regional specialisation in terms of exports remained 
unchanged at 1.4% (Aronica 2005, p. 161).
The analysis of regional trends in exports to brics countries reveals 
that exports are higher for Russia and South A frica and lower for China, 
India and Brazil. For this reason, recent initiatives of the Chambers 
of Commerce of the Emilia-Romagna Region and the ice (Institute for 
Foreign Trade) have targeted the latter countries. For example, in Octo-
9. The focus on sustainable mobility among regional firms is demonstrated by several 
initiatives. In the Province of Brescia, for example, traditional producers of aluminium for 
the building sector are considering the possibility of producing aluminium also for the 
automotive sector (Meneghello 2010).
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ber 2011 the Emilia-Romagna Region financed twenty-four cooperative 
company projects (210 firms in all) to support exports to brics countries 
and Turkey with €3 million. Most projects concerned the Mechanical 
Engineering sector and sub-sectors (45.2%), followed by furniture for 
home and construction (25.8%), clothing (12.9%), food (9.7%), energy 
(3.2%) and information technology (3.2%). For the automotive sector, 
for example, the financed project is named «Automotive in Brazil, Eu-
roclean 2011» and this is one of the Regional Programmes under bricst 
2011-2013.
In this programme, the Emilia-Romagna regional administration, the 
Chambers of Commerce of Reggio Emilia and Modena, the Emilia Ro-
magna Empowering Italy Agency and the regional Chamber of Com-
merce promoted a diversified project to support the creation of trade 
relations and productive partnerships between firms in Emilia-Romag-
na and Russian companies in the Mechanical Engineering sector. This 
project is open to all companies active in the automotive industry at 
regional level (technology, materials, equipment, components, after-
market, etc.) and in Agricultural Engineering (machinery, equipment, 
technologies, etc.). 
Once again in 2012, the regional administration promoted the bricst 
programme 2013-2015 (with €30 million of regional funding) that in-
cludes another eleven countries, such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Mexico. 
New actors are involved in this programme, such as universities, trade 
associations and banks – and the key sectors indicated involve mechani-
cal engineering and the automotive industry.
In December 2012, the Region approved funding for 48 projects involv-
ing industrial research (€31.6 million, out of a total investment of €80 
million). A significant share was allocated to biomedical firms located 
in the earthquake area of 2012. As in previous cases, the mechanical 
engineering and automotive sectors play a key strategic role. At the 
end of February 2013, the Autonet-Transnational Network of Automo-
tive Regions was agreed and approved and co-financed by the European 
Regional Development Fund, of which the Reggio Emilia Province is a 
partner. This project seeks to promote process innovation in the automo-
tive sector and to encourage closer ties between universities and firms. 
The international partners are the Slovak Republic (project leader with 
the automotive cluster in West Slovakia), regional development agencies 
such as ComunImprese for the Emilia-Romagna region, the Polish Cham-
ber of Commerce of South Carpathia and other clusters from Slovenia, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Germany.
The initiatives described above show that the Emilia-Romagna re-
gional administration, together with other institutions and trade asso-
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ciations, has constantly pursued a policy of promoting access to foreign 
markets, establishing collaborative links between the world of research 
and private firms. This was possible because of the presence of research 
centres in Modena, Parma, Bologna and Reggio-Emilia which are spe-
cialised in the automotive sector.
The impressive nature of the initiatives that have been undertaken in 
Emilia-Romagna and in the other two Regions (see Table 2) show that, in 
collaboration with Chambers of Commerce and industrial associations, 
these actors have the potential to promote the internationalisation of 
enterprises and a closer relationship with the world of research. This 
is particularly important for small and medium-sized firms which often 
lack the resources necessary for sustaining R&D.
In conclusion, all (or almost all) of the industrial policies described 
above were emanated in order to support car component production in 
light of the absence of an assembly plant at regional level. Moreover, 
access to special forms of unemployment protection for surplus labour 
at the Mirafiori factory (initially justified by reorganisation and then by 
the effects of the crisis) do not appear to be justified by increased car 
production at this plant in the future. The production target of 50,000 
Maseratis by 2015 at the Grugliasco factory also appears ambitious, 
due to the high cost of the cars in question and the presence of many 
competitors in the luxury car market. These regional policies are thus 
coherent with a local context characterised by small and medium-sized 
firms; regional supports for R&D and export promotion are strongly 
focused on a production that is already «export-oriented production», 
due to the decline in national car production.
5 Can suppliers exist without large assembly plants?  
 Some final remarks on the Italian context
The Fiat group crisis is having extremely negative consequences for 
the car components sector in Italy, especially in the South. On the con-
trary, the greater autonomy of car component firms in the North from 
Fiat orders appears to be more effective in overcoming the effects of 
sectoral crisis. In Northen Italy, the initiatives undertaken by regional 
administrations, Chambers of Commerce and scientific research sys-
tems support both investment in innovation and internationalisation. 
In other words, the absence of significant new investments by Fiat 
in Italy, with the exception of Grugliasco (Maserati) and Melfi (produc-
tion of Chrysler-branded cars), Italy could be the first European case of 
a country with a strong tradition in the automotive sector which has a 
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Region Organism Action Period Description of the action
Piedmont Piedmont Region
Programme for 
productive activi-
ties for the period 
2011-2015
2012
Technological 
projects and 
initiatives for the 
automotive sector 
(30 million euro)
Piedmont Piedmont Region
Project
Electromobility+ 2011
Industrial re-
search on sustain-
able mobility (one 
million euro)
Piedmont
Chambre of 
Commerce 
of Turin
From concept to 
car 2003
Internationalisa-
tion of smes in the 
automotive sector 
and investment 
attraction 
Lombardy
University 
Politecnico 
of Milan 
and others
poli-auto 2009
Support the inter-
nationalisation of 
smes in the auto-
motive sector
Lombardy
Lombardy 
Region and 
Ministry of 
Education
Programme 
Agreement 2010
Industrial re-
search, pre-com-
petitive develop-
ment, advanced 
training
Emilia-
Romagna
Emilia-
Romagna 
Region
Automotive in 
Brasil, Euroclean 
2011
(Regional Pro-
gramme bricst)
2011
Internationalisa-
tion of smes in the 
automotive sector
Emilia-
Romagna
Emilia-
Romagna 
Region
Public funding 
programme 2012
Industrial re-
search
Emilia-
Romagna
Province 
of Reggio 
Emilia 
autonet project 
for a Transna-
tional Network 
of Automotive 
Regions (Europe 
Programme)
2013 Innovation 
Table 2. Framework of recent initiatives to support the automotive industry in Piedmont, 
Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna.
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solid car components industry, with good export capacity, even without 
growth in car manufacturing.
In Europe today, productive capacity is currently much higher than 
the market can absorb, and this is the main reason for the crisis that 
has hit producers of generalist cars. This is illustrated by the crisis in 
European markets in 2012 (except for Kia and Hyundai), within which 
Fiat represents an extreme.10 Undoubtedly, the decision by Fiat to delay 
production of new models has created uncertainty in almost all of the 
factories that form part of the group. With the exception of Pomigliano 
and Melfi, it is unlikely that more than four Fiat plants can be maintained 
with production levels below their Polish equivalents. The tendency 
is thus to produce for export and to scale down Italian production for 
segment B. In fact, if we limit our attention to the Panda model and the 
likely transfer of production of the substitute for the Punto, the risk of a 
drastic reduction in national automotive production is a serious one, as 
car production coincides with Fiat production in Italy.
Moreover, the decision by Fiat to transfer production of B-segment 
vehicles (e.g. the Fiat Punto) is another critical factor in the supply chain. 
In fact, the new models that will be produced in Melfi, Mirafiori and 
Grugliasco will have inferior volumes compared to the city car segment. 
In the coming years, the real risk is that the city-car market is increasing-
ly filled by non-Italian manufacturers, especially those from Korea and 
Japan. For example, the Chinese government recently declared the ob-
jective of concentrating 90% of car production amongst domestic manu-
facturers in order to increase export capacity in the international market.
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The crisis and the survival  
of the Italian automotive suppliers
Aldo Enrietti and Giuseppe Calabrese
abstract During the crisis started in 2008 several plants and businesses 
have closed down in the Italian supply chain. Such events have been reported 
by the press, but this does not provide a historical and comprehensive overview 
of the phenomenon. In fact, closures and bankruptcies are significant occur-
rences which have so far been overlooked: in the period under our investigation 
(2007-2011), almost 16% of the companies included in our sample went out of 
business. The aim of this preliminary paper is to analyse the transition from 
activity to inactivity of these firms. To sum up, the reorganisation of the Italian 
automotive supply chain seems to be characterised by a twofold trend: the mi-
cro enterprises are most heavily affected by the crisis and often expelled from 
the market, whereas the medium to large enterprises not only survive but also 
become financially stronger through the creation or expansion of industrial or 
financial groups. Furthermore, in terms of regional location, the effects have 
been stronger in the South of Italy.
1 Introduction
The Italian automotive industry has some peculiar characteristics 
when compared to other European countries. On the one hand, in Italy 
there is only one manufacturer of cars and industrial vehicles, the Fiat 
Group; on the other hand, Italy’s component manufacturing sector is 
among the most important in Europe, but it mainly comprises small and 
medium-sized companies and is quite heavily dependent on Fiat. 
The last ten years marked important changes in this historical condi-
tion, especially by the appointment of Sergio Marchionne as Fiat’s ceo: 
he represented a chance for a radical change in Fiat (Volpato 2011; Berta 
2006) after the death of Giovanni and Umberto Agnelli, the two leading 
figures of the Agnelli family. The most important one is the new start of 
internationalisation process after the failure, in 2005, of the agreement 
with gm signed in 2000; in fact, the matter became once again crucial 
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when the financial downturn of 2008 started to affect the automotive 
sector, since Fiat was considered too small in comparison to its competi-
tors (Volpato 2011). So, in 2008 the Group moved to pursue scale and 
scope economies through international mergers and acquisitions with 
the production target of 5-6 million units globally (Ciferri 2008). The 
strategy has been successful, also thanks to gaining control of Chrysler 
in 2009 (Balcet, Comisso, Calabrese 2013), but the production targets 
have not been met so far, as total production in 2012 was 4.2 million 
passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. Further steps towards 
internationalisation have been taken in Europe, with investments in 
Serbia, where the Fiat 500L is produced, and in Russia. 
The other main change is the crisis of the Italian car industry start-
ing from 2008, with a decrease of car production from 910,860 in 2007 
to 396,817 in 2012. When analysing this gloomy scenario, related to 
Fiat’s car production in Italy as well as to the general crisis spreading 
across Europe as a whole, it might be appropriate to wonder how this 
has affected the component manufacturers, considering that they have 
traditionally been strongly dependent on Fiat (Enrietti, Lanzetti, San-
lorenzo 2007; Enrietti, Whitford 2005; step various years). Contrary to 
expectations, Istat data on foreign trade and a number of researches 
(step various years, Enrietti et al. 2010) show that this sector has dis-
played a great ability to withstand the crisis. 
Nevertheless, the Istat data and researches do not shed light on a 
dramatic aspect which has characterized the recent years, i.e. the fact 
that several plants and businesses have closed down, especially due to 
bankruptcy.1 Instead the press has reported such events especially by 
regional daily newspapers, but this does not provide a historical and 
comprehensive overview of the phenomenon. 
In order to make up for this lack, the aim of this preliminary article 
is to analyse the most undesirable effects of the ongoing financial and 
industrial crisis by highlighting the transition from activity to inactiv-
ity of the Italian automotive suppliers due to: bankruptcy, compulsory 
liquidation, or voluntary closure.
Our empirical analysis should be framed into the literature on entry-
1. The 2012 Report of the Osservatorio sulla componentistica autoveicolare italiana 
mentions the matter for the first time: «Another consequence of this difficult phase in the 
markets is a drive towards changes and replacements in the production base. The Obser-
vatory has reviewed the enterprises included in the database, finding that 299 enterprises 
(out of around 2,700 enterprises in total) went out of business over a period of three years. 
In 2007, these enterprises still had a turnover of two billion euro» (step 2012, p. 44). Also, a 
research made by Enrietti and others in 2010 on Piedmont’s smes in the automotive sector 
highlighted that the data referred to enterprises which had survived the crisis.
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exit and firm survival. Agarwal and Gort (2002) pay attention on varia-
tions across firm mainly from learning-by-doing linked to the product 
and the firm life-cycle. Audretsch (1991) hypotheses that firms survival 
is related to the technological regime, especially the extent of scale 
economies and capital intensity. Cefis and Marsili (2005) focus not only 
on the inputs to the innovation process, such as R&D expenditure, but 
also on the impact of innovative performance on survival distinguishing 
between product and process innovation.
In this context, our contribution could represent an element of novelty 
as we address in particular firms’ features in terms of Darwinian survival 
of the fittest – size, location, specialisation, ownership, financial rating 
– in a special period such as the ongoing crisis.
The article is organised as follows: section 2 briefly describes the 
current crisis of Italian car industry and the structure and performance 
of the Italian manufacturers of automotive components; section 3 il-
lustrates the methodology used; lastly, section 4 presents the results 
emerging from the analysis.
2 The crisis of the Italian car industry  
 and the Italian automotive supply chain
The crisis started in 2008 and affecting most of Europe, but Fiat’s 
internationalisation strategy (by focusing on Chrysler and relocating 
part of its manufacturing from Italy to Serbia), and delays in upgrading 
the Italian portfolio of Fiat models have had a negative impact on the 
production levels of the Italian plants. In fact, the production of vehicles 
in general (cars, industrial vehicles, and buses, see Table 1) decreased by 
61.4% in the 2000-2012 period, dropping from 1,738,315 units in 2000 to 
671,768 units in 2012,2 even though differences can be detected within 
the sector. 
The production of cars decreased by an astounding 72.1%, whereas 
the production of industrial vehicles suffered less, and the commercial 
vehicles returned to almost pre-crisis levels. However, by considering 
the crisis years only (2007-2012), the production of cars decreased by 
57%, versus 26.3% for industrial vehicles.
The figure for buses, worse than that for cars, can be partly ascribed 
to the fact that the Iveco plant of Grottaminarda, dedicated to the pro-
duction of buses, was closed in 2012. 
2. If we consider only the last crisis (2007-2012), the total production decreased by 48%.
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The above data, in particular those concerning cars, only partially mir-
ror the general crisis of the European automotive industry,3 since they 
mostly refer to some specific features of the Italian situation: 
 - the weakness of Fiat’s production range in Italy, linked to the fact that 
models which have reached their end of life have not been replaced 
(among these, the Fiat Croma, the Fiat Idea, the Fiat Multipla, the Fiat 
Punto Classic, the Lancia Musa, and the Lancia Thesis); 
 - the closure of the Termini Imerese plant (Sicily), from where produc-
tion was moved to Poland, while the production of the new Panda was 
moved from Poland back to Italy (in Pomigliano plant);
 - a severe drop in car sales in the domestic market: from 2,495,115 
3. The production of cars in eu-15 went from 14,216,262 units in 2007 to 11,331,076 units 
in 2012, with a 20% drop.
 Cars Industrial vehicles Buses Total
No. Index No. Index No. Index No. Index
2000 1,422,284 100 312,868 100 3,163 100 1,738,315 100
2001 1,271,780 89.4 305,710 97.7 2,206 69.7 1,579,696 90.9
2002 1,125,769 79.2 298,715 95.5 2,597 82.1 1,427,081 82.1
2003 1,026,454 72.2 292,327 93.4 2,850 90.1 1,321,631 76.0
2004 833,578 58.6 305,451 97.6 3,076 97.2 1,142,105 65.7
2005 725,528 51.0 309,365 98.9 3,459 109.4 1,038,352 59.7
2006 892,502 62.8 316,225 101.1 2,867 90.6 1,211,594 69.7
2007 910,860 64.0 372,003 118.9 1,449 45.8 1,284,312 73.9
2008 659,221 46.3 363,209 116.1 1,344 42.5 1,023,774 58.9
2009 661,100 46.5 181,135 57.9 1,004 31.7 843,239 48.5
2010 573,169 40.3 263,952 84.4 1,065 33.7 838,186 48.2
2011 485,606 34.1 303,919 97.1 823 26.0 790,348 45.5
2012 396,817 27.9 274,466 87.7 489 15,6 671,768 38,6
Table 1. Italian vehicle production.
Source: Anfia.
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vehicles sold in 2007 (the year with the highest absolute sales) to 
1,402,986 in 2012, which corresponds to a 44% decrease (Table 2);
 - a limited tendency towards exporting vehicles produced in Italy, so 
that the weakness of the Italian market has not been offset by an in-
crease in its exportation, which has actually decreased by 54% (Table 
3), a figure higher than the decrease in production in Italy, i.e. -47%; 
 - the fact that the Italian plants are generally underutilized and work-
ers are temporarily laid off. On the basis of recent data (Ciferri 2013), 
the production capacity utilization of Fiat’s European plants in 2012 
was as follows (Table 4):
Years Passenger cars Index
2007 2,494,115 100
2008 2,161,359 86.7
2009 2,159,924 86.6
2010 1,962,042 78.7
2011 1,749,294 70.1
2012 1,402,986 56.3
Table 2. Passenger car sales in Italy.
Source: Anfia.
Years Passenger cars Index
2007 374,177 100
2008 279,670 74.7
2009 251,038 67.1
2010 231,557 61.9
2011 203,769 54.5
2012 174,514 46.6
Table 3. Passenger cars export.
Source: Anfia.
Plant Brands Production Capacity utilisation
Cassino, Italy Alfa, Fiat, Lancia 91,809 46%
Melfi, Italy Fiat 106,857 36%
Mirafiori, Italy Alfa, Lancia 46,809 17%
Pomigliano, Italy Fiat 155,822 74%
Tychy, Poland Fiat, Lancia, Ford 293,890 65%
Kragujevac, Serbia Fiat 23,830 13%
Bursa, Turkey Fiat, psa 189,680 63%
Table 4. Fiat plants capacity utilization.
Source: Ciferri (2013).
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The only positive event was Fiat’s decision to reopen the ex-Bertone 
plant in Grugliasco (Turin) as a site dedicated to the production of Ma-
serati vehicles.
When analysing this gloomy scenario, related to Fiat’s car produc-
tion in Italy as well as to the general crisis spreading across Europe as 
a whole, it might be appropriate to wonder how this has affected the 
component manufacturers but, preliminary, we to analyse the structure 
of the Italian component.
According to step (2012), the Italian component manufacturers gener-
ated a turnover of 41.8 billion euro in 2011 (45% exported) and employed 
179,000 workers for 2,500 firms. In 2012, the turnover is forecasted at 
37-38 billion euro, with a decrease between 10 and 12% on 2011 and the 
export decreasing from 19 to 18 billion euro (-5,3%)4.
The industry is still characterized by small size and high production 
fragmentation. As indicated by step (2012), small firms with less than 
50 employees are about 75% of the total (about 67% in Piedmont, the 
most important Italian region for this sector). Of course, this might 
be a weakness, because small firms are generally less innovative than 
medium-large firms. 
Production is concentrated in certain areas, with just under 40% of 
manufacturers located in Piedmont (step 2012).
The level of diversification towards other sectors is quite low: on the 
whole, 80% of the sales are made to the automotive sector (step 2011) 
and 35% to the sub-suppliers. Nevertheless, diversification changes 
across the various regions: it is higher in Emilia-Romagna, where firms 
focus not only on the automotive but also on the motorcycle and agricul-
tural vehicle sectors, as well as other sectors (Bardi, Calabrese 2007), 
while it is lower among Piedmont companies, mainly manufacturing for 
the Fiat Group (Enrietti et al. 2010). 
The automotive sector’s dependence on the Fiat Group (cars and 
industrial vehicles) is still high, about 55%, but it is decreasing. On the 
contrary, the firms’ export capacity is increasing: 
Within the sample of companies interviewed, exporters are now more numer-
ous than the firms which supply the Turin automotive group, both in Piedmont 
(where 84% of the enterprises are exporters and 79% supply the Fiat Group 
directly or indirectly) and in the rest of Italy (70% are exporters and 55% supply 
Fiat) [step 2012, pp. 37-38]. 
4. Ferrari M., Introduction to Convegno ANFIA, Quali prospettive per la componentistica 
italiana nel contesto internazionale? Limiti e opportunità, Turin, May 7, 2013.
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Table 5 shows the distribution of Italian automotive cluster according 
to its main areas of operation: manufactures of automotive modules and 
systems, manufactures of automotive parts (components), providers of 
materials and minor mechanical works (sub-suppliers) and providers 
of automotive design and engineering services (engineering & design). 
Most of the module and system suppliers are multinationals which 
have purchased plants from large domestic suppliers and adapted them 
to the tiered production system launched by Fiat Auto during the 1990s 
(Enrietti, Lanzetti, Sanlorenzo 1997; Rolfo, Vitali 2001). Nowadays, their 
dependence on Fiat Auto has decreased and they are selling to other car-
makers through their affiliated companies; consequently, many module 
and system suppliers seem to have downsized or closed their local R&D 
centres, as research is carried out at their headquarters.
The component manufacturers and sub-suppliers have a tendency to 
operate in a context of incremental innovation: for these firms innova-
tion is not a structured activity, rather, it is incremental, occurring on 
a daily basis and involving all aspects of the company. Nevertheless, 
the technological sophistication of component suppliers has constantly 
increased in order to meet the needs of their automotive customers. In 
the past they only provided generic materials, whereas they now tend 
to produce highly specialised products.
Engineering & design firms are concentrated in Piedmont (more than 
60%), but only few of them, such as Pininfarina, Giugiaro and Bertone, 
are known worldwide. However, Piedmont’s automotive cluster includes 
a large number of firms, even though most of them are very small and 
only a dozen have more than 100 employees (Calabrese 2010). 
The above overview describes the structure of the component sector 
in Italy, but let us now return to the main question of this article: how 
have automotive component manufacturers reacted to the crisis of Fiat 
in the first place and of the European automotive sector in general?
Istat data on foreign trade and recent researches carried out at the 
%
Modules, systems 6.0
Components 30.0
Sub-suppliers 52.0
Engineering & design 12.0
Total 100 Table 5. The Italian automotive cluster.Source: step 2012.
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national and regional level (step various years; Enrietti et al. 2010) high-
light the resilience of this sector and its ability to withstand the gener-
alised crisis. 
The data on foreign trade (Table 6) show that exports fell in 2009 but 
increased strongly in the following years, soon returning to the 2007 
levels. This, combined with a drop in import, led to an increase in the 
balance of trade.
step’s annual reports5 have repeatedly underlined that the sector’s 
ability to withstand the crisis can be ascribed for the most part to its 
exports that has counterbalanced the drop of the internal market (Fig-
ure 1). 
5. Made in collaboration with the Chambers of Commerce of Turin and Chieti and with 
anfia.
 Import Export Balance
2007 12,053,628,806 18,810,757,764 6,757,128,958
2008 11,748,249,439 18,556,695,690 6,808,446,251
2009 9,096,752,061 13,091,537,777 3,994,785,716
2010 10,663,844,408 16,466,904,961 5,803,060,553
2011 11,799,217,583 19,104,518,929 7,305,301,346
Table 6. 
International 
trade of 
components 
(euro).
Source: Anfia 
elaborations on 
Istat data.
Figure 1. The 
turnover of 
the Italian 
component 
industry (2005 
= 100)
Source: 
Aversa S. 
(AlixPartners), 
presentation 
to Convegno 
anfia, Quali 
prospettive 
per la 
componentistica 
italiana nel 
contesto 
internazionale? 
Limiti e 
opportunità, 
Turin, May 7, 
2013.
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Here are some remarks included in the 2012 report, referring to year 
2011: 
While the final national production decreased overall, positive results were 
mostly due to our companies’ ability to export. 77% of the companies included in 
the national sample […] managed to export, so that the share of revenues coming 
from abroad over the total turnover of the supply chain was equal to 57% […] At 
the same time, the companies’ dependence on Fiat is decreasing: within the sam-
ple of companies interviewed, exporters are now more numerous than the firms 
which supply the Turin automotive group, both in Piedmont (where 84% of the 
enterprises are exporters and 79% supply the Fiat Group directly or indirectly) 
and in the rest of Italy (70% are exporters and 55% supply Fiat) [pp. 37-38]. 
Therefore, within the Italian automotive supply chain, weaknesses in 
the domestic production of cars are partially offset by increases in exports, 
contrary to what happened for what concerns the manufacturing of cars.
3 Methodology, sample selection and description
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the most undesirable effects of 
the ongoing economic-financial crisis by highlighting the transition from 
activity to inactivity of the Italian automotive suppliers due to: bank-
ruptcy, compulsory liquidation, or voluntary closure.
To this end, a comprehensive picture of the Italian automotive sup-
ply chain before the beginning of the crisis (2008) was put together by 
merging different databases coming from previous empirical investiga-
tions made by Italian scholars (step, several years; Bardi, Garibaldo 
2005; Morsa, Pirone, 2010; Zirpoli, Stocchetti, Scattola 2012) and by the 
authors of this chapter (Enrietti, Lanzetti, Sanlorenzo 2007; Enrietti et 
al. 2010; Calabrese 2005).
The result can be considered an accurate representation of the total pop-
ulation of the Italian automotive supply chain.6 The sample includes 4,207 
firms and it is more comprehensive than other surveys (step 2012). Differ-
ences mainly consist in how the supply chain7 is defined and which types 
6. Nevertheless, the described methodology don’t allow an entry analysis because re-
searches in this field haven’t make about the Italian component industry and it wouldn’t 
be correct to study the new firms starting from the database of the Italian Network of 
Chambers of Commerce, as several Istat activities are related to the component industry 
and not all these firms belong to the automotive supply chain.
7. The automotive supply chain can be understood as including only companies whose 
core business is directly connected to car products or extended to companies belonging to 
functional sectors too.
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of companies, as to their liability, are considered. The sample is made up of 
72.6% limited-liability companies and 27.4% unlimited-liability companies.
The impossibility to cross-check the sample with the database of the 
Italian Network of Chambers of Commerce, in which all the companies 
are listed, caused the analysis to be restricted to the limited-liability 
companies included in the Aida8 database of Bureau van Dijk. This limita-
tion reduced the sample to 2,458 companies, but its spatial representa-
tiveness was preserved, since regional differences between the first and 
the second sample are minimal (Table 7).
Concerning the second sample, the first methodological step was 
to determine the legal status of the companies which were active in 
2007 and became inactive in the following years: 81.1% of the compa-
nies in the sample remained active, whereas 15.9% turned out to be in 
bankruptcy, in liquidation, or no longer existing. Furthermore, the Aida 
database made it possible to identify a further 3% of the sample made 
up of companies bought or incorporated by other companies. Since this 
subgroup includes a large number of companies and displays some spe-
cific features, it was decided to separate it from the other two.
The second step was to identify some explanatory variables which 
might be significantly correlated to the legal status of the companies 
belonging to the Italian automotive supply chain.
The selected variables are: regional location; company size; sector; 
ownership and original country ownership; static and dynamic strate-
gies in make or buy; and static and dynamic rating assessment. 
8. The Aida database mainly contains financial data on limited companies. Companies 
which are no longer active are included as well.
First sample Second sample
Piedmont 48.1 45.9
Lombardy 14.5 16.0
Veneto 6.5 6.8
Emilia-Romagna 8.4 8.7
Rest of Northern Italy 2.0 2.0
Central Italy 10.8 11.1
Southern Italy 9.8 9.5
Total 100 100
Table 7. Sample 
distribution by 
region before and 
after the analysis 
restriction (%).
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4 Empirical results
4.1 The study
As mentioned in the previous section, 15.9% of the companies in the 
sample became inactive within a five-year period, with 3-4% of compa-
nies closing down each year, a percentage which is slightly higher than 
that found by step (2012). Conversely, 81.1% of the companies were still 
active and filed their financial statements in 2011, as indicated by the 
Aida database. The remaining 3% of the sample underwent a process of 
financial concentration, thus increasing their economic and/or financial 
dimensions. 
The sample of companies divided in the groups illustrated above was 
cross-referenced with the selected variables in order to generate contin-
gency tables.9 This made it possible to ascertain the presence (connec-
tion) or absence (independence) of relations at a given level of signifi-
cance (Table 8). The chi-squared analysis shows that there is statistical 
significance for what concerns current legal status and size as well as, 
above all, geographical location, make or buy strategies, solvency risk, 
9. See the section below; due to missing values, in some contingency tables the percent-
ages of active, incorporated, and inactive companies might diverge slightly.
Total sample Without incorporated
Chi-squared test P-value Chi-squared test P-value
Regional location 17.8036 0.1218 15.7338 0.0153
Company size 48.7711 0.0000 36.8791 0.0000
Sector 17.6441 0.2235 8.2389 0.3120
Ownership 72.0114 0.0000 71.8167 0.0000
Original country ownership 5.1137 0.5293 0.2333 0.9720
Make or buy strategy 17.7723 0.0068 17.2941 0.0006
Sourcing strategy 27.8755 0.0000 25.9879 0.0000
Rating 328.0107 0.0000 315.5652 0.0000
Rating change 34.9022 0.0000 34.9037 0.0000
Table 8. Chi-squared test on contingency tables between legal status and some variables.
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and type of ownership. In the following sections, each chi-squared test 
will be specified and it will be analysed how these processes modified 
the scenario described in section 2. 
4.2 Regional location analysis
As already highlighted in Table 7, the geographical distribution of the 
companies in the sample was simplified by focusing on the regions which 
play a major role in the Italian automotive sector, such as Piedmont 
(45.9%), Lombardy (16.0%), Emilia-Romagna (8.7%) and Veneto (6.8%), 
while the remaining regions were grouped by homogeneous geographi-
cal areas: North (2.0%), Centre (11.1%) and South (9.5%). 
For what concerns the distribution of mean values, it can be observed 
that the location of the companies operating in this sector was modified 
by the economic crisis (Table 9), although in an unexpected way. Indeed, 
the highest frequency of closures and bankruptcies was not found in 
Piedmont (where inactive companies correspond to 14.4% of the sub-
group), undoubtedly the region most heavily hit by Fiat’s production 
crisis due to the presence of the Mirafiori plant. Instead, closures and 
bankruptcies occurred mostly in the South of Italy (22.6% of the sub-
group) – due to changes in production at the Fiat plant of Pomigliano 
(Naples, which ceased to produce the Alfa and began to manufacture the 
Fiat Panda) and to the closure of the Termini Imerese plant (Sicily) – and 
in Central Italy (18.8% inactive companies in the subgroup), where Fiat 
operates at the Cassino plant (Lazio). 
Active Incorporated Inactive Total
Piedmont 82.1 3.5 14.4 100
Lombardy 79.4 3.1 17.5 100
Veneto 84.4 1.8 13.8 100
Emilia-Romagna 86.5 2.8 10.7 100
Rest of Northern Italy 80.0 0.0 20.0 100
Central Italy 78.6 2.6 18.8 100
Southern Italy 74.8 2.6 22.6 100
Total sample 81.1 3.0 15.9 100
Table 9. Regional location of the Italian automotive supply chain.
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On the contrary, regions such as Veneto (13.8% of the subgroup) and, 
above all, Emilia-Romagna (10.7% of the subgroup) interestingly dis-
play the highest negative difference in comparison to the overall sam-
ple. The component sectors of these two regions have some specific 
features. Most companies located in Veneto do not work to supply Fiat 
Auto, whereas the Emilia-Romagna sector (Bardi, Calabrese 2007) is 
characterised by two key aspects: on the one hand, despite still being 
within Fiat’s sphere of influence, it does not manufacture components 
for mass-produced vehicles (since it supplies Ferrari and Maserati) or 
for motor vehicles (but, instead, for tractors); on the other hand, a large 
portion of its production is not within the Fiat Group.10
Nevertheless, the chi-squared test (17.8026) does not provide evi-
dence of a significant association between the two variables since the 
P-value (0.1218) is greater than the significance level of 0.05 probability. 
It becomes significant if incorporated companies are excluded.
As table 9 shows, the merger phenomena occurred more in Piedmont 
(3.5% of the subgroup) than in other regions. At this stage of the work, 
we can presume this is related to the characteristics of the Piedmont’s 
automotive supply chain: the companies are more dependent on Fiat 
business that has been heavily declining and, therefore, they need to 
achieve more economies of scale by merger and acquisition.
4.3 Company size analysis
The analysis performed in this chapter is based on the eu regulations 
which divide companies into three groups depending on their turnover: 
micro enterprises (less than 2 million euro and 35% of the sample); 
small enterprises (from 2 to 10 million euro and 36.4% of the sample); 
medium enterprises (from 10 to 50 million euro and 21% of the sample). 
Our investigation considers two additional subgroups, i.e. medium-large 
enterprises (from 50 to 300 million euro and 6.4% of the sample)11 and 
large enterprises (above 300 million euro and 1.1% of the sample).
As far as size is concerned, the companies display significantly dif-
ferent behaviours (Table 10). It clearly emerges that, at least until 2011, 
the companies most heavily hit by the crisis were the micro enterprises 
(21.1% of companies in this subgroup became inactive). In the other 
size classes, instead, this percentage is lower than the average and 
10. According to Istat data, in 2007 Veneto and Emilia-Romagna accounted for around 
23% of the Italian exports in the sector, whereas the South of Italy accounted for less than 
3%. 
11. The threshold of 300 million euro follows indications provided by Mediobanca.
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decreases progressively as the company size increases, until it reaches 
zero when companies with more than 300 million euro turnover are con-
sidered. Furthermore, only 4.5% of medium-large companies became in-
active. On the other hand, however, mergers and incorporations mostly 
involved the bigger companies, as confirmed by the higher percentages 
found in the larger size classes (7.1% of large enterprises).
The above figures indicate that a clear selection process occurred: 
over one fifth of the micro enterprises, which can be classed as marginal, 
were expelled from the market, whereas the medium to large enter-
prises not only survived but also became financially stronger through 
the creation or expansion of industrial or financial groups. 
The chi-squared test confirms the association between the two vari-
ables since the P-value (0.0000) is lower than the significance level of 
0.01, with or without the incorporated companies.
4.4 Sector analysis
A more detailed analysis of the automotive supply chain takes eight 
subgroups into account, in order to identify those companies whose core 
business is directly connected to automotive products – parts and com-
ponents (50.2% of the sample), rubber and plastic (7.7% of the sample), 
and electrical and electronics components (6.9% of the sample) – and 
those which belong to functional sectors: metal products (i.e. cold/hot 
plate pressing – 22.2% of the sample); basic metal (i.e. above all metal 
and alloy casting – 1.9% of the sample); machinery (i.e. machine tools, 
instrumental mechanics, electrical machines, die manufacturers – 7% of 
the sample); engineering houses (i.e. design, test, prototype construc-
tion – 1.8% of the sample); other suppliers (i.e. textile, leather, glass, and 
logistics – 2.4% of the sample).
Active Incorporated Inactive Total
Micro 77.0 1.9 21.1 100
Small 82.5 2.5 15.0 100
Medium 82.4 4.6 13.0 100
Medium-Large 89.8 5.7 4.5 100
Large 92.9 7.1 0.0 100
Total sample 81.1 3.0 15.9 100
Table 10. 
Company size 
of the Italian 
automotive 
supply chain.
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The chi-squared test (17.6441) indicates the independence between 
the two variables since the P-value (0.2235) is greater than the signifi-
cance level of 0.05, with or without the incorporated companies (0.3120). 
In fact, in the sectors directly linked to the production of cars there are 
no relevant differences among the various activities (Table 11): the pro-
pensity to become inactive is slightly higher in «parts and components» 
(16.7% of companies in this subgroup became inactive) and moderately 
lower in «plastic-rubber components» (12.2% of the subgroup). For what 
concerns the functional sectors, only in the «other suppliers» subgroup 
the share of companies which became inactive is considerably higher 
than the total sample average (27.6% of the subgroup).
As table 11 shows, a higher occurrence of merger phenomena is found 
in «basic metal» (8.5% of the subgroup) and «engineering houses» 
(6.7% of the subgroup).
4.5 Ownership analysis
The sample was analysed (Table 12) in relation to the type of parent 
company – natural person or family (66.9%), industrial company (26.5%), 
or financial company (6.6%) – and the nationality of the parent company 
– Italian (94.1%), European (5.1%), American (0.6%), and Asian (0.2%).
Active Incorporated Inactive Total
Parts and components 80.6 2.7 16.7 100
Electronic components 80.5 5.3 14.2 100
Plastic-rubber components 85.2 2.6 12.2 100
Total direct sectors 81.1 3.0 15.9 100
Metal products 83.0 1.8 15.2 100
Basic metal 76.6 8.5 14.9 100
Machinery 81.3 3.5 15.2 100
Engineering houses 80.0 6.7 13.3 100
Others 67.2 5.2 27.6 100
Total functional sectors 81.1 3.0 15.9 100
Total sample 81.1 3.0 15.9 100
Table 11. Sectors of the Italian automotive supply chain.
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The results displayed in Table 12 are particularly interesting for what 
concerns mergers and incorporations, which almost exclusively involved 
companies not controlled by a natural person and occurred only among 
European companies.
The chi-squared test (17.7723) shows divergent results. There is an 
association between type of ownership and legal status (P-value 0.0000) 
but not between original country ownership and legal status (P-value 
0.5293). This is due to the fact that enterprises controlled by an indus-
trial company had a higher propensity to become inactive (14.9% of the 
subgroup versus 13.9% of the total sample). Data on original country 
ownership do not provide significant evidence, besides the fact that no 
Asian companies became inactive or were incorporated.
As table 12 shows, merger phenomena were more common among the 
firms acquired by industrial companies and located in Europe (respec-
tively 7.2% and 5.9% of each subgroup).
4.6 Make or buy analysis
Make or buy activities are investigated from both a static and a dy-
namic point of view. The aim of the static analysis (Table 13) is to evaluate 
the performance of the firms according to their degree of outsourcing, 
whereas the dynamic analysis focuses on make or buy trends (Table 14). 
Active Incorporated Inactive Total
Natural person or family 85.8 0.8 13.4 100
Industrial company 78.0 7.1 14.9 100
Financial company 82.6 3.2 14.2 100
Total sample 83.5 2.6 13.9 100
Italy 83.5 2.5 14.0 100
Europe 79.8 5.9 14.3 100
America 85.7 0.0 14.3 100
Asia 100 0.0 0.0 100
Total sample 83.5 2.6 13.9 100
Table 12. Ownership and original country ownership of the Italian automotive supply 
chain.
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In the static analysis, the firms are split into four quartiles calculated 
on the basis of the ratio between internal costs and total operating costs 
incurred in 2007 and classified in ascending order as follows: highly de-
verticalised (ratio less than 17%), deverticalised (ratio less than 24.7%), 
integrated (ratio less than 35.2%), and highly integrated (ratio more 
than 35.2%). 
Although the chi-squared test (17.7723) shows the association be-
tween the two variables, since the P-value (0.0068) is less than the 
significance level of 0.05 with or without the incorporated companies 
(0.0006), verticalisation strategies do not have a direct correlation to 
legal status. The quartile of highly integrated companies is character-
ised by a higher share of inactive companies (20.9% of the subgroup); 
however, this is found, though to a lesser extent, also among highly 
deverticalised companies (16.9% of the subgroup)
In the dynamic analysis approach (Table 14), make or buy trends are 
calculated on the basis of the difference between the ratios of 2007 and of 
2005. The threshold value used to define changes in sourcing strategies 
is half of the mean absolute deviation (±0.029). If the difference between 
the ratio of 2007 and that of 2005 is higher than +0.029, then the firm 
adopted insourcing strategies (30.9% of the sample); if it is lower than 
-0.029, then the firm adopted outsourcing strategies (38.0% of the sample).
Active Incorporated Inactive Total
Highly 
deverticalised 80,1 3,0 16.9 100
Deverticalised 84,2 3,0 12,8 100
Integrated 83,7 3,5 12,8 100
Highly 
integrated 76,5 2,6 20,9 100
Total sample 81.1 3.0 15.9 100
Table 13. Make 
or buy strategy 
of the Italian 
automotive 
supply chain.
Active Incorporated Inactive Total
Outsourcing 79.4 3.6 17.0 100
No strategy 85.3 3.1 11.6 100
Insourcing 76.2 2.1 21.7 100
Total sample 81.3 3.0 15.7 100
Table 14. 
Sourcing 
strategies of 
the Italian 
automotive 
supply chain.
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Once again, the data are not univocal: the companies which became 
inactive belong to both the group that increased its outsourcing and 
the group that decreased it during the period considered. However, the 
biggest difference from the sample average is found among compa-
nies which increased their vertical integration (i.e. which reduced their 
outsourcing). It can be deduced that increases in internal costs had a 
negative impact on the companies, as also confirmed by the higher av-
erage share of companies which became inactive found in the «highly 
integrated» quartile.
Again, the chi-squared test (27.8755) shows the association between 
the two variables since the P-value (0.0000) is less than the significance 
level of 0.01, with or without the incorporated companies (0.0000).
4.7 Rating analysis
The rating assessment is also based on a static and dynamic approach. 
In the first case (Table 15), technical ratings were calculated using 
the cnr-Ceris software (Falavigna 2012). The sample was divided into 
Active Incorporated Inactive Total
aaa 87.6 6.2 6.2 100
aa 88.5 4.4 7.1 100
a 91.0 2.0 6.9 100
bbb 84.9 2.2 12.9 100
bb 77.1 1.8 21.1 100
b 62.7 4.3 33.0 100
ccc 40.8 2.0 57.1 100
Default 17.8 2.2 80.0 100
Total sample 81.1 3.0 15.9 100
Improved 81.7 3.1 15.3 100
Constant 84.4 2.8 12.7 100
Worsened 73.2 3.1 23.7 100
Total sample 81.2 3.0 15.8 100
Table 15. Rating 
and rating 
dynamics of the 
Italian automotive 
supply chain.
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the standard eight categories, from excellent to default (aaa 5.2% of 
the sample, aa 21.1%, a 15.9%, bbb 26.1%, bb 18.3%, b 9.5%, ccc 2.0%, d 
1.6%). In the dynamic analysis, the rating of 2007 is compared to that of 
2005: ratings improved for 21% of the companies in the sample, whereas 
they worsened for 23.4% of the companies.
In both the static and dynamic approach, the chi-squared test con-
firms the association between the two variables since the P-value is 
less than the significance level of 0.01, with or without the incorporated 
companies.
As expected, the higher the rating, the lower the percentage of inac-
tive companies. 80% of the firms with default rating and 57.2% of those 
with ccc rating in 2007 went bankrupt. However, about 7% of the com-
panies with upper-medium to high rating (at least a) went out of business, 
which means that their good financial situation did not prevent them 
from suffering the most undesirable effects of the ongoing economic-
financial crisis. 
A similar assessment of rating can be provided by adopting a dynamic 
approach. 23.7% of the companies with a worsening rating between 
2005 and 2007 became inactive. Nevertheless, 15.3% of the companies 
which improved their rating also became inactive. As further proof of 
how deep the ongoing economic crisis is, 8.5% of the companies which 
became inactive in 2007 had actually improved their rating, achieving 
a high or upper-medium grade (Table 16).
As table 15 shows, merger phenomena mostly occurred in firms with 
aaa or aa rating (respectively 6.2% and 4.4% of each subgroup).
Improved Constant Worsened Total
aaa 1.4 0.5 0.0 1.9
aa 4.1 4.6 0.8 9.5
a 3.0 2.7 1.1 6.8
bbb 5.9 10.8 4.9 21.6
bb 4.9 12.2 7.8 24.9
b 1.1 8.4 10.2 19.7
ccc 0.0 1.6 5.4 7.0
Default 0.0 3.8 4.8 8.6
Total sample 20.3 44.6 35.1 100
Table 16. 
Comparison 
between 2007 
rating and rating 
change in 2005-
2007 of inactive 
companies.
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5 Conclusions
The results presented in this chapter concerning the impact of the 
economic crisis on the Italian automotive supply chain are to be seen as 
preliminary evidence requiring further investigation, by using a larger 
number of explanatory variables and more comprehensive statistical 
methodologies. At this stage of the research, we address in particular 
firms’ features in terms of Darwinian survival of the fittest (Agarwal, 
Gort 2002): size, location, specialization, ownership, financial rating. 
The next step will be the analysis of technological and efficiencies vari-
ables in relation to survival of the automotive suppliers.
Nevertheless, these early results make it possible to interpret the 
reorganization which is currently underway in the Italian automotive 
sector.
Closures and bankruptcies are significant occurrences which have 
so far been overlooked. In the period under investigation (2007-2011), 
almost 16% of the companies included in the initial sample went out 
of business. However, considering that 2012 was the worst year of the 
period in terms of both macroeconomic and sector indicators, it is rea-
sonable to assume that, following the current trend, at least another 4% 
of companies might have become inactive, so that the total is likely to 
be around 20%.
In other words, around one fifth of the companies which were active 
in 2007 became inactive in the following five-year period. Nevertheless, 
this figure is probably an underestimation of the actual extent of the 
phenomenon. Micro enterprises display a higher propensity to become 
inactive, but our sample includes only joint stock companies and not 
partnerships, which are by definition of very small size. Therefore, if 
our data are related to the actual overall situation, the percentage of 
closures is likely to be well above 20%.
As mentioned above, inactivity heavily affected above all the micro 
enterprises (which represent 46.5% of the total sample), regardless 
of their solvency risk. Indeed, if the inactive companies are divided 
according to their rating classes, the share of micro companies which 
became inactive is higher than the sample average, both for those with 
a near-default rating and for those with a rating equal to or higher than 
a (respectively 60.9% and 56.9% of each subgroup). 
The chi-squared analysis shows that there is statistical significance 
for what concerns current legal status and size as well as, above all, 
geographical location, make or buy strategies, solvency risk, and type 
of ownership. 
The crisis does not seem to have affected all the geographical areas 
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uniformly. Its effects have been stronger in the South of Italy, confirming 
that the enterprises located in these regions have suffered from isola-
tion and, in most cases, the network of suppliers has not been able to 
create an autonomous market for itself, independent of Fiat (Bubbico, 
Pirone 2006).
As far as make or buy strategies are concerned, the crisis has had a 
more limited impact on the enterprises which fall into the intermediate 
categories in relation to both their degree of verticalisation and changes 
in their sourcing strategies.
A more in-depth analysis should be performed on the companies which, 
during the period under investigation, were incorporated by other com-
panies (these represent around 3% of the sample). This phenomenon 
concerned above all the larger companies, which were mostly taken over 
by industrial or financial companies. 
Hence, the reorganization of the Italian automotive supply chain 
seems to be characterised by a twofold trend: the micro enterprises 
are the most heavily affected by the crisis and often expelled from the 
market, whereas the medium to large enterprises not only survive but 
also become financially stronger through the creation or expansion of 
industrial or financial groups.
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